Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Half Title -- Series Page -- Title Page -- Copyright Page -- Table of Contents -- Notes on contributors -- Foreword -- References -- Acknowledgments -- Chapter 1: The pandemic age: An overview -- 1.1 Between pandemics and morality -- 1.2 Book summary -- Notes -- References -- Part I: Rationality and moral emotions -- Chapter 2: On the moral psychology of the pandemic agent -- 2.1 Introduction -- 2.2 Decision-making in an uncertain world -- 2.3 Filling gaps and resolving uncertainty -- 2.3.1 Need for cognitive closure -- 2.3.2 Need for uniqueness -- 2.4 Unrealistic optimism -- 2.4.1 What is unrealistic optimism? -- 2.4.2 Reasons for unrealistic optimism -- 2.4.3 Unrealistic optimism in the pandemic -- 2.5 Effects of biases in the pandemic - the good and the bad -- 2.6 Moral decision-making in times of crisis -- 2.7 Conclusions -- Acknowledgements -- References -- Chapter 3: Feeling lonely: Toward a phenomenological account of loneliness during the COVID-19 pandemic -- 3.1 Introduction -- 3.2 Loneliness during the COVID-19 pandemic -- 3.3 The ontological structure of pandemic loneliness -- 3.4 The bodily affective structure of loneliness -- 3.5 The cognitive dimension of loneliness -- 3.6 Conclusion -- Acknowledgments -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 4: From fear to anger: An investigation of the relationship between negative emotions and populism in the context of COVID-19 -- 4.1 Introduction -- 4.2 Pandemic stressors and the psychobiological bases of fear -- 4.3 The influence of fear and anger on social perception -- 4.3.1 Connecting fear and anger to political preferences -- 4.4 Populism and its relationship to fear and anger -- 4.4.1 Populist rhetoric and information mediated by fear and anger -- 4.5 Conclusion -- Notes -- References -- Chapter 5: "Nobody makes it alone": Toward a relational view of resilience -- 5.1 Introduction.

The mainstream view of the twentieth century suggests that the Scottish philosopher and economist Adam Smith made a tout court defense of individualism and the pure rational calculation of economics. However, we consider this to be a biased interpretation that ignores an integrated reading of his books, The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759) and Wealth of Nations (1776), which hinder a global view of his thinking. In opposition to this dominant view, we propose, as the central objective of this article, the conciliation between Smith's classical liberalism and his sentimental ethics, based on the notion of human dignity, present in the recognition of the other as an equal. If this hypothesis is confirmed, we will defend the thesis of sympathetic liberalism in Adam Smith's philosophical system. For this, we will analyze the feeling of Smithian sympathy and its interference in interpersonal relationships, then, the device of moral justification of impartiality as a promoter of fairness behavior. Finally, we will argue that the intertwining of these two elements of Smithian sentimental ethics in public space engenders a notion of human dignity compatible with his liberalism, insofar as it respects individual freedoms while fostering the progress of commercial societies. For such, we will make use of the work Theory of Moral Sentimentalism by Adam Smith and the article Sympathetic Liberalism: Recent Work on Adam Smith by Stephen Darwall.