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Abstract
This article elaborates an account of political theology that is both historical and critical in orientation. Whereas the historical dimension excavates theological antecedents that inform the vocabulary of international relations, the critical dimension illuminates incoherence in accepted ways of thinking and speaking about the subject. The article develops these distinct, though complementary, modes of argument to illustrate what political theology contributes to the study of international relations. Part one situates the historical mode within the broader discourse of political theology, followed in part two by a consideration of the marginal place of political theology in international relations scholarship. Part three re-reads the exception—extraordinary action that contravenes established legal or moral order—to illustrate what is at stake when analogies between divine and human deviate from the theological original. This, in turn, unlocks in part four a critical project that subverts the ubiquitous contrast between irrational (religious) belief and rational (secular) unbelief and the privilege it asserts. Political theology conceived along these lines breaks free of the parochialism of the present by denaturalizing a matrix of international relations knowledge that is anything but natural.

Theology is a neglected resource in international relations scholarship; it is, more often than not, characterised as a threat to political order because it is seen as a cradle of fanaticism and irrationality. Postsecular scholarship challenges this view by exploring the persistence of theological ideas and religious belief in political discourse and practice. Political Theology of International Order is my own contribution to this type of scholarship. This article engages responses from five distinguished scholars. It considers the implications of taking theology seriously when theorising international order; the veracity of narratives that frame the study of international relations; and new directions and possibilities that arise out of the book.

This article elaborates an account of political theology that is both historical and critical in orientation. Whereas the historical dimension excavates theological antecedents that inform the vocabulary of international relations, the critical dimension illuminates incoherence in accepted ways of thinking and speaking about the subject. The article develops these distinct, though complementary, modes of argument to illustrate what political theology contributes to the study of international relations. Part one situates the historical mode within the broader discourse of political theology, followed in part two by a consideration of the marginal place of political theology in international relations scholarship. Part three re-reads the exception—extraordinary action that contravenes established legal or moral order—to illustrate what is at stake when analogies between divine and human deviate from the theological original. This, in turn, unlocks in part four a critical project that subverts the ubiquitous contrast between irrational (religious) belief and rational (secular) unbelief and the privilege it asserts. Political theology conceived along these lines breaks free of the parochialism of the present by denaturalizing a matrix of international relations knowledge that is anything but natural.

This article reflects on themes of continuity and change over the past century of international relations. In 1919 the victors of the First World War endeavoured to remake international relations by abolishing war and erecting institutional structures that were intended to promote a more just world order. The achievements and failures of this project can be discerned in overlapping patterns of continuity and change that portray a world that is at once old and new. The discourse of change tends to dominate thinking about international relations. Technological innovation, globalisation, and human rights, among other factors, cultivate the progressive 'one-worldism' of an interconnected global community of nations and peoples. But, evidence of change notwithstanding, much of contemporary international relations would be intelligible to persons who lived a century ago. International relations is still fundamentally about order and security, power and restraint, and freedom and equality. These patterns provide an important reminder that progress is possible but that international relations involves an open-ended project of continuous renovation and conservation.

Scholars of international relations generally invoke Hobbes as the quintessential theorist of international anarchy. David Armitage challenges this characterisation, arguing that Hobbes is regarded as a foundational figure in international relations theory in spite of as much as because of what he wrote on the subject. Thus, for Armitage, Hobbes is not the theorist of anarchy that he is made out to be. This article agrees with the general thrust of Armitage's critique while maintaining that it is still possible to imagine Hobbes as a theorist of anarchy. Hobbes is a theorist of anarchy, not in a political sense, but in a metaphysical sense. This conception of anarchy is a reflection of a comprehensive theological account of reality that is grounded in an omnipotent God. Any historical inquiry into the foundations of modern international thought must take account of theology, because theology defines the ultimate coordinates of reality in terms of which the concepts of international thought are intelligible. [Copyright Elsevier Ltd.]

AbstractThis article takes up Louise Arbour's claim that the doctrine of the 'Responsibility to Protect' is grounded in existing obligations of international law, specifically those pertaining to the prevention and punishment of genocide. In doing so, it argues that the aspirations of the R2P project cannot be sustained by the idea of 'responsibility' alone. The article proceeds in arguing that the coherence of R2P depends on an unacknowledged and unarticulated theory of obligation that connects notions of culpability, blame, and accountability with the kind of preventive, punitive, and restorative action that Arbour and others advocate. Two theories of obligation are then offered, one natural the other conventional, which make this connection explicit. But the ensuing clarity comes at a cost: the naturalist account escapes the 'real' world to redeem the intrinsic dignity of all men and women, while the conventionalist account remains firmly tethered to the 'real' world in redeeming whatever dignity can be had by way of an agreement. The article concludes by arguing that the advocate of the responsibility to protect can have one or the other, but not both.