Search results

Abstract
Turkey's Justice and Development Party (AKP) is one of the longest ruling among contemporary populist radical
right parties (PRR). For nearly two decades, the AKP has shown tremendous success in achieving electoral dominance and political
control. This article argues that AKP's success lies in its ability to reconfigure the issue salience in Turkish politics by
bringing the secular-conservative cleavage into the center of political competition. However, as this article shows, while the
government's framing of conservative/religious values was initially populist, as the Party consolidated its power, populism became
secondary to nativism. This nativist turn is characterized by an emphasis on the foreignness of "the elites" and is shaped by
secularization of the public sphere and antiwesternism. Overall, AKP has not presented a fundamental opposition to the
"establishment" but brought together many components of Turkey's institutional and cultural structure and radicalized patterns
already present in earlier eras.

"This book explores the diverse meanings and values that various actors attribute to U.S. citizenship, actors who possess or seek to obtain U.S. citizenship while residing in Turkey. It is based on interviews with families who obtain U.S. citizenship for their children by giving birth in the United States, Turkish citizens who receive green cards and U.S. citizenship for themselves through naturalization but choose to return to and reside in Turkey, and natural-born U.S. citizens who have settled in Turkey during their adulthood"--

AbstractThis article aims to explore the views of the Turkish elite on the state of polarization in Turkey. By identifying four political frames—namely, harmony, continuity/decline, conspiracy, and conflict—that selected Turkish political and civil society elites use in discussing the phenomenon of polarization in the country through their contributions to a workshop and in-depth qualitative interviews, the article finds that there is a considerable degree of polarization among the Turkish elite regarding their views on the presence of polarization in Turkey. Moreover, this overlaps with the divide between the government and the opposition in the country. An analysis of the justificatory arguments employed in constituting the aforementioned frames shows that, while those elites who deny the existence of polarization seek its absence in essentialist characteristics of society, in reductionist comparisons with history, or in internal/external enemies, those who acknowledge polarization's presence look for its roots in political and institutional factors and processes. The article highlights how, given the denial of polarization by the pro-government elite and the substantial gap between the two camps' justificatory narratives, the currently reported high rates of polarization in Turkey can, at best, be expected to remain as is in the near future, barring a radical change in political constellations.

This article analyses the process whereby members of new classes in Turkey mobilize their resources so that their children receive US citizenship at birth. Following the actors' self-perceptions and motivations, we argue that US citizenship acquisition is a new capital accumulation strategy, aimed to forestall against risks in intergenerational transmission of class privileges. With this article, we aim to contribute to cultural class studies in the following ways: we suggest that the unpredictable nature of classification struggles becomes more evident in contexts where transition to neoliberalism is accompanied by dramatic political shifts. We situate the desire for US citizenship within class anxieties in Turkey, informed by historical meanings attached to the binary of 'the West' versus 'the East'. Finally, we break down the boundaries between different country-cases by drawing on citizenship as capital, rather than as a backdrop that actors share. We explain the new ways in which class distinction strategies are transnationalized in the contemporary period.

Militia groups have only recently started to attract scholarly attention in the literature on internal conflicts. This attention is mostly focused on either the causes of their emergence or their functions and performance during the conflict. The role of militia groups in post-conflict processes, however, has not been adequately addressed. This article intends to fill this gap by analyzing the case of village guards, a type of pro-government militia system in Turkey, based on qualitative evidence from field research. While the dominant narrative in the literature identifies militia groups as spoilers in peace processes, the article shows that militias do not act as spoilers under certain conditions. In the case of the village guard system in Turkey, the permanent integration of militias into the state's regular military apparatus prevented militia groups from acting as spoilers. It then argues that the permanent integration of wartime militia systems is a consequence of two factors: militia networking and a lack of comprehensive peace-building structures.

Militia groups have only recently started to attract scholarly attention in the literature on internal conflicts. This attention is mostly focused on either the causes of their emergence or their functions and performance during the conflict. The role of militia groups in post-conflict processes, however, has not been adequately addressed. This article intends to fill this gap by analyzing the case of village guards, a type of pro-government militia system in Turkey, based on qualitative evidence from field research. While the dominant narrative in the literature identifies militia groups as spoilers in peace processes, the article shows that militias do not act as spoilers under certain conditions. In the case of the village guard system in Turkey, the permanent integration of militias into the state's regular military apparatus prevented militia groups from acting as spoilers. It then argues that the permanent integration of wartime militia systems is a consequence of two factors: militia networking and a lack of comprehensive peace-building structures.

ObjectiveIn this study we draw on the conflict between the Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) and Turkey to explore how exposure to violence can engender support for democracy at the individual level.MethodsWe rely on two nationwide representative surveys carried out in Turkey and estimate a series of ordered logistic and logistic regression models.ResultsWe find that exposure to violence during civil war is a significant predictor of embracing positive attitudes toward democracy. Wartime experiences are associated with a conceptualization of democracy that underscores equality and greater tolerance toward others.ConclusionBeing a member of a repressed minority is not sufficient to explain support for democracy. The link between wartime experiences and holding positive attitudes toward democracy is conditioned by the degree of exposure to violence or which political party is supported.

What happens to the anti-establishment sentiments of pro-incumbent voters for a populist force that is in government and thus controls the political system? This article examines this question utilizing the case of Turkey, a country in which a populist force has been in power for more than a decade. By analyzing populist attitudes among a nationally representative sample, we demonstrate that while the voters of the incumbent populist party (AKP) are less likely, compared to everyone else, to hold populist sentiments, the same voters are also substantially more likely to endorse conspiracy theories that center on malign foreign powers. This finding is relevant beyond Turkey, because it demonstrates that populist forces might be able to maintain popular support and thus stay in power for a long stretch of time by employing government propaganda to fuel an antagonism against conspiratorial foreign and global forces.