Electromagnetic Pulse Resilience of United States Critical Infrastructure: Progress and Prognostics
In: Journal of critical infrastructure policy: JCIP, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 35-46
ISSN: 2693-3101
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In: Journal of critical infrastructure policy: JCIP, Band 2, Heft 1, S. 35-46
ISSN: 2693-3101
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 2, Heft 2, S. 360-361
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 1, Heft 3, S. 493-494
ISSN: 1538-165X
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 347-347
ISSN: 1538-165X
The United States (US) Department of Defense (DoD) Electromagnetic Pulse (EMP) protection standard offers a solid basis for protecting commercial communication, data, and control facilities. Because of the standard's shielded barrier and test requirements, it is not surprising that there is a strong temptation within industry and government to dismiss the MIL-STD 188-125 approach in favor of less rigorous protection methods. It is important to understand that US DoD EMP protection standard for fixed facilities, MIL-STD-188-125, reflects an evolution by trial and error that spanned a period of decades beginning with the acquisition of the Minuteman Missile System in the 1960s. In fact, one of the main motivating factors for developing the standard was that system developers in the Air Force, Army, Navy, and Defense Communications Agency (now Defense Information Systems Agency) and the Federal Emergency Management Agency tried less technically-sound approaches that failed in their effectiveness, testability, and maintainability. This paper revisits the development of the US DoD standard and explains its provisions and underlying technical rationale. The paper's objective is to enable the public officials and engineers involved in planning and implementing EMP protection for critical infrastructure facilities to avoid the pitfalls encountered in the past and use the best practices available to achieve low risk protection designs that can be maintained over the entire lifecycle of critical infrastructure systems.
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The presentation emphasizes the growing importance of electromagnetic survivability and compatibility. Operation Desert Storm demonstrated the clear military advantage provided by sophisticated electronic weapon and communication systems. In addition, the offensive tactic of taking out the enemy's eyes and ears during the air war paid off, giving our military decisive air superiority. The lessons for the future are clear. High-tech electronics now so dominates the battlefield that the outcome of future conflicts could well be decided by electronics attrition rather than human casualties. Our Desert Storm experience thus accentuates the importance of guaranteeing that our electronic systems will not be disabled either deliberately or accidentally by electromagnetic environmental effects. Factors which pose implementation challenges and problems are addressed. The increasing use of commercial equipment in military applications will require that commercial and military standards be integrated to some degree. While many technical questions will need to be resolved, the major challenges are associated with organization and process given the large number of technical disciplines and organizations involved in electromagnetic effects issues. The presentation concludes by proposing a top-level solution path. Recognizing the growing importance of electronics survivability, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (J6) has requested and the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition has tasked the development of Combined Battlefield Environmental Effects (CBEE).
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In: Journal of homeland security and emergency management, Band 3, Heft 4
ISSN: 1547-7355
In: Journal of Homeland Security and Emergency Management, Band 3, Heft 4, S. [np]
The government of North Korea has declared high-altitude EMP-capability to be a "strategic goal" and has also threatened an atmospheric test of a hydrogen bomb. Atmospheric nuclear tests have the potential to cripple satellites and the undersea cable networks critical to communication, and navigation necessary for trans-Pacific trade among the U.S., China, and other nations. When a nuclear warhead is detonated at high altitude, a series of electromagnetic pulses radiate downward within the line of sight of the blast. These pulses can disable equipment with miniature electronics and long conductors. Electric grid controls and transmission systems are especially vulnerable. Intense X-rays and free electrons caused by high-altitude nuclear tests can also disable satellites over large regions of space. After the 1962 Starfish Prime test of EMP effects by the U.S, numerous satellites failed. Based on past missile tests, calculated delivery ranges, EMP coverage areas, and geography, Resilient Societies developed five scenarios for North Korean atmospheric tests. Possible sites for EMP tests include the South Pacific Ocean northeast of French Polynesia, Johnson Atoll southwest of Hawaii, and vicinity of the U.S. territory of Guam. Missile trajectories for all three of these EMP test scenarios overfly populated areas. Missile navigation or nuclear device fuzing errors could place the populations of Japan, Guam, and Hawaii are at risk. All potential EMP test locations could cause disruption to international satellite and undersea cable communications networks. North Korea should not be permitted to conduct an atmospheric nuclear tests since EMP effects on large networks necessary for electric power and international data sharing could have serious worldwide consequences due to the importance of Asia and the Pacific region to the global economy. In the regrettable event that North Korea chooses to conduct atmospheric nuclear tests, U.S. and allied monitoring of EMP effects will be helpful.
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