Suchergebnisse

From the outset of her existence, Italy was the bête noire of the successor state of Yugoslavia created on the ruins of Austria-Hungary after the Great War. A historical claim on Dalmatia populated by Yugoslavs remained a watchword of Italian nationalists despite the territorial settlement reached between the two countries in Rapallo in 1920 and Rome's acquisition of the town of Fiume in 1924 as part of the Italo-Yugoslav treaty of friendship in 1924 (Pact of Rome). The Italians based their territorial ambitions on what the Entente Powers had granted them on the eastern coast of the Adriatic by the 1915 Treaty of London, but had not fully materialized at the end of the war. Moreover, for Italy, the very existence of Yugoslavia was an obstacle for its grandiose plans for political domination in the Balkans and the Danube region. The animosity towards Belgrade was made more pronounced on account of Yugoslavia's friendly relations with France and membership of the anti-Hungarian Little Entente, together with Czechoslovakia and Romania, which Rome perceived as an instrument of French security system in post-war Europe. For that reason, Yugoslavia became central to Mussolini's rivalry with France over predominance in South-Eastern Europe, which made her importance in international relations far exceed her economic and military capabilities

This paper details the entry of the Serbian army into Bosnia and Herzegovina in the concluding stage of the Great War, after the breakthrough of the Salonica (Macedonian) front. It examines the interaction of the Serbian army with the newly established authorities in the province, in Sarajevo and on the local level, in the vacuum brought about by the collapse of the Habsburg regime, and the order and peace keeping to which the presence of Serbian soldiers was crucial. On the basis of military records, the paper challenges the conventional wisdom about the creation of Yugoslavia by shedding additional light on the attitude of the three Bosnian-Herzegovinian religious and ethnic communities towards the Yugoslav unification realised in Belgrade on 1 December 1918.

The Yugoslav prime minister (and foreign minister), Milan Stojadinović, and Italian for-eign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, signed a friendship agreement on 25 March 1937, ush-ering in an atmosphere of confidence between the two formerly hostile countries. This rapprochement resulted from the changing international constellation: the resurgent Ger-many was expected to annex Austria and become a powerful neighbour to both countries. Ciano and Stojadinović struck close personal relations which no doubt buttressed the so-lidity of their agreement. Moreover, Ciano believed that Stojadinović was inclined towards authoritarian concept of power. There were also increasing signs that the Stojadinović regime was acquiring some fascist trappings in line with the new course of foreign policy. Indeed, Prince regent, Paul, dropped Stojadinović from the government in February 1939 because he came to believe that his premier was intent on becoming a fascist dictator. This paper will explore whether there was substance to the often repeated accusations that Stojadinović was sliding towards fascism. Much of these accusations were centred on his foreign policy, especially his cordial relations with the fascist regime in Italy and, to a lesser extent, with Nazi Germany. Therefore, this paper will analyse, on the one hand, to what extent Stojadinović aligned Yugoslavia's conduct of foreign affairs with Rome's foreign policy and, on the other, to what degree the Yugoslav-Italian rapprochement was reflected in internal developments which might smack of fascism. The analysis will be un-dertaken with reference to the recent and influential theories of fascism.

This paper examines in broad lines the relations between Great Britain and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia) throughout the two interwar decades of the latter country's existence. The survey shows that Yugoslavia was the most important country in the Balkans and thus commanded serious attention of British diplomacy, since Yugoslav foreign policy had an impact on Great Power rivalries in South-Eastern Europe incommensurate with her size and actual strength. While Yugoslavia constantly sought security for her borders, the Foreign Office wanted to see her as a pillar of peace and stability in the region. With her permanent troubles with hostile neighbors, most notably Italy, and internal tensions, the main of which was Croat discontent, this was a difficult undertaking for the Belgrade government. The Foreign Office had a good deal of sympathy for Yugoslavia in dealing with her difficulties, but it was also highly critical of Belgrade's inefficient and corrupt administration. In foreign affairs, Britain often took a dim view of what it perceived as Yugoslavia's conduct of foreign policy that ran contrary to British policy of all-round appeasement in South-Eastern Europe and later, in the latter half of the 1930s, containment of Nazi Germany. This would eventually lead to British involvement in the 27 March 1941 coup d'état in Belgrade which embroiled Yugoslavia in the Second World War. Keywords: Yugoslavia, Great Britain, Anglo-Yugoslav relations, interwar period

The Yugoslav prime minister (and foreign minister), Milan Stojadinović, and Italian foreign minister, Galeazzo Ciano, signed a friendship agreement on 25 March 1937, ushering in an atmosphere of confidence between the two formerly hostile countries. This rapprochement resulted from the changing international constellation: the resurgent Germany was expected to annex Austria and become a powerful neighbour to both countries. Ciano and Stojadinović struck close personal relations which no doubt buttressed the solidity of their agreement. Moreover, Ciano believed that Stojadinović was inclined towards authoritarian concept of power. There were also increasing signs that the Stojadinović regime was acquiring some fascist trappings in line with the new course of foreign policy. Indeed, Prince Regent, Paul, dropped Stojadinović from the government in February 1939 because he came to believe that his premier was intent on becoming a fascist dictator. This paper will explore whether there was substance to the often repeated accusations that Stojadinović was sliding towards fascism. Much of these accusations were centred on his foreign policy, especially his cordial relations with the fascist regime in Italy and, to a lesser extent, with Nazi Germany. Therefore, this paper will analyse, on the one hand, to what extent Stojadinović aligned Yugoslavia's conduct of foreign affairs with Rome's foreign policy and, on the other, to what degree the Yugoslav-Italian rapprochement was reflected in internal developments which might smack of fascism. The analysis will be undertaken with reference to the recent and influential theories of fascism.

This paper seeks to examine the outlook of the Serbian Minister in London, Mateja Mata Bošković, during the first half of the Great War on the South Slav (Yugoslav) question – a unification of all the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in a single state, which was Serbia's war aim. He found himself in close contact with the members of the Yugoslav Committee, an organisation of the irredentist Yugoslav émigrés from Austria-Hungary in which two Croat politicians, Frano Supilo and Ante Trumbić, were leading figures. In stark contrast to other Serbian diplomats, Bošković was not enthusiastic about Yugoslav unification. He suspected the Croat émigrés, especially Supilo, of pursuing exclusive Croat interests under the ruse of the Yugoslav programme. His dealings with them were made more difficult on account of the siding of a group of British "friends of Serbia", the most prominent of which were Robert William Seton-Watson and Henry Wickham Steed, with the Croat émigrés. Though not opposed in principle to an integral Yugoslav unification, Bošković preferred staunch defence of Serbian Macedonia from Bulgarian ambitions and the acquisition of Serb-populated provinces in southern Hungary, while in the west he seems to have been content with the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina, part of Slavonia and an outlet to the Adriatic Sea in Dalmatia. Finally, the reception of and reaction to Bošković's reports on the part of the Serbian Prime Minister, Nikola Pašić, clearly shows that the latter was determined to persist in his Yugoslav policy, despite the Treaty of London which assigned large parts of the Slovene and Croat lands to Italy and made the creation of Yugoslavia an unlikely proposition. In other words, Pašić did not vacillate between the "small" and the "large programme", between Yugoslavia and Greater Serbia, as it has been often alleged in historiography and public discourse.

This paper analyses the role played by Regent Alexander Karađorđević in Serbia's politics and military effort during the First World War. He assumed the position of an heir-apparent somewhat suddenly in 1909, and then regency, after a political crisis that made his father King Peter I transfer his royal powers to Prince Alexander just days before the outbreak of the war. At the age of twenty-six, Alexander was going to lead his people and army through unprecedented horrors. The young Regent proved to be a proper soldier, who suffered personally, along with his troops, the agonising retreat through Albania in late 1915 and early 1916, and spared no effort to ensure the supplies for the exhausted rank and file of the army. He also proved to be a ruler of great personal ambitions and lack of regard for constitutional boundaries of his position. Alexander tried to be not just a formal commander-in-chief of his army, but also to take over operational command; he would eventually manage to appoint officers to his liking to the positions of the Chief of Staff and Army Minister. He also wanted to remove Nikola Pašić from premiership and facilitate the formation of a cabinet amenable to his wishes, but he did not proceed with this, as the Entente Powers supported the Prime Minister. Instead, Alexander joined forces with Pašić to eliminate the Black Hand organization, a group of officers hostile both to him and the Prime Minister, in the well-known show trial in Salonika in 1917. The victories of the Serbian army in 1918 at the Salonika front led to the liberation of Serbia and the formation of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia), while Alexander emerged as the most powerful political factor in the new state. [Project of the Serbian Ministry of Education, Science and Technological Development, Grant no. 177011: History of political ideas and institutions in the Balkans in the 19th and 20th centuries]

The activities of Colonel Dragutin Dimitrijević Apis and his clandestine Black Hand organisation in Serbia have long been scrutinised in connection with the assassination of Franz Ferdinand in Sarajevo in 1914 and the outbreak of the First World War. Regent Alexander and the Pašić government dealt severely with the Black Hand in the Salonica show trial in 1917 when Apis and two of his friends were sentenced to death, a number of officers sentenced to prison and other Black Handers purged from the civilian and military authorities. The rest of Black Handers, particularly those more prominent, who survived the war found themselves in a position of pariah in the newly-founded Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (Yugoslavia). They were constantly under the watchful eye of the authorities and suspected of plot-ting subversive activities. To be sure, the Black Handers remained in close contact and sought to bring about a "revision" of the Salonica trial and rehabilitate themselves and their dead comrades. This paper focuses on three particular Black Handers, Božin Simić, Radoje Janković and Mustafa Golubić – although their other friends are also mentioned in connection with them – who offered stiff resistance to the regime that had condemned them. Their cases demonstrate that some of former Apis's associates in time came to terms with the authorities in order to secure peaceful existence or even obtain a prominent status, whereas other remained staunch opponents of King Alexander and their frustration took the shape of a left-wing opposition ranging from republicanism to outright communism.

This paper looks at Nikola Pašić's views of and contribution to the foreign policy of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes (SCS/Yugoslavia after1929) during the latest phase of his political career, a subject that has been neglected by historians. His activities in this field are divided into two periods – during the Paris Peace Conference where he was the head of the SCS Kingdom's delegation and after 1921 when he became Prime Minister, who also served as his own Foreign Minister. During the peace conference, Pašić held strong views on all the major problems that faced his delegation, particularly the troubled delimitation with Italy in the Adriatic. In early 1920, he alone favoured the acceptance of the so-called Lloyd George-Clemenceau ultimatum, believing that the time was working against the SCS Kingdom. The Rapallo Treaty with Italy late that year proved him right. Upon taking the reins of government, Pašić was energetic in opposing the two restoration attempts of Karl Habsburg in Hungary and persistent in trying to obtain northern parts of the still unsettled Albania. In time, his hold on foreign policy was weakening, as King Alexander asserted his influence, especially through the agency of Momčilo Ninčić, Foreign Minister after January 1922. Pašić was tougher that King and Ninčić in the negotiations with Mussolini for the final settlement of the status of the Adriatic town of Fiume and the parallel conclusion of the 27 January 1924 friendship treaty (the Pact of Rome). Since domestic politics absorbed much of his time and energy, the old Prime Minister was later even less visible in foreign policy. He was forced to resign in April 1926 on account of his son's corruption scandal shortly before the final break-down of relations with Italy.

This paper analysis the policy of Milan Stojadinović, Prime Minister and Foreign Minister of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia (1935–1939) towards the Croat question, i.e. the passive resistance with which the Croat Peasant Party led by Vlatko Maček opposed the Belgrade government, struggling for an autonomous status of Croatia. Based on the private papers of Stojadinović and Prince Regent, Paul Karadjordjević, the reports of the well-informed and shrewd British Minister in Belgrade, Ronald Hugh Campbell, as well as the rich literature on the Serbo-Croat relations in the Kingdom, this article attempts to examine Stojadinović's approach to the Croat problem. It is argued here that Stojadinović's treatment of the Croat question was closely related to his foreign policy, especially towards Italy and Germany.

The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, officially named Yugoslavia after 1929, came into being on the ruins of the Habsburg Empire in 1918 after the immense war efforts and sacrifices endured by Serbia. The experience of anti-Habsburg struggle both before and after 1914 and the memory of some of the most difficult moments in the Great War left a deep imprint on the minds of policy-makers in Belgrade. As they believed that many dangers faced in the war were likely to be revived in the future, the impact of these experiences was instrumental to their post-war foreign policy and military planning. This paper looks at the specific ways in which the legacy of the Great War affected and shaped the (planned) responses of the Yugoslav government to certain crises and challenges posed to Yugoslavia and the newly-established order in the region. These concern the reaction to the two attempts of Habsburg restoration in Hungary in 1921, the importance of the Greek port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) for Yugoslavia's strategic and defence requirements, and military planning within the framework of the Little Entente (the defensive alliance between Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia and Romania) in the early 1930s. In addition, it is argued here that the legacy of Serbo-Croat differences during the war relating to the manner of their unification was apparent in the political struggle between Serbs and Croats during the two decades of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia's existence.

This paper explores the importance of the Greek port of Salonica (Thessaloniki) for Yugoslav foreign policy-makers during the interwar period. It suggests that, apart from economic interests, namely securing trade facilities in the port and transport facilities offered by the Ghevgheli-Salonica railway connecting the Yugo­slav territory with Salonica, there were security considerations which accounted for Belgrade's special interest in this matter. These stemmed from two reasons - Serbia's painful experience from the Great War on which occasion the cutting off of the route for Salonica had had dire consequences for the Serbian Army and the post-war strategic situation whereby Yugoslavia was nearly ringed by hostile and potentially hostile neighbours which was a constant reminder of the immediate past and made both political and military leadership envisage a potential renewed need to retreat to Salonica in a general conflict. The events prior to and during the Second World War seem to have vindicated such preoccupations of Yugoslav policy-makers. All the Great Powers involved in the conflict in the Balkans realised the significance attached to Salonica in Belgrade and tried to utilise it for their own ends. Throughout these turbulent events Prince Paul and his government did not demonstrate an inclination to exploit the situation in order to achieve territorial aggrandisement but rather reacted with restraint being vitally concerned that neither Italy nor Germany took possession of Salonica and thus encircled Yugoslavia completely leaving her at their mercy.