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For policy makers and analysts, it is important to isolate the redistributive impact of tax-benefit policy changes from changes in the environment in which policies operate. When actual reforms are motivated by work incentives, it is also crucial to evaluate behavioural responses and the distributional consequences thereof. For that purpose, we embed counterfactual simulations in a formal framework based on the Shapley value decomposition and quantify the relative roles of (i) tax-benefit policy changes (direct policy effect), (ii) labour supply responses to the policy reforms (indirect effect) and (iii) all other factors affecting income distribution over time. An application to the UK shows that the redistributive reforms of the 1998-2001 period have offset the increase in inequality that would have occurred otherwise. They also contribute to a strong decline in child poverty and poverty amongst single parent households. In the latter group, a third of the headcount poverty reduction (and half of the reduction in the depth of poverty) is on account of the very large incentive effect of policy changes.

Using counterfactual microsimulations, Shapley decompositions of time change in inequality and poverty indices make it possible to disentangle and quantify the relative effect of tax-benefit policy changes, compared to all other effects including shifts in the distribution of market income. Using this approach also helps to clarify the different issues underlying the distributional evaluation of policy reforms. An application to the UK (1998-2001) confirms previous findings that inequality and depth of poverty would have increased under the first New Labour government, had important reforms like the extensions of income support and tax credits not been implemented. These reforms have also contributed to substantially reduce poverty among families with children and pensioners.

Using counterfactual microsimulations, Shapley decompositions of time change in inequality and poverty indices make it possible to disentangle and quantify the relative effect of tax-benefit policy changes, compared to all other effects including shifts in the distribution of market income. Using this approach also helps to clarify the different issues underlying the distributional evaluation of policy reforms. An application to the UK (1998-2001) confirms previous findings that inequality and depth of poverty would have increased under the first New Labour government, had important reforms like the extensions of income support and tax credits not been implemented. These reforms have also contributed to substantially reduce poverty among families with children and pensioners.

Using counterfactual microsimulations, Shapley decompositions of time change in inequality and poverty indices make it possible to disentangle and quantify the relative effect of tax-benefit policy changes, compared to all other effects including shifts in the distribution of market income. Using this approach also helps to clarify the different issues underlying the distributional evaluation of policy reforms. An application to the UK (1998-2001) confirms previous findings that inequality and depth of poverty would have increased under the first New Labour government, had important reforms like the extensions of income support and tax credits not been implemented. These reforms have also contributed to substantially reduce poverty among families with children and pensioners.

To assess the impact of tax-benefit policy changes on income distribution over time, we suggest a methodology based on counterfactual simulations. We start by decomposing changes in inequality/poverty indices into three contributions: reforms of the tax-benefit structure (rules, rates, etc.), changes in nominal levels of market incomes and tax-benefit parameters (benefit amounts, tax bands, etc.), and all other changes in the underlying population (market income inequality, demographic composition, employment level, etc.). Then, the decomposition helps to extract an absolute measure of the impact of tax-benefit changes on inequality when evaluated against a distributionally-neutral benchmark, i.e., a situation where tax-benefit parameters are adjusted in line with income growth. We apply this measure to assess recent policy changes in twelve European countries. Finally, the full decomposition allows quantifying the relative role of policy changes compared to all other factors. We provide an illustration for France and Ireland and check the sensitivity of the results to the decomposition order. -- Tax-benefit policy ; inequality ; poverty ; decomposition ; microsimulation

The literature on household behavior contains hardly any empirical research on the withinhousehold distributional effect of tax-benefit policies. We simulate this effect in the framework of a collective model of labor supply when shifting from a joint to an individual taxation system in France. We show that the net-of-tax relative earning potential of the wife is a significant determinant of intrahousehold negotiation but with very low elasticity. Consequently, the labor supply responses to the reform are entirely driven by the traditional substitution and income effects as in a unitary model. For some households only, the reform alters the intrahousehold distribution in a way that tends to change normative conclusions. A sensitivity analysis shows that the collective model would be required if the tax reform was both radical and of extended scope.

This study quantifies undeclared work patterns in France using a unique pilot survey which collects data on households' demand and supply of undeclared work (Enquête pilote auprès des ménages sur la fraude). It also proposes an international comparison at the European level using Eurobarometer data. Socio-demographic characteristics fail to explain the variance in undeclared work, while subjective factors are strongly associated with households' supply and demand for undeclared work. This suggests the underlying influence of intrinsic, extrinsic and peer effects. Similar results from the Eurobarometer allow for a cross-validation of the two surveys. We obtain similar correlates for undeclared work in France and countries where undeclared work is also a supplementary income (Denmark and Germany). This suggests homogeneous patterns across European countries.

This study quantifies undeclared work patterns in France using a unique pilot survey which collects data on households' demand and supply of undeclared work (Enquête pilote auprès des ménages sur la fraude). It also proposes an international comparison at the European level using Eurobarometer data. Socio-demographic characteristics fail to explain the variance in undeclared work, while subjective factors are strongly associated with households' supply and demand for undeclared work. This suggests the underlying influence of intrinsic, extrinsic and peer effects. Similar results from the Eurobarometer allow for a cross-validation of the two surveys. We obtain similar correlates for undeclared work in France and countries where undeclared work is also a supplementary income (Denmark and Germany). This suggests homogeneous patterns across European countries.

While degraded trust and cohesion within a country are often shown to have large socioeconomic impacts, they can also have dramatic consequences when compliance is required for collective survival. We illustrate this point in the context of the COVID-19 crisis. Policy responses all over the world aim to reduce social interaction and limit contagion. Using data on human mobility and political trust at regional level in Europe, we examine whether the compliance to these containment policies depends on the level of trust in policy makers prior to the crisis. Using a double difference approach around the time of lockdown announcements, we find that high-trust regions decrease their mobility related to non-necessary activities significantly more than low-trust regions. We also exploit country and time variation in treatment using the daily strictness of national policies. The efficiency of policy stringency in terms of mobility reduction significantly increases with trust. The trust effect is nonlinear and increases with the degree of stringency. We assess how the impact of trust on mobility potentially translates in terms of mortality growth rate.