Suchergebnisse

Recent studies (Brace and Hall 1990, 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992; Hall and Brace 1989) have demonstrated that state supreme court judges' decisionmaking is influenced by the type of selection mechanism that put them into office. In particular, judges are found to respond to the interests of those who have placed them on the bench. We extend this line of inquiry further by testing the effect of rules governing the retention of these judges in merit systems. Do these judges respond to the subtle differences in constituency that these rules establish? We address this question with a larger dataset than that used in previous studies of decisionmaking (Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992), and we find overwhelming evidence of the effects of these retention rules. In fact, we also conclude that judicial decisions are more influenced by the actor charged with retaining them than the actor who placed them on the bench in the first place. Adapted from the source document.

Recent studies (Brace and Hall 1990, 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992; Hall and Brace 1989) have demonstrated that state supreme court judges' decisionmaking is influenced by the type of selection mechanism that put them into office. In particular, judges are found to respond to the interests of those who have placed them on the bench. We extend this line of inquiry further by testing the effect of rules governing the retention of these judges in merit systems. Do these judges respond to the subtle differences in constituency that these rules establish? We address this question with a larger dataset than that used in previous studies of decisionmaking (Brace and Hall 1995, 1997; Hall 1987, 1992), and we find overwhelming evidence of the effects of these retention rules. In fact, we also conclude that judicial decisions are more influenced by the actor charged with retaining them than the actor who placed them on the bench in the first place.

Following the Civil War, the Democratic Party enjoyed almost complete dominance in southern electoral politics. Democratic hegemony was particularly acute in gubernatorial elections: In most southern states, more than a century elapsed before the first Republican governor was elected. Gubernatorial electoral success is a fundamental question, given the prominence of governors in state politics and the importance of states in the federal system. Here, we develop a model that explains the election of Republican gubernatorial candidates. We find that election of Republican governors in the South was delayed because of a comparative lack of quality Republican gubernatorial candidates in that region throughout much of the 20th century. Our research clarifies the contradictions reported in prior work by demonstrating that the effect of candidate quality varies by party and region. Interestingly, the competitive advantage once enjoyed by the Democratic Party in the South is now firmly held by the Republican Party.