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1. Introduction -- 2. The theory of rationality and objective justification -- 3. Free movement rights under the treaties and implementing legislation -- 4. The area of freedom, security and justice (AFSJ) -- 5. Free movement rights under association agreements -- 6. The practical application of rationality -- 7. Conclusions.

This article investigates how the prevalence of collectivism or individualism in a society relates to the economic development of the society. The central premise of the article is that causality runs in two directions: the collectivist or individualistic character of a society will influence the course of economic development, & simultaneously economic growth & changes in economic structure will alter the orientation of the society toward individualism or collectivism. The recognition of this two-way causality suggests four broad hypotheses concerning the interaction between economic & cultural factors: (1) economic development is impeded by collectivism & facilitated by individualism; (2) economic development is facilitated by collectivism & impeded by individualism; (3) economic development promotes collectivism & erodes individualism; & (4) economic development erodes collectivism & promotes individualism. The arguments & evidence that have been marshaled in support of each of these hypotheses are examined, & the general themes & implications that emerge are discussed. 74 References. Adapted from the source document.

This paper examines the social costs and benefits of special interest group political influence activities. It is commonly recognized that, to the extent that such activities induce legislators to choose policies that favor the interest group at the expense of society at large, they can reduce welfare. It may also be the case, however, that lobbying can convey information held by interest groups to policy‐makers. When costless announcements would not be credible, interest groups can signal their private information through costly influence activities. To the extent that this information enables governments to choose better policies, lobbying can enhance welfare. A simple game between a special interest group and a policy‐maker that captures this tradeoff between the distortionary costs and the informational benefits of political influence activities is developed. Welfare properties of the equilibria are analyzed, and conditions are derived under which social welfare is greater when lobbying occurs than it would be if lobbying were prohibited. In conclusion, the phenomenon analyzed in this paper is related to Bhagwati's taxonomy of DUP activities.