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Cover -- Half Title -- Title -- Copyright -- Contents -- Preface -- Introduction -- Chapter-by-Chapter Summary -- 1 Chemical Weapons Inspections -- Iraqi Chemical Weapons Capabilities -- UNSCOM Chemical Weapons Inspections -- Lessons Relevant to Inspections Implementation -- Lessons Regarding Ability to Detect Noncompliance -- Conclusion -- 2 Biological Weapons Inspections -- The Iraqi BW Program -- The UNSCOM Missions -- Iraqi Behavior During the BW Inspections -- Lessons Learned for Verification -- Conclusion -- 3 Nuclear Weapons Inspections -- The Iraqi Nuclear Program -- UNSCOM/IAEA Inspections -- Iraq's Concealment and Deception Activities -- Conclusion -- 4 Ballistic Missile Inspections -- Iraqi Ballistic Missile Capabilities -- UNSCOM Missile Inspections -- Lessons Relevant to Inspections Implementation -- Lessons Regarding Ability to Detect Noncompliance -- Conclusion -- 5 Iraqi Circumvention of Export Controls -- Nuclear Export Controls and Circumvention -- Missile Technology Controls and Circumvention -- Chemical Export Controls and Circumvention -- Biological Weapons and Export Controls -- Conclusion -- 6 Summary -- Notes -- Appendix A: List of UNSCOM Inspections and Sites -- Appendix B: United Nations Security Council (UNSC) Resolution 687 -- Appendix C: UNSC Resolution 707 -- Appendix D: UNSC Resolution 715 -- About the Book and Author -- Index.

This book examines the components of the nuclear non-proliferation regime and policies which have been suggested as means to strengthen it. It discusses alternatives that might lower the likelihood of further proliferation and help reduce the nuclear arms and capabilities of proliferant states.

Examines Saddam Hussein's weapons of mass destruction capabilities, leadership values and potential use of such weapons, and possible impact of its WMD capabilities on US behavior. Atomic, biological, and chemical weapons, guided missiles including the "Al Hussein" and modified SA2 "Volga" SAM, and unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs).

Pressures are mounting for a regime to verify the dismantlement of US and Russian warheads, as well as a system of international control over the weapons' fissile materials to assure irreversibility. There are at least four motivating factors for these measures: • As the United States and Russia lower their numbers of nuclear weapons, each side seeks assurance that the warheads are actually being dismantled. • By accounting for the fissile materials and placing them under effective controls, the potential for smuggling and theft is reduced. • A fissile materials cutoff is being discussed at the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva. Verification of a US-Russian cutoff, as well as substantial reductions in fissile materials stockpiles, are seen as integral to the cutoff. • Calls for total nuclear disarmament have greatly increased. Dismantlement verification and international control of fissile materials are widely viewed as requisite steps toward this goal. There are many questions to be answered before the United States can agree to a warhead verification regime and international control over excess fissile materials, let alone total nuclear disarmament. Two of the most important are: What are the prospects for effective verification? and How much fissile material can be declared as excess, and possibly be, given over to international control? These topics - compliance weaknesses and excess materials - are the focus of this paper. ; Naval Postgraduate School ; United States Strategic Command ; U.S. Department of Energy ; Contract no. W-7405-Eng-48 (DOE)