By exploring the many differing conceptions of security, this study explains how the idea of security in world affairs can be understood in relation to other ideas and points of view. It tackles the key questions in the debate such as: What norms of sovereignty relate to security? Does security necessarily follow from the recognition of identity?
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This is an accessible new examination of what 'security' means today, contextualizing the term amongst other key ideas, such as the nation state, diplomacy, war and autonomy. By exploring the many differing conceptions of security, this study clearly explains how the idea of security in world affairs can be understood in relation to other ideas and points of view. It shows how, when standing alone, the word 'security' is meaningless, or just an empty term, when divorced from other ideas distinctive to international life. This essential new volume tackles the key questions in the deba.
This innovative study rescues the normative discourse of trusteeship from the obscurity into which it has fallen since decolonization. It traces the development of trusteeship from its emergence out of debates concerning the misrule of the East India Company
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AbstractThis article takes up Louise Arbour's claim that the doctrine of the 'Responsibility to Protect' is grounded in existing obligations of international law, specifically those pertaining to the prevention and punishment of genocide. In doing so, it argues that the aspirations of the R2P project cannot be sustained by the idea of 'responsibility' alone. The article proceeds in arguing that the coherence of R2P depends on an unacknowledged and unarticulated theory of obligation that connects notions of culpability, blame, and accountability with the kind of preventive, punitive, and restorative action that Arbour and others advocate. Two theories of obligation are then offered, one natural the other conventional, which make this connection explicit. But the ensuing clarity comes at a cost: the naturalist account escapes the 'real' world to redeem the intrinsic dignity of all men and women, while the conventionalist account remains firmly tethered to the 'real' world in redeeming whatever dignity can be had by way of an agreement. The article concludes by arguing that the advocate of the responsibility to protect can have one or the other, but not both.
AbstractThis article takes as its starting point the failure of the so-called normative wing of the English School to theorise the foundational determinants of value from which international society derives its normative character. In other words, they have not adequately thought through 'the law behind the law'; that is, the underlying basis of obligation in international life. Thus, English School theorists are able to describe and to explain various norms but they cannot make sense of the reasons why any of these norms should be regarded as obligatory. Failure in this regard is attributable in large part to the way in which pluralist and solidarist conceptions of international life are typically understood as representing conflicting moral claims. This article seeks to move beyond these seemingly incommensurable claims, and the debate to which they give their names, by putting forward an account of obligation that reconciles the unity of human community and the freedom of international society in a single, intellectually coherent argument. The article concludes by arguing that a normative version of English School theory formulated in this way opens space for thinking through much of what still confounds the English School, including the normative character of political economy, the existence of a rational order of values, and the ever elusive meaning of world society.