Suchergebnisse

AbstractAt the end of the Second World War, millions of men, women, and children shared a similar experience: delousing, at the hands of Allied armies and relief agencies, to prevent the spread of infectious disease. The procedure lasted seconds. In studies of displaced populations in this period, its effects upon them are commonly presented as invasive, humiliating, and, for some, reminiscent of Nazi abuse. Adopting a wider lens, this article explores how events and developments in a global range of settings shaped demands for effective delousing as well as the character of measures devised to achieve it. Harnessing fresh perspectives on how delousing was managed, delivered, and experienced, the article also advances understanding of how refugees responded to it.

A prominent feature in the historiography of Anglo-American special operations during WWII has been the concept of "competitive cooperation." The Balkans, in particular, where both nations initially agreed that GB should call the shots, proved a battleground for diverging British & US policies on which guerrilla movements deserved support. Recently declassified, the Balkan files of GB's Special Operations Executive confirm that SOE, in line with the Foreign Office, sought to resist excessive interference by the American Office of Strategic Services just as OSS sought greater involvement. Yet care must be taken not to exaggerate the scope of this friction & the geographical area affected. Indeed, there is a danger of attention being diverted from operational failings & weaknesses in the field. Contrary to the claims of the official OSS historian, SOE was not responsible for the limited involvement & achievements of OSS in the mountains & forests of Albania. Adapted from the source document.