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"Annette C. Baier is one of David Hume's most sensitive and insightful readers. In The Cautious Jealous Virtue, she deepens our understanding of Hume by examining what he meant by "justice." In Baier's account, Hume always understood justice to be closely linked to self-interest (hence his description of it in An Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals as "the cautious jealous virtue"), but his understanding of the virtue expanded over time, as evidenced by later works, including his History of England." "Along with justice, Baier investigates the role of the natural virtue of equity (which Hume always understood to constrain justice) in Hume's thought, arguing that Hurne's view of equity can serve to balance his account of the artificial virtue of justice. The Cautious Jealous Virtue is an illuminating meditation that will interest not only Hume scholars but also those interested in the issues of justice and in ethics more generally."--BOOK JACKET

The author presents a series of new and recent essays in ethics, broadly conceived to include both engagements with other philosophers and personal meditations on life. The author's unique voice and insight illuminate a wide range of topics. In the public sphere, she enquires into patriotism, what we owe future people, and what toleration we should have for killing. In the private sphere, she discusses honesty, self-knowledge, hope, sympathy, and self-trust, and offers personal reflections on faces, friendship, and alienating affection

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Abbreviations -- Preface -- 1 Philosophy in This Careless Manner -- 2 Other Relations: The Account of Association -- 3 Customary Transitions from Causes to Effects -- 4 Necessity, Nature, Norms -- 5 The Simple Supposition of Continued Existence -- 6 Persons and the Wheel of Their Passions -- 7 The Direction of Our Conduct -- 8 The Contemplation of Character -- 9 A Catalogue of Virtues -- 10 The Laws of Nature -- 11 The Shelter of Governors -- 12 Reason and Reflection -- Chronology -- Notes -- Index

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Preface -- Abbreviations -- I EASY AND OBVIOUS -- 1 Acting in Character -- 2 Impersonation, the Very Idea -- 3 Hume's Excellent Hypocrites -- 4 Hume's Treatment of Oliver Cromwell -- 5 Hume and the Conformity of Bishop Tunstal -- 6 Hume's Deathbed Reading: A Tale of Three Letters -- II MORE DIFFICULT AND ABSTRUSE -- 7 Hume's Impressions and His Other Metaphors -- 8 The Life and Mortality of the Mind -- 9 Hume's Labyrinth -- 10 A Voice, as from the Next Room -- 11 The Energy in the Cause -- 12 Hume's Post-Impressionism -- 13 Why Hume Asked Us Not to Read the Treatise -- Conclusion Hume's Curriculum Vitae: His "Own Life," Written by Himself -- Index of Persons -- Subject Index

Should a "caring" immigration policy give special treatment to would-be immigrants who are near neighbors? It is argued that, while those on our borders requesting entry have some special claim, it should not drown out the claims of more distant applicants for citizenship.

David Hume has been invoked by those who want to found morality on human nature as well as by their critics. He is credited with showing us the fallacy of moving from premises about what is the case to conclusions about what ought to be the case; and yet, just a few pages after the famous is-ought remarks in A Treatise of Human Nature, he embarks on his equally famous derivation of the obligations of justice from facts about the cooperative schemes accepted in human communities. Is he ambivalent on the relationship between facts about human nature and human evaluations? Does he contradict himself – and, if so, which part of his whole position is most valuable?Between the famous is-ought passage and the famous account of convention and the obligations arising from established cooperative schemes once they are morally endorsed, Hume discusses the various meanings of the term "natural." "Shou'd it be ask'd, Whether we ought to search for these principles [upon which all our notions of morals are founded] in nature or whether we must look for them in some other origin? I wou'd reply, that our answer to this question depends upon the definition of the word, Nature, than which there is none more ambiguous and equivocal." (T. 473–74) The natural can be opposed to the miraculous, the unusual, or the artificial. It is the last contrast that Hume wants, for his contrast between the "artificial" culturally variant, convention-dependent obligations of justice and the more invariant "natural virtues," and what he says about that contrast in this preparation for his account of the "artificial" virtues, makes it clear why he can later refer to justice as "natural" and to the general content of the rules of justice – that is, of basic human conventions of cooperation – as "Laws of Nature" (T. 484).

Abstract
Maclntyre's contrast between contemporary individualist versions of morality, expressive of arbitrary selfwill, and some less willful or less arbitrary moral guidance, is queried. All social practices, both those Maclntyre disapproves of and those he prefers, are claimed to contain elements of arbitrariness, and some scope for the expression of some individual human wills. Maclntyre's neglect of the question of what allocation of power a particular practice or set of practices involves is contrasted with Hume's due but not undue attention to this matter. Maclntyre's treatment of Hume's place in the history of the Aristotelian conception of the moral life as cultivation of virtues is criticized and tentatively explained as really due not to Hume's anti-rationalism, but to his acceptance of the political and commercial practices which Maclntyre distrusts, and to his rejection of the non-Aristotelian religious concepts of other-worldly goods, sin and redemption from it, which Maclntyre wants added on to Aristotle's moral theory.