Suchergebnisse

La baisse des violences pourrait laisser penser que la guerre en Syrie est en passe de prendre fin. En fait, le conflit est temporairement gelé mais les conditions d'une reprise des hostilités sont bel et bien présentes. Le pays est actuellement divisé en quatre zones contrôlées respectivement par le régime épaulé par Moscou et Téhéran ; par l'administration autonome du Nord-Est soutenue par Washington ; par la Turquie ; et les djihadistes d'Hayat Tahrir Al-Sham. Le statu quo risque de ne pas durer.

Depuis son étiage du printemps 2013, le régime de Bachar el-Assad est parvenu à reprendre le contrôle des deux tiers du territoire syrien avec l'aide de ses alliés russe et iranien. Cependant, l'essentiel de ses frontières internationales lui échappe au profit de ses alliés et de ses ennemis. Cette perte d'un symbole régalien par excellence témoigne de la réalité du pouvoir à Damas, où la Russie et l'Iran imposent leurs agendas, tandis que la Turquie étend son influence sur le Nord du pays.

International audience ; With the re-establishment of Bashar al-Assad's power in Syria, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the political and military victory of pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, it is clear that an Iranian axis now prevails in the Levant. The strength of this geopolitical axis is reinforced by the territorial continuity between Tehran and Beirut via Damascus and Baghdad: "the Iranian land bridge" or "Iranian corridor," controlled by Iranian troops directly and by proxies. Since the Shia militias joined the Syrian-Iraqi border in May 2017, the Iranian land bridge has continued to expand, despite the U.S. troop presence on both sides, in the al-Tanef pocket and in northeastern Syria. Until spring 2017, the West seemed incredulous about this reality. However, at that time, it was already too late to block the Shiite militias in eastern Syria, and the Iranian land bridge became a reality.

International audience ; Trying to decipher the United States' still indecisive strategy in the North East of Syria, it is already clear that the issue of a limited commitment ("leading from behind") comes up against a lack of knowledge of local dynamics and actors in the field, in particular of the Kurdish PYD and the Arab tribes. ; Si l'on tente de décrypter la stratégie encore floue des États-Unis au nord-est de la Syrie, il s'avère d'ores et déjà que la question d'un engagement limité (leading from behind) se heurte à une méconnaissance des dynamiques locales et des acteurs sur le terrain, notamment les Kurdes du PYD et les tribus arabes. Ce territoire stratégique, riche en ressources, sera au cœur des évolutions du conflit.

International audience ; With the re-establishment of Bashar al-Assad's power in Syria, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the political and military victory of pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, it is clear that an Iranian axis now prevails in the Levant. The strength of this geopolitical axis is reinforced by the territorial continuity between Tehran and Beirut via Damascus and Baghdad: "the Iranian land bridge" or "Iranian corridor," controlled by Iranian troops directly and by proxies. Since the Shia militias joined the Syrian-Iraqi border in May 2017, the Iranian land bridge has continued to expand, despite the U.S. troop presence on both sides, in the al-Tanef pocket and in northeastern Syria. Until spring 2017, the West seemed incredulous about this reality. However, at that time, it was already too late to block the Shiite militias in eastern Syria, and the Iranian land bridge became a reality.

International audience ; With the re-establishment of Bashar al-Assad's power in Syria, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the political and military victory of pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, it is clear that an Iranian axis now prevails in the Levant. The strength of this geopolitical axis is reinforced by the territorial continuity between Tehran and Beirut via Damascus and Baghdad: "the Iranian land bridge" or "Iranian corridor," controlled by Iranian troops directly and by proxies. Since the Shia militias joined the Syrian-Iraqi border in May 2017, the Iranian land bridge has continued to expand, despite the U.S. troop presence on both sides, in the al-Tanef pocket and in northeastern Syria. Until spring 2017, the West seemed incredulous about this reality. However, at that time, it was already too late to block the Shiite militias in eastern Syria, and the Iranian land bridge became a reality.

International audience ; With the re-establishment of Bashar al-Assad's power in Syria, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the political and military victory of pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, it is clear that an Iranian axis now prevails in the Levant. The strength of this geopolitical axis is reinforced by the territorial continuity between Tehran and Beirut via Damascus and Baghdad: "the Iranian land bridge" or "Iranian corridor," controlled by Iranian troops directly and by proxies. Since the Shia militias joined the Syrian-Iraqi border in May 2017, the Iranian land bridge has continued to expand, despite the U.S. troop presence on both sides, in the al-Tanef pocket and in northeastern Syria. Until spring 2017, the West seemed incredulous about this reality. However, at that time, it was already too late to block the Shiite militias in eastern Syria, and the Iranian land bridge became a reality.

International audience ; Trying to decipher the United States' still indecisive strategy in the North East of Syria, it is already clear that the issue of a limited commitment ("leading from behind") comes up against a lack of knowledge of local dynamics and actors in the field, in particular of the Kurdish PYD and the Arab tribes. ; Si l'on tente de décrypter la stratégie encore floue des États-Unis au nord-est de la Syrie, il s'avère d'ores et déjà que la question d'un engagement limité (leading from behind) se heurte à une méconnaissance des dynamiques locales et des acteurs sur le terrain, notamment les Kurdes du PYD et les tribus arabes. Ce territoire stratégique, riche en ressources, sera au cœur des évolutions du conflit.

International audience ; With the re-establishment of Bashar al-Assad's power in Syria, the strengthening of Hezbollah in Lebanon, and finally the political and military victory of pro-Iranian forces in Iraq, it is clear that an Iranian axis now prevails in the Levant. The strength of this geopolitical axis is reinforced by the territorial continuity between Tehran and Beirut via Damascus and Baghdad: "the Iranian land bridge" or "Iranian corridor," controlled by Iranian troops directly and by proxies. Since the Shia militias joined the Syrian-Iraqi border in May 2017, the Iranian land bridge has continued to expand, despite the U.S. troop presence on both sides, in the al-Tanef pocket and in northeastern Syria. Until spring 2017, the West seemed incredulous about this reality. However, at that time, it was already too late to block the Shiite militias in eastern Syria, and the Iranian land bridge became a reality.

International audience ; Trying to decipher the United States' still indecisive strategy in the North East of Syria, it is already clear that the issue of a limited commitment ("leading from behind") comes up against a lack of knowledge of local dynamics and actors in the field, in particular of the Kurdish PYD and the Arab tribes. ; Si l'on tente de décrypter la stratégie encore floue des États-Unis au nord-est de la Syrie, il s'avère d'ores et déjà que la question d'un engagement limité (leading from behind) se heurte à une méconnaissance des dynamiques locales et des acteurs sur le terrain, notamment les Kurdes du PYD et les tribus arabes. Ce territoire stratégique, riche en ressources, sera au cœur des évolutions du conflit.

International audience ; Trying to decipher the United States' still indecisive strategy in the North East of Syria, it is already clear that the issue of a limited commitment ("leading from behind") comes up against a lack of knowledge of local dynamics and actors in the field, in particular of the Kurdish PYD and the Arab tribes. ; Si l'on tente de décrypter la stratégie encore floue des États-Unis au nord-est de la Syrie, il s'avère d'ores et déjà que la question d'un engagement limité (leading from behind) se heurte à une méconnaissance des dynamiques locales et des acteurs sur le terrain, notamment les Kurdes du PYD et les tribus arabes. Ce territoire stratégique, riche en ressources, sera au cœur des évolutions du conflit.