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Merleau-Ponty was a pivotal figure in twentieth century French philosophy. He was responsible for bringing the phenomenological methods of the German philosophers - Husserl and Heidegger - to France and instigated a new wave of interest in this approach. His influence extended well beyond the boundaries of philosophy and can be seen in theories of politics, psychology, art and language.This is the first volume to bring together a comprehensive selection of Merleau-Ponty's writing. Sections from the following are included:The Primacy of PerceptionThe Structure of BehaviourThe Phenomenology of P

The flesh of perception : Merleau-Ponty and Husserl / A.D. Smith -- What do we see (when we do)? / Sean D. Kelly -- Merleau-Ponty and the power to reckon with the possible / Komarine Romdenh-Romluc -- Reply to Romdenh-Romluc / Hubert L. Dreyfus -- The phenomenology of social rules / Mark A. Wrathall -- Speaking and spoken speech / Thomas Baldwin -- The genius of man / Simon Glendinning -- Consciousness, self-consciousness and communication / Naomi Eilan -- Freedom, perception and radical reflection / Eran Dorfman -- Philosophy and non-philosophy according to Merleau-Ponty / Francoise Dastur.

1. The refutation of idealism -- 2. Pure realism -- 3. The naturalistic fallacy -- 4. Ideal utilitarianism -- 5. Pure realism rejected -- 6. Logic and fictions -- 7. Philosophical analysis -- 8. Sense-data and perception -- 9. Knowledge and scepticism.

Recognition plays a central role in international affairs and in moral and political theory. Hegel noted the connections between these two contexts, and this article explores Hegel's approach with reference to the work of two political philosophers (Honneth and Rawls) and debates in international law. The conclusion is that while recognition has a constitutive role in international affairs, it has a different role in moral and political theory: morality is the evaluative recognition of the significance of individual autonomy.

Jacques Bouveresse is professor of philosophy at the Collège de France in Paris. He has published widely on Wittgenstein, Robert Musil and Karl Kraus. As an analytical philosopher, he has been, as it were, the mirror image of an Adorno at pre-war Oxford. Unlike his Anglo-Saxon counterparts at Oxford, he is the beleaguered minority in France. He does not have the option either of lofty disdain or Ayerish japery. He grumbles. Anyone familiar with philosophical debate or its journalistic variant in France over the past 20 years, and indeed with the `affaire Sokal', will be aware of the charge (some have regarded it as more of a jibe) made by some `analytical' philosophers that what passes for philosophy in France is not `scientific' or `precise' enough: it is little more and even less than `littérature'. This article argues that while Bouveresse is one who makes such a charge, and is well armed to do so, he nevertheless provides an interesting case in that he is by no means immune to literary materials, and indeed his treatment of metaphor leads us to question the content as well as the effectiveness of the charge.

"G. E. Moore's fame as a philosopher rests on his ethics of love and beauty, which inspired Bloomsbury, and on his 'common sense' certainties, which challenge abstract philosophical theory. Behind these themes lie his critical engagement with Kant's idealist philosophy, which is published here for the first time. These early writings, Moore's fellowship dissertations of 1897 and 1898, show how he initiated his influential break with idealism. In 1897 his main target was Kant's ethics; but by 1898 it was the whole Kantian project of transcendental philosophy that he rejected, and the theory which he developed to replace it gave rise to the new project of philosophy as logical analysis. This edition includes comments by Moore's examiners, Henry Sidgwick, Edward Caird and Bernard Bosanquet, and in a substantial introduction the editors explore the crucial importance of the dissertations to the history of twentieth-century philosophical thought"--