Suchergebnisse

Was funktioniert nicht? Woran liegt das? Wie kann das Problem gelöst werden? Die traditionelle Supervision und Intervision orientieren sich meist an diesen Fragen. Der Schwerpunkt liegt vor allem auf Problemen, Fehlentwicklungen, Stagnationen und Sackgassen, eher selten auf den bereits erzielten Erfolgen. Positive Supervision und kollegiale Beratung stellen dagegen die Fragen: Was funktioniert gut? Wodurch gelingt das? Wie lässt sich im Weiteren darauf aufbauen? Positive Supervision und Intervision sind kompetenzorientiert: Es geht darum, Kompetenzen aufzuspüren, daran zu arbeiten und sich weiterzuentwickeln. Das Buch umreisst zunächst die theoretischen Hintergründe und die praktischen Anwendungsmöglichkeiten der positiven Supervision und kollegialen Beratung und geht ausführlich auf die vier Pfeiler der positiven Supervision und Intervision ein: Die Zielformulierung, das Finden von Kompetenzen, die Arbeit am Fortschritt und die Reflexion. Schritt für Schritt wird erläutert, wie Ziele positiv formuliert, wie Stärken und Kompetenzen identifiziert, wie Weiterentwicklungen angeregt, wie Reflexionen unterstützt und wie Rückmeldungen gegeben werden können. Zahlreiche Fallbeispiele veranschaulichen das Vorgehen, Übungen und Materialien geben Anregungen für die praktische Umsetzung. Das Buch liefert damit einen systematischen Supervisionsansatz, der Anregungen für alle Personen gibt, die in der Psychotherapie, im Coaching oder in der Mediation ihren Kollegen Supervision geben, die in einer Organisation die Rolle des Supervisors übernehmen, um ihre Kollegen zu supervidieren, oder die als Lehrkraft oder Coach im schulischen Bereich oder im Sport als Supervisor tätig sind

AbstractSocial policy development and reform in corporatist welfare states often follows a pattern of subsequent collectivization and de‐collectivization. This has to do, the article argues, with the social problems these phases address. Early social policy development forms a response to Olson‐type collective action problems that organized actors (labour and employers' organizations) in the field experience: state‐obliged benefits solve free rider problems, while bipartite administration allows labour and employers' organizations to organize their constituencies. This solution to Olson‐type collective action problems, however, also constitutes an Ostrom‐type collective action problem. Such a system functions as a common pool resource. Individual benefit take‐up is experienced as free and the costs of benefit take‐up are collectivized in the common pool. The article illustrates this pattern with reference to Dutch disability insurance.

There is growing awareness that Western educational practices and language pedagogies cannot simply be exported to other parts of the world. The ethnocentricity of many teacher education projects that aim at introducing CLT to Asian societies have caused cultural conflicts and have led to the call for culturally appropriate methodologies. This paper presents an ethnographic analysis of three situations taken from two in-service teacher education courses in which cultural norms and identities were salient. It is argued that in the context of cross-cultural in-service courses it is important to identify possible culturally inappropriate procedures and ideas and locally introduce these aspects in the learning situation. This approach paves the way for 'intercultural reciprocity' (Coulby 2006), which will allow the course to evolve into a place from which C1 and C2 can be reflected upon without loss of face.

AbstractRather than dwelling on the conflict, solution‐focused mediation asks: What would you prefer instead of the conflict? The focus is on the desired outcome: the future with a difference. Clients are considered capable of formulating their own goal and of devising solutions. The expertise of the mediator lies in asking questions that help clients in this respect and that motivate clients to change. This article demonstrates that concept and the methodology differ significantly from other types of mediation. Conversations become increasingly positive and shorter, ensuring that solution‐focused mediation is also cost‐effective.

AbstractIn this article, we aim to show that the treatment of wicked problems in the literature on public administration approaches is inadequate. We briefly discuss the literature on wicked problems and propose a conceptualization of wicked problems that, we think, shows the core of the problem of wicked problems. Wicked problems, we argue, are wicked because the factual and normative aspects of the issues are intertwined at actor-level. As a result, the phenomena that Rittel and Webber observed at problem level emerge. This has strong implications for public administration. Since actors are deciding on responses, a wicked problem evokes, what we call, a double governance challenge. The governance mechanisms provided in the literature on public administration approaches, also the new ones, do not provide responses to such double challenge. They either assume that actors do not build upon their own, actor-level factual and normative evaluations or that some compiled actor or supra-actor might overcome the limitations of the actors that together constitute the collective level of wicked problem response. Making such assumptions, they apparently conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked. Therefore, re-iterating, wicked problems are indeed wicked: solutions that implicitly conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked might be perfect, but seem unintelligent. A wicked problem, we argue, does not allow perfect, but instead requires imperfect, but intelligent responses. In this paper, we then discuss four such intelligently imperfect responses. They are necessarily imperfect in the sense that they cannot be considered to completely cover the problem, but intelligent in the sense that they truly acknowledge its wickedness.

In this article, we aim to show that the treatment of wicked problems in the literature on public administration approaches is inadequate. We briefly discuss the literature on wicked problems and propose a conceptualization of wicked problems that, we think, shows the core of the problem of wicked problems. Wicked problems, we argue, are wicked because the factual and normative aspects of the issues are intertwined at actor-level. As a result, the phenomena that Rittel and Webber observed at problem level emerge. This has strong implications for public administration. Since actors are deciding on responses, a wicked problem evokes, what we call, a double governance challenge. The governance mechanisms provided in the literature on public administration approaches, also the new ones, do not provide responses to such double challenge. They either assume that actors do not build upon their own, actor-level factual and normative evaluations or that some compiled actor or supra-actor might overcome the limitations of the actors that together constitute the collective level of wicked problem response. Making such assumptions, they apparently conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked. Therefore, re-iterating, wicked problems are indeed wicked: solutions that implicitly conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked might be perfect, but seem unintelligent. A wicked problem, we argue, does not allow perfect, but instead requires imperfect, but intelligent responses. In this paper, we then discuss four such intelligently imperfect responses. They are necessarily imperfect in the sense that they cannot be considered to completely cover the problem, but intelligent in the sense that they truly acknowledge its wickedness.

Shifts in governance can be conceived of as a response to policy capacities being shared-in a material sense-between centralized and decentralized levels of government. A comparative case study is conducted of three conceptually different shifts in governance. Unclear responsibility relations lead to "paradoxes of decentralization," in which the applied mode of governance blocks the intended improvements. Three case studies are presented to illustrate these mechanisms. There is no "best" way of decentralizing responsibilities; requirements of governance modes are ambiguous. The sharing of policy capacities between central and decentralized levels of governance requires internally inconsistent governance arrangements. © 2012 SAGE Publications.