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In: Bestuurskunde, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 66-72
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In: Bestuurskunde, Band 29, Heft 3, S. 66-72
In: Social policy and administration, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 279-299
ISSN: 1467-9515
In: Social policy & administration: an international journal of policy and research, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 279-299
ISSN: 0037-7643, 0144-5596
In: Social policy and administration, Band 48, Heft 3, S. 279-299
ISSN: 1467-9515
AbstractSocial policy development and reform in corporatist welfare states often follows a pattern of subsequent collectivization and de‐collectivization. This has to do, the article argues, with the social problems these phases address. Early social policy development forms a response to Olson‐type collective action problems that organized actors (labour and employers' organizations) in the field experience: state‐obliged benefits solve free rider problems, while bipartite administration allows labour and employers' organizations to organize their constituencies. This solution to Olson‐type collective action problems, however, also constitutes an Ostrom‐type collective action problem. Such a system functions as a common pool resource. Individual benefit take‐up is experienced as free and the costs of benefit take‐up are collectivized in the common pool. The article illustrates this pattern with reference to Dutch disability insurance.
In: Policy and society, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 198-217
ISSN: 1839-3373
In this article, we aim to show that the treatment of wicked problems in the literature on public administration approaches is inadequate. We briefly discuss the literature on wicked problems and propose a conceptualization of wicked problems that, we think, shows the core of the problem of wicked problems. Wicked problems, we argue, are wicked because the factual and normative aspects of the issues are intertwined at actor-level. As a result, the phenomena that Rittel and Webber observed at problem level emerge. This has strong implications for public administration. Since actors are deciding on responses, a wicked problem evokes, what we call, a double governance challenge. The governance mechanisms provided in the literature on public administration approaches, also the new ones, do not provide responses to such double challenge. They either assume that actors do not build upon their own, actor-level factual and normative evaluations or that some compiled actor or supra-actor might overcome the limitations of the actors that together constitute the collective level of wicked problem response. Making such assumptions, they apparently conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked. Therefore, re-iterating, wicked problems are indeed wicked: solutions that implicitly conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked might be perfect, but seem unintelligent. A wicked problem, we argue, does not allow perfect, but instead requires imperfect, but intelligent responses. In this paper, we then discuss four such intelligently imperfect responses. They are necessarily imperfect in the sense that they cannot be considered to completely cover the problem, but intelligent in the sense that they truly acknowledge its wickedness.
In: Bannink , D & Trommel , W 2019 , ' Intelligent modes of imperfect governance ' , Policy and Society , vol. 38 , no. 2 , pp. 198-217 . https://doi.org/10.1080/14494035.2019.1572576
In this article, we aim to show that the treatment of wicked problems in the literature on public administration approaches is inadequate. We briefly discuss the literature on wicked problems and propose a conceptualization of wicked problems that, we think, shows the core of the problem of wicked problems. Wicked problems, we argue, are wicked because the factual and normative aspects of the issues are intertwined at actor-level. As a result, the phenomena that Rittel and Webber observed at problem level emerge. This has strong implications for public administration. Since actors are deciding on responses, a wicked problem evokes, what we call, a double governance challenge. The governance mechanisms provided in the literature on public administration approaches, also the new ones, do not provide responses to such double challenge. They either assume that actors do not build upon their own, actor-level factual and normative evaluations or that some compiled actor or supra-actor might overcome the limitations of the actors that together constitute the collective level of wicked problem response. Making such assumptions, they apparently conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked. Therefore, re-iterating, wicked problems are indeed wicked: solutions that implicitly conceptualize the wicked problem as non-wicked might be perfect, but seem unintelligent. A wicked problem, we argue, does not allow perfect, but instead requires imperfect, but intelligent responses. In this paper, we then discuss four such intelligently imperfect responses. They are necessarily imperfect in the sense that they cannot be considered to completely cover the problem, but intelligent in the sense that they truly acknowledge its wickedness.
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In: Administration & society, Band 44, Heft 5, S. 595-625
ISSN: 0095-3997
In: Administration & society, Band 44, Heft 5, S. 595-624
ISSN: 1552-3039
In: Administration & society, Band 44, Heft 5, S. 595-624
ISSN: 1552-3039
Shifts in governance can be conceived of as a response to policy capacities being shared—in a material sense—between centralized and decentralized levels of government. A comparative case study is conducted of three conceptually different shifts in governance. Unclear responsibility relations lead to "paradoxes of decentralization," in which the applied mode of governance blocks the intended improvements. Three case studies are presented to illustrate these mechanisms. There is no "best" way of decentralizing responsibilities; requirements of governance modes are ambiguous. The sharing of policy capacities between central and decentralized levels of governance requires internally inconsistent governance arrangements.
In: Journal of European social policy, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 19-32
ISSN: 1461-7269
In this article, we propose a method for the disaggregation of welfare state regimes that enhances our insight into innovative welfare state change; that is, change beyond the borders of regime logic. Welfare states, we argue, are composed of different approaches to various social risks, and the approach to each social risk is often 'hybrid': it consists of various types of arrangements. It is no coincidence that risk approaches, and consequently welfare states, are often hybrid entities. We argue that a singular approach to a social risk creates a social residue that may evoke social pressure which can in turn be diminished by hybridizing the arrangement; that is, changing allocation rules to include new social groups or to cover previously uncovered needs. In itself, however, a hybrid arrangement is unstable. This is why hybridization may be followed by either a return to a singular risk approach so that social pressure re-emerges, or by the establishment of a new, additional arrangement so that a hybrid risk approach emerges. This is innovative change. We do not argue that innovative change inevitably occurs. Change requires that groups facing residues are able to employ sufficient power resources. However, some level of autonomous institutional welfare state change is to be expected as an outcome of the continuous creation of residues.
In: Journal of European social policy, Band 17, Heft 1, S. 19-32
ISSN: 0958-9287
World Affairs Online
In: Journal of comparative policy analysis: research and practice, Band 10, Heft 1, S. 75-92
ISSN: 1572-5448
In: Tijdschrift voor arbeidsvraagstukken, Band 22, Heft 2
ISSN: 2468-9424
In: Public policy and administration: PPA
ISSN: 1749-4192
In this introductory article to our PPA special issue we argue that the relation between wicked problems and collaborative governance is fraught with difficulties. Doing so, we take four steps: we maintain that wicked problems are better understood as wicked actor constellations; we delve into the collaborative governance-approach and posit that it is mainly concerned with wicked problems; we then argue that collaborative governance might not be the most feasible response to wicked problems; and after that we argue that an assumption instead of actors being engaged in actor positioning processes allows a clearer understanding of policy processes in wicked actor constellations. Following this discussion, we introduce the articles featured in the special issue and discuss implications for research.
In: Business history, Band 54, Heft 5, S. 805-809
ISSN: 1743-7938