Demand elasticities, asymmetry and strategic trade policy
In: Journal of international economics, Band 42, Heft 1-2, S. 167-177
ISSN: 0022-1996
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In: Journal of international economics, Band 42, Heft 1-2, S. 167-177
ISSN: 0022-1996
In: Journal of development economics, Band 50, Heft 2, S. 369-380
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: European journal of political economy, Band 76, S. 102250
ISSN: 1873-5703
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 66, Heft 10, S. 1797-1825
ISSN: 1552-8766
A two-stage game investigates how counterterrorism measures affect within-country competition between two rival terrorist groups. Although such competition is commonplace (e.g., al-Nusra Front and Free Syria Army; Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and the National Liberation Army; and al-Fatah and Hamas), there is no theoretical treatment of how proactive and defensive measures influence this interaction. Previous studies on rival terrorist groups are solely empirical concerning group survival, outbidding, and terrorism level, while ignoring the role that government countermeasures exert on the rival groups' terrorism. In a theoretical framework, alternative counterterrorism actions have diverse impacts on the level of terrorism depending on relative group sizes and government-targeting decisions. In the two-stage game, optimal counterterrorism policy rules are displayed in terms of how governments target symmetric and asymmetric terrorist groups. Comparative statics show how parameter changes affect Nash or subgame perfect equilibrium outcomes.
World Affairs Online
In: Emerging markets, finance and trade: EMFT, Band 54, Heft 7, S. 1578-1585
ISSN: 1558-0938
In: FRB of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2012-061A
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Working paper
In: Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Paper No. 2009-23D
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Working paper
In: Economica, Band 78, Heft 311, S. 546-564
In: Economics & politics, Band 19, Heft 2, S. 219-234
ISSN: 0954-1985
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Working paper
In: Journal of development economics, Band 73, Heft 2, S. 715-725
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2022-7
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In: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2022-23
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In: FRB St. Louis Working Paper No. 2017-18
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Working paper
Reflecting recent enforcement policy activism of US states, this paper examines federal-state overlap of illegal immigration policy in a spatial context. Keeping the US-Mexico context in mind, we assume that labor from a source nation enters a host nation through bordering states. Once in the host, illegal immigrants may stay in the state of entry or move to another state. The host nation's federal government and/or the state governments choose border and internal enforcement policies, and also provide local goods. As a benchmark, we define the completely centralized solution as the case where the federal government chooses all the policies, while the state governments are passive. At higher levels of decentralization (i.e., as states take more responsibility in deciding some of the policies), the overlap of federal and state policies is associated with both vertical and horizontal externalities. Among other results, we find that if inter-state mobility is costless, internal enforcement is overprovided, and border enforcement and local goods are under-provided under decentralization, leading to relatively high levels of illegal immigration. While inter-state migration costs moderate such overprovision/under-provision, extreme levels of inter-state immobility may lead to too little illegal immigration, and an overprovision of local goods.
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