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Just as intuition, fueled by hubris, led us to exclude insects from moral consideration, so intuition can lead to the opposite conclusion. Observed insect behavior, combined with scientific support for insect consciousness summarized in Mikhalevich & Powell's target article, and bolstered by the Precautionary Principle, all militate against completely denying moral status to insects.

Marino summarizes research showing that chickens perform cognitively and emotionally at a higher level than previously assumed. Here, I describe capacities of teleost fishes that parallel those of chickens, including the ability to recognize human faces, perspective-taking, and referential communication. Research on chickens and on fishes reveals an emerging trend in cognitive ethology: abilities once thought limited to a scant few highly intelligent non-humans may actually occur broadly across taxa.

I respond to five commentaries on my 2016 book What a Fish Knows. The commentaries express more harmony than dissent about my interpretation of fishes as cognitive, aware individuals deserving better treatment by humankind.

I present a little-known example of flexible, opportunistic behavior by a species of fish to undermine Key's (2016) thesis that fish are unconscious and unable to feel. Lack of a cortex is flimsy grounds for denying pain to fish, for on that criterion we must also then deny it to all non-mammals, including birds, which goes against scientific consensus. Notwithstanding science's fundamental inability to prove anything, the precautionary principal dictates that we should give the benefit of the doubt to fish, and the state of the oceans dictates that we act on it now.

Our relationship to fishes in the modern era is deeply problematic. We kill and consume more of them than any other group of vertebrates. At the same time, advances in our knowledge of fishes and their capabilities are gaining speed. Fish species diversity exceeds that of all other vertebrates combined, with a wide range of sensory adaptations, some of them (e.g., geomagnetism, water pressure and movement detection, and communication via electricity) alien to our own sensory experience. The evidence for pain in fishes (despite persistent detractors) is strongly supported by anatomical, physiological and behavioral studies. It is likely that fishes also seek pleasure, as evidenced by their willingness to approach divers to receive caresses that may mimic those given out by cleaner-fishes who seek to curry favor with valued clients. Observations of play behavior in fishes present another possible source of pleasure, or at least relief from boredom. Some fishes are also subject to emotional stress and will take action to relieve it. Fishes routinely recognize other individuals. Their social lives involve cooperation, virtue, democracy, deception, and cumulative monitoring. Courtship and sexual behavior are highly variable across species, and parental care is known for about a quarter of all fish species. Based on the cumulative research now available, we may conclude that fishes are deserving of levels of protections comparable to those deemed suitable for any other vertebrate. Currently, however, our treatment of fishes falls far short of such a standard.

If representative of other facilities, our findings uncover serious welfare concerns for the wellbeing of primates kept in American research facilities. These animals face regular or chronic sources of pain and distress including noxious experimental and non‐experimental events and illness and injury; and severe and prolonged social disruptions. Pain relief is meager by comparison to that normally provided to humans, despite legislative requirements to minimize pain and distress and assume similarity to humans in terms of ability to experience pain and distress. Living environments are usually confinement indoors to a metal cage, often alone, and often with a minimum of physical or mental stimulation.

This commentary presents the case against housing rats and mice in laboratory cages; the commentary bases its case on their sentience, natural history, and the varied detriments of laboratory conditions. The commentary gives 5 arguments to support this position: (a) rats and mice have a high degree of sentience and can suffer, (b) laboratory environments cause suffering, (c) rats and mice in the wild have discrete behavioral needs, (d) rats and mice bred for many generations in the laboratory retain these needs, and (e) these needs are not met in laboratory cages.