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AbstractThe increasing visibility of prominent political leaders in news media is well documented in political science literature. The main concern that has been raised in this connection is that the complexity of political processes is being reduced to achievements and standpoints of individual politicians, and the importance of rational opinion building is discounted. The results of the current study provide the first empirical evidence to account for the misgivings about emotional effects of personalized political information on media audiences. Using data from an online experiment, this study shows that news coverage regarding behaviors and personal characteristics of a foreign leader influences (a) evaluations of personal characteristics typical of his or her nation's citizens and (b) emotional perceptions of that leader's country (sentiment and respect). This effect is shown to reflect a psychological phenomenon whereby people project their emotions and perceptions regarding a leader's personal characteristics onto his or her country and people.

This research assesses possible associations between viewing fake news (i.e., political satire) and attitudes of inefficacy, alienation, and cynicism toward political candidates. Using survey data collected during the 2006 Israeli election campaign, the study provides evidence for an indirect positive effect of fake news viewing in fostering the feelings of inefficacy, alienation, and cynicism, through the mediator variable of perceived realism of fake news. Within this process, hard news viewing serves as a moderator of the association between viewing fake news and their perceived realism. It was also demonstrated that perceived realism of fake news is stronger among individuals with high exposure to fake news and low exposure to hard news than among those with high exposure to both fake and hard news. Overall, this study contributes to the scientific knowledge regarding the influence of the interaction between various types of media use on political effects.

A big data analysis of six countries has demonstrated that Western news media focus increasingly on foreign leaders, at the expense of their respective countries—a process termed here as mediated political personalization in the international arena. Important variations found across the countries in the sample are attributed to differences in media systems, media values, and the level of development of communication technologies. However, for the first time, it was shown that the personalization process is not deterministic; rather, it is affected by leaders' personal qualities, particularly those that are aligned with the values of prevalent media logic. Thus, the election of a leader endowed with strong charisma accelerates the process of personalization in the coverage of his or her country in the foreign media. Data were obtained from a large corpus comprising more than 800,000 news items spanning two to three past decades, subjected to a computerized content analysis.

Targeting messages on sensitive, conflict-related issues while mediating between disparate audience expectations presents a significant risk to the image and interests of political actors. This study provides a basis for understanding the factors that impact a politician's choice between using message consistencies or gaps and discusses their consequences for conflict resolution processes. Based on quantitative and qualitative analysis of 644 messages presented by Israeli officials with respect to the Israeli–Arab conflict and Israeli–Palestinian conflict over three different periods (1967‒73; 1993‒2000; 2009‒12), the study points to foreign relations defined by the existence of negotiations rather than mediatization processes as the significant factor that impacts the rhetorical dynamics of conflict resolution negotiations, due to the amplified pressures of a two-level game during periods of rapprochement.

This article examines the prevalence and nature of negativity in news content. Using dictionary-based sentiment analysis, we examine roughly fifty-five thousand front-page news stories, comparing four different affect lexicons, one for general negativity, and three capturing different measures of fear and anger. We show that fear and anger are distinct measures that capture different sentiments. It may therefore be possible to separate out fear and anger in media content, as in psychology. We also find that negativity is more strongly related to anger than to fear for each measure. This result appears to be driven by a small number of foreign policy words in the anger dictionaries, rather than an indication that negativity in U.S. coverage reflects "anger." We highlight the importance of tailoring lexicons to domains to improve construct validity when conducting dictionary-based automation. Finally, we connect these results to existing work on the impact of emotion on political preferences and reasoning.

The literature on press–state relations has shown that a high degree of consensus among officials limits the appearance of dissenting voices in news coverage. In the present article, we examine this proposition with regard to the debate in the Israeli media concerning how Israel should have reacted to Hamas' victory in the 2006 Palestinian elections. The data presented here show that even though the debate within the Israeli leadership was limited, national newspapers did produce counterviews that strongly challenged the government's position of penalizing the Palestinian Authority. In addition, the longer the debate continued, the larger the proportion of oppositional actors, especially Palestinian, that were heard. Finally, the study also points to the important role that the journalists themselves can play in preventing official control by presenting their own views on the issue.

AbstractWhat reputational dividends in the media, if any, do federal agencies reap from collaboration with a highly reputable agency, such as the U.S. Food and Drug Administration (FDA)? Utilizing a dataset covering 30 U.S. federal agencies over a period of 34 years (1980–2013), we estimate the short and long‐term reputational effects of interagency collaboration. Collaboration is measured by the number of memorandums of understanding in effect between each agency and the FDA, while agency reputation in the media is assessed using an automated measure of media‐coverage valence (positive/negative tone) for each agency‐year. To account for potential reverse and reciprocal causality, we utilize cross‐lagged fixed‐effects models. We find evidence of moderate rises in reputation in the media due to increased collaboration with the FDA. These effects persist significantly for 2 years following the end of the collaboration, before declining to null after 4 years. Employing similar analyses, we furthermore estimate reverse causality—of reputation in the media on the level of consequent collaboration—finding no evidence of such effects.

"This chapter focuses on the challenges faced by political actors when communicating with their audiences. It is argued that communicative skills are of increasing importance due to the mediatization of politics and the increased centrality of media logic. Furthermore, the chapter reflects on the personalization of politics that is closely linked to mediatization and that has broad implications for political institutions, citizen behavior, and the role of political actors as communicators. In particular, personalization increases the importance of personal resources, the communication skills of political actors, and specifically charismatic communication and rhetorical skills. The authors discuss in detail research regarding those skills and suggest that charismatic communication and rhetorical skills should both be important in future study of political actors as communicators." (publisher's description)

This article describes two opposing types of political personalization: centralizing and decentralizing personalization. The first implies the centralization of political power in the hands of a few leaders, while the latter indicates a diffusion of group power among its components: individual politicians. We start by proposing definitions of the types and subtypes of centralized and decentralized personalization and review the literature in search of evidence of their occurrence. We then demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed typology by examining personalization trends in various aspects of Israeli politics and conclude with a discussion of the challenges that personalization set for liberal democracies. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

This article describes two opposing types of political personalization: centralizing and decentralizing personalization. The first implies the centralization of political power in the hands of a few leaders, while the latter indicates a diffusion of group power among its components: individual politicians. We start by proposing definitions of the types and subtypes of centralized and decentralized personalization and review the literature in search of evidence of their occurrence. We then demonstrate the usefulness of the proposed typology by examining personalization trends in various aspects of Israeli politics and conclude with a discussion of the challenges that personalization set for liberal democracies.