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Over the past few years, the number of political science departments offering qualitative methods courses has grown substantially. The number of qualitative methods textbooks has kept pace, providing instructors with an overwhelming array of choices. But how to decide which text to choose from this exhortatory smorgasbord? The scholarship desperately needs evaluated. Yet the task is not entirely straightforward: qualitative methods textbooks reflect the diversity inherent in qualitative methods itself. Consequently, evaluating qualitative methods textbooks consists more of weighing competing strengths than identifying weaknesses. I undertake just such an evaluation in the following survey, which should be useful both to teachers of qualitative methods and to researchers keen to brush up on specific techniques.

AbstractThroughout Latin America, particular business conglomerates have begun to sponsor their own political parties, building those parties on their own corporate assets. These "corporation-based parties" represent a new wave of highly particularized conservative representation in the region. Indeed, corporation-based parties have become a regular—though largely unrecognized—feature of contemporary Latin American party systems. This article develops a theory of how and why particular business conglomerates sponsor their own parties, provides substantial evidence for the existence of corporation-based parties across much of Latin America, and uses a case study of a party built on a Panamanian supermarket chain to demonstrate how such parties are organized. In closing, it discusses the possible future for these parties in the region.

During the first decade of the 2000s, Bolivia occasionally turned violent. Yet the causes of these episodes of sustained violence have not yet been identified. To this end, this article tests which mechanisms theorized by existing scholarship produced two prolonged episodes of violence. It concludes that both episodes emerged from the same causal pathway: the national government provoked violence by seeking to raze the economic foundations of well-organized sectors – sectors that represented the mass bases of ascendant political oppositions. This finding not only sheds light on political order in Bolivia, but also opens up new directions in research on violent confrontation in Latin America.

During the first decade of the 2000s, Bolivia occasionally turned violent. Yet the causes of these episodes of sustained violence have not yet been identified. To this end, this article tests which mechanisms theorized by existing scholarship produced two prolonged episodes of violence. It concludes that both episodes emerged from the same causal pathway: the national government provoked violence by seeking to raze the economic foundations of well-organized sectors -- sectors that represented the mass bases of ascendant political oppositions. This finding not only sheds light on political order in Bolivia, but also opens up new directions in research on violent confrontation in Latin America. Adapted from the source document.

Abstract
Although Ecuadorian presidents tolerate most opposition voices most of the time, they routinely try to restrict the basic political liberties of particular critics. In doing so, they initiate executive assaults. Why do some of these executive assaults succeed while others fail? This article analyzes patterns of support for and opposition to publicly contested assaults in Ecuador between 1979 and 2004. Using a combination of statistical tests and a case study, it develops an argument based on the relative power of different types of organizations and associations to influence the outcomes of assault conflicts. The analysis demonstrates that executive assaults fail only when neither the state security forces nor the business sector supports them. In this situation, particular business organizations are able to force presidents to back down. The analysis provides new insights into the social foundations of democratic practice in Ecuador, and Latin America more broadly.

Recent studies appear to show that democracy has no robust association with economic growth. Yet all such work assumes that the causal effect of democracy can be measured by a country's regime status in a particular year (T), which is correlated with its growth performance in a subsequent period (T+l). The authors argue that democracy must be understood as astock,rather than alevel,measure. That is, a country's growth performance is affected by the number of years it has been democratic, in addition to the degree of democracy experienced during that period. In this fashion, democracy is reconceptualized as a historical, rather than a contemporary, variable—with the assumption that long-run historical patterns may help scholars to understand present trends. The authors speculate that these secular-historical influences operate through four causal pathways, each of which may be understood as a type of capital: physical capital, human capital, social capital, and political capital. This argument is tested in a crosscountry analysis and is shown to be robust in a wide variety of specifications and formats.