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I consider whether a privately informed incumbent can use limit pricing and upward distortions in advertising to deter profitable entry. Profitable entry is not deterred when the incumbent is privately informed only about its cost type. Profitable entry may be deterred, however, if the incumbent is privately informed about its cost type and its patience level. An equilibrium foundation is thus provided for the traditional hypothesis that limit pricing and aggressive advertising by an incumbent may deter profitable entry. At a methodological level, the article contributes by characterizing the refined equilibria of a signalling model with multiple dimensions of private information and multiple signals.

I present a dynamic model of price determination in customer markets that are subject to exogenous business cycle fluctuations. The business cycle is described in terms of a Markov process, in which market demand alternates stochastically between fast growth (boom) and slow growth (recession) phases. In the consumers' preferred equilibrium outcome, (1) prices are below the monopoly level, and (2) prices are countercyclical when demand growth rates are positively correlated through time. A firm faces a dynamic trade‐off when making its current price selection. While a higher price may raise a firm's profit in the short term, it also may diminish the firm's reputation for low prices, leading to lower profits in the future.

We characterize the design of an optimal trade agreement when governments are privately informed about the value of tariff revenue. We show that the problem of designing an optimal trade agreement in this setting can be represented as an optimal delegation problem when a money burning instrument is available. In a specification with quadratic payoffs and a uniform distribution, we find that the tariff cap and the probability of binding overhang are higher when the upper bound of the support distribution is higher and when the support distribution has greater width.