Suchergebnisse

L'article de Laslier [2017] présente une étrange description du nouveau mode de scrutin appelé le « jugement majoritaire », de ses propriétés, de ses supposés paradoxes et antécédents. Cette réponse apporte des clarifications. Classification JEL : D71, D72.

AbstractThis paper formulates a fixed‐cost transportation problem as an integer program, describes some of its special properties, and suggests an approximate method of solution. Examples are given to demonstrate the approximation technique.

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.

The validity of majority rule in an election with but two candidates—and so also of Condorcet consistency—is challenged. Axioms based on measures—paralleling those of K. O. May characterizing majority rule for two candidates based on comparisons—lead to another method that is unique in agreeing with the majority rule on pairs of "polarized" candidates. The method—majority judgment—meets R. A. Dahl's requirement that an apathetic majority does not always defeat an intense minority. It is a practical method that accommodates any number of candidates, avoids both the Condorcet and Arrow paradoxes, and best resists strategic manipulation.