Suchergebnisse

On June 26, 2015, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled, in Obergefell v. Hodges, that the Fourteenth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution forbids legal discrimination against same-sex marriage. The decision sent shock waves throughout the country, with both supporters and opponents regarding it as signal of dramatic shifts in public opinion and a revolutionary development on the road to sex-gender equality. Just two days earlier, on June 24, 2015, Stephen Macedo's Just Married: Same-Sex Couples, Monogamy, and the Future of Marriage was published. Macedo has always worked at the intersection of legal theory, normative theory, and public policy, and Just Married offers a nuanced liberal democratic defense of marriage equality with striking resonance in light of Obergefell. We have thus invited a range of scholars on LGBT rights, and LGBT politics more generally, to comment on his book.

In 2006, President Bush publicly stated that, in relation to the same-sex marriage issue, "activist judges" were thwarting the preferred policy of the elected representatives and the expression of popular will embodied in popular initiatives and constitutional amendments. Notwithstanding the philosophical discussion of the constitutionally assigned role of courts in the political system and the idea of judicial independence, President Bush's statement raises an interesting empirical question: In the case of same-sex marriage, have state and federal courts really acted in direct opposition to the expressed policy preferences of current or recent legislative majorities or overturned popular initiatives and constitutional amendments? Using evidence from state and federal legislative and judicial action around same-sex marriage primarily from the fifteen years preceding President Bush's 2006 statement, I argue that, with some rare exceptions, judges can not easily be identified as "activist" on the issue of same-sex marriage even if we assess their actions according to President Bush's criteria.

In this article, I argue that litigants identify the appellate courts as offering a powerful and public arena where litigants' claims are placed (at least temporarily) on an equal footing with the current state of the law. In this context, the initiation of appeals is treated as synonymous with receiving endorsements from the appellate courts that the litigants' original claims had sufficient merit to deserve better treatment than they had received previously from either the opposing parties or the trial courts. These actions work to raise appellants' social status, and I propose that such activity is one additional reason why some litigants might appeal.

Investigates whether self-representation in legal proceedings can be part of an effective legal strategy. Qualitative telephone interviews conducted with 23 self-represented & 72 lawyer-represented litigants seeking appeals following civil actions in IL, MN, & MS, 1991-1995 revealed a disjuncture between litigants' perceptions of the important issues in their claims & the central issues identified by the court. Consistent with the empowerment theory, it is argued that self-representation is used as a strategy aimed at forcing the courts to deal with issues that the litigants, but not the legal system, identify as critical in their disputes. While granting that the financial burdens associated with retaining legal counsel usually play a significant role in choosing self-representation, it is concluded that self-representation may still be a legitimate legal strategy in that it allows the particular concerns of the litigant to be voiced. 30 References. Adapted from the source document.

AbstractThis article reviews the results of a discipline-wide survey concerning lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and the transgendered in the discipline. We find that both research and teaching on LGBT topics have made some headway into the discipline, and that political scientists largely accept that LGBT issues can be fundamentally political and are worth studying and teaching for that reason. Nonetheless, troubling questions about discrimination both against those who conduct research concerning LBGT issues and LGBT individuals themselves remain.

From 1990 through 2004, same sex marriage emerged as a major policy issue. In responding to this controversial policy issue, many state legislatures demonstrated unusual behavior. A substantial minority of state legislatures continued to introduce new legislative bills on this topic long after the legal position of the respective state would indicate that the state had articulated a recognized and settled policy. In this article, we propose that the apparently aberrant behavior of these state legislatures can be explained in part by consideration of legislative signaling directed toward state courts. Specifically, we consider the attempt of state legislators to discourage intervention by the state courts around some policy issues.