Suchergebnisse

The status of women as property is shown to be reflected in and reinforced by the social and legal perceptions of rape and prostitution in the United States. Rape laws and their enforcement are shown to protect a man's property interests in a woman. Prostitution laws and their enforcement are shown to allow the treatment of the prostitute as common property. The significance of race and income class are noted. The experience of women in capitalist and socialist societies is considered to determine the relationship between the elimination of rape and prostitution and the existence of private property and sexism.

The success of the Superfund program rests substantially on the ability of the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to induce major corporations to share in the cost of a multibillion-dollar hazardous waste site cleanup effort. Over the past decade, EPA enforcement strategy has evolved from highly accommodative to much more enforcement oriented. Reports also indicate a substantial increase in application of Superfund's most powerful enforcement tools. Industrial targets of EPA enforcement are attempting to shift partial liability and transaction costs onto third parties. Viewed against the economic and political evolution of EPA strategy, a continuation of the enforcement-first approach depends on the willingness of society to accept the costs of sanctioning the powerful.

The Environmental Protection Agency's Superfund enforcement program is examined to test the hypothesis that change in the political environment contributes to implementation failure. Agency achievements are evaluated under two enforcement strategies: a Burford strategy dominated by the Reagan administration deregulatory agenda and a Ruckelshaus/Thomas strategy that is more in keeping with the Agency's initial pro‐regulatory legislative mandate. The latter strategy is found to be more effective in terms of quantitative and qualitative enforcement outcome measures. This supports the conclusion that the systematic intrusion of deregulatory politics into enforcement strategy formulation contributed to Superfund failure.

Social regulation resolves the conflict over who will bear the costs of production‐related harm to public health, safety, and the environment. The extent of social regulation reflects the political power of affected interests, the economic consequences of control, and the prevailing regulatory ideol‐ ogy. In this paper, I analyze the impact of the Reagan deregulatory ideology on implementation of the Superfund program to cleanup hazardous waste sites. Itesolution of the conflict over enabling legislation is examined to gauge the relative political power of Superfund Act supporters. Resolution of the ronflict over implementation is examined to determine the extent to which these same political forces limited the success of the Reagan ideology in promoting regulatory inaction.

Industry culture and industry economy have been used, with mixed results, to explain violations of law by corporate enterprise. The purpose of this paper is to use these theoretical concepts to examine differential noncompliance with tax law across Swedish industry in the early 1980s. A measure of noncompliance by industry is developed using tax audit data. The impact of audit policy on measured noncompliance is evaluated. Differences in industry culture are indicated by information on the presence and diffusion of techniques for noncompliance. Differences across industries in incentives to violate are indicated by bankruptcy rates and opportunities to gain through noncompliance. A hypothetical model is offered that explains the dynamic interaction of these factors and that could generate the static results reported. The paper concludes with a discussion of industry‐level analysis in predicting corporate violations.