Suchergebnisse

It has become part of the conventional wisdom in the economics of education that subsidies to higher education have a regressive distributional effect. Given that relatively more children from wealthier families enroll in higher education, many economist assume that these subsidies to higher education have an unwanted distributional impact. This volume presents new empirical evidence for the cross-sectional point of view and provides an analytical framework for the longitudinal perspective. The present volume also analyzes the equity and efficiency effects of widely-discussed funding reforms and proposes a voluntary graduate tax.

ZusammenfassungNeben der Umsatzsteuer unterliegt eine Reihe gesundheitsschädlicher Produkte einer spezifischen Verbrauchssteuer wie der Bier‑, Alkohol- und Tabaksteuer. In einer Gesamtschau dieser sin taxes offenbart sich ein Steuersystem voller Inkonsistenzen. Zum Beispiel unterliegt Bier einer speziellen Verbrauchssteuer, während der ebenfalls wegen seines Alkoholgehaltes gesundheitsschädliche Wein nicht spezifisch besteuert wird. Dieser Beitrag problematisiert die fehlende Systematik in der Besteuerung gesundheitsschädlicher Produkte. Diese Inkonsistenz rückt vor dem Hintergrund der aktuellen Diskussion um die Legalisierung von Cannabis besonders in den Fokus. Nach einer Bestandsaufnahme skizziert dieser Beitrag einen rationalen Besteuerungsansatz, der sich an den gesundheitlichen Risiken der Produkte orientiert. Dieser Ansatz identifiziert zwei mögliche Leitlinien der Besteuerung gesundheitsschädlicher Produkte: das jeweilige harm level des Produktes und die Preiselastizitäten.

Unconditional intergovernmental grants are popular with economists but increasingly rarely observed in practice. Conversely, earmarking grants became a common form of the centres' support to states in federalist countries, though they are seriously flawed by welfare loss induced by the intended reallocation of states' provision of goods and services. Conditional grants bring states' governments a dilemma: intergovernmental grants increase states' revenues and enhance welfare, but the revenue gain is paid with amendments on the expenditure side, which harms welfare. We introduce the notion of price-shifting fungibility. It describes the effect of grant-receiving states minimizing the distortionary impact of conditional grants by lowering the prices or quality of the targeted good. By reducing the expenditure for the subsidized good, states create financial leeway to promote goods and services other than the targeted interest. By doing so, they can compensate for the welfare loss caused by conditional grants. We provide a simple theoretical model and some empirical evidence.

"Öffentliche Bildungsfinanzierung ist hinsichtlich ihrer Verteilungswirkung nicht unsozial, wie von ihren wettbewerbsorientierten Kritikern immer wieder behauptet wird. Die These von der regressiven, also die oberen Einkommensschichten begünstigenden Verteilungswirkung der Bildungspolitik ist so nicht zu belegen. Für die Forderung nach einem Rückzug des Staates aus der Bildungsfinanzierung gibt es damit aus volkswirtschaftlicher Sicht keine empirische Grundlage." (Autorenreferat)

Most itemized tax exemptions lead to significant deductions for a minority of the population only. This raises the question why the majority does not vote for the abolition of these tax privileges in exchange for lower tax rates. In this paper we show that a reform proposal may be voted down, even when the majority uses the exemption at stake below the average. Turning to an empirical application, we simulate the voting outcome on the proposal to abolish the tax deductibility of commuting expenses in Germany. Our model predicts that this proposal would be rejected, even though a comfortable majority has below-average deductions. Adapted from the source document.

The individual voting behavior on the abolishment of single income-tax exemptions crucially depends on how strongly agents are affected by other deduction possibilities that are not at stake in the reform plans of the government. The interactions depend (i) on the shape of the tax schedule, and (ii) on how the government wants to use the revenue that is generated by the cut of tax privileges. If government plans to increase redistribution in form of lump-sum transfers, then the political chances of a tax reform increase with the existence of other deduction possibilities under progressive taxation. With proportional taxation and a budgetenlargement policy, the voting decision depends only on the particular tax privileges at stake. Matters are different if the government wants to adopt a revenue-neutral tax-cut-cum-basebroadening policy. Except for strong progression, it is less likely that an agent supports the elimination of tax privileges the stronger she is affected by other exemptions in the back.

In this paper we analyze the political economics of different strategies to implement revenue neutral reforms of a complicated income tax system ('tax-cut-cum-base-broadening'). We set up a straightforward social choice model where individuals initially have two deduction possibilities from the tax base. The government wants to cut back the tax base exemptions and it can do so symmetrically or asymmetrically. Asymmetrical approaches face the difficulty that even such individuals can vote against an isolated cut (or an abolishment) of a single tax concession who benefit below average from it. In some constellations a symmetrical cut is in fact the only politically feasible option, whereas all asymmetrical reforms would not be supported by the public.