Suchergebnisse

More donors are formally assessing their multilateral aid disbursement policies as well as the multilateral institutions that they contribute to. Analyzing OECD Creditor Reporting System data from 2011 to 2019 of 23 donors and 34 multilateral organizations, we find evidence of institutional portfolio building of donors to align multilateral and bilateral aid channels. Such tendency is more pronounced for core-funding than multi-bi funding and much stronger at the recipient country level than at the sectoral level. Smaller donors that operate from a limited multilateral budget show greater preferences for geographical similarity. When donors give to institutions with sectoral specialization, they seek sectoral similarity with their bilateral aid.

This paper investigates the role and the welfare rationale of secondary sanctions using a game theoretic framework and a case study of the US sanctions targeting Iran. Existing literature on secondary sanctions focuses either on the sender–third party or the sender–target relations, and fails to address the interdependency of the three players' strategies. An integrated approach allows us to examine the conditions under which the secondary sanction succeeds in coercing the third party to participate in a sanction campaign against a target. I argue that it acts as a commitment device for the third parties that value target compliance but find it too costly to voluntarily participate in the sanctions when the target complies at a suboptimal level. Despite the coercive nature, secondary sanction can be welfare improving for them. The framework provides an explanation of the successful outcome of the recent US secondary sanctions targeting Iran.

This paper investigates the role and the welfare rationale of secondary sanctions using a game theoretic framework and a case study of the US sanctions targeting Iran. Existing literature on secondary sanctions focuses either on the sender–third party or the sender–target relations, and fails to address the interdependency of the three players' strategies. An integrated approach allows us to examine the conditions under which the secondary sanction succeeds in coercing the third party to participate in a sanction campaign against a target. I argue that it acts as a commitment device for the third parties that value target compliance but find it too costly to voluntarily participate in the sanctions when the target complies at a suboptimal level. Despite the coercive nature, secondary sanction can be welfare improving for them. The framework provides an explanation of the successful outcome of the recent US secondary sanctions targeting Iran.

AbstractObjectiveThis article provides a novel measure of nonprofit political ideology using semantic text analysis of public Internal Revenue Service filings. It explores the relationship between electoral competition and private donations.MethodsMission statements of over 150,000 U.S. nonprofits are matched to Congressional speeches to classify ideology on a political spectrum. The measure is validated against established ideology scores. Donation data are analyzed to examine if donors strategically countervail expected policy changes after elections.ResultsThe proposed measure shows a significant correlation with other ideology metrics. Donations are found to move in sync with ideological shifts of the government rather than to countervail expected policy changes after elections.ConclusionThe mission statement‐based measure enables studying nonprofit positioning. Findings suggest expressive motivations make donation trends complementary to voting trends.