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Revolutionary protest rarely begins as democratic or revolutionary. Instead, it grows in a process of positive feedback, incorporating new constituencies and generating new demands. If protest is not revolutionary at its onset, theory should reflect this and be able to explain the endogenous emergence of democratic demands. In this article, I combine multiple data sources on the 2010–2011 Tunisian Revolution, including survey data, an original event catalogue, and field interviews. I show that the correlates of protest occurrence and participation change significantly during the uprising. Using the Tunisian case as a theory-building exercise, I argue that the formation of protest coalitions is essential, rather than incidental, to democratic revolution.

AbstractThis article asks how, when, and why people came to mobilize en masse in the name of the Tunisian nation against French Protectorate rule. Rather than taking anti‐colonial nationalism as an inevitable response to the imposition of colonial rule, the account offered here insists that it is an outcome to be explained. Building on more recent theoretical directions that stress the processual, relational, and eventful dynamics of nationalism, the article shows that nationalism and nationalist mobilization cannot be attributed simply to the workings of nationalist intellectuals, to long‐standing grievances, or to larger macro‐level transformations. Rather, seeing nationalism as part of struggle and as a domain in which various forms of contentious politics are played out, I show how attention to a particular contentious event in the anti‐naturalization campaign can help us to understand how a certain version of the nation becomes salient as a mobilizing rubric for mass‐level mobilization and how various forms of contention coalesce to produce nationalist outcomes.

Saudi Arabia has one of the highest rates of Twitter penetration in the world. Despite high levels of repression, the platform is frequently used to discuss political topics. Recent disclosures from Twitter have revealed state-backed attempts at distorting the online information environment through influence operations (IOs). A growing body of research has investigated online disinformation and foreign-sponsored IOs in the English-speaking world; but comparatively little is known about online disinformation in other contexts or about the domestic use of IOs. Using public releases of IO tweets, we investigate the extent of such activity in Saudi Arabia. Benchmarking these tweets to four samples of Saudi Twitter users, we find that engagement with IO accounts was lower than engagement with the average user, but equal to engagement with news accounts. Network analysis reveals that engagement with IO accounts was largely driven by a small number of influential accounts.

Saudi Arabia has one of the highest rates of Twitter penetration in the world. Despite high levels of repression, the platform is frequently used to discuss political topics. Recent disclosures from Twitter have revealed state-backed attempts at distorting the online information environment through influence operations (IOs). A growing body of research has investigated online disinformation and foreign-sponsored IOs in the English-speaking world; but comparatively little is known about online disinformation in other contexts or about the domestic use of IOs. Using public releases of IO tweets, we investigate the extent of such activity in Saudi Arabia. Benchmarking these tweets to four samples of Saudi Twitter users, we find that engagement with IO accounts was lower than engagement with the average user, but equal to engagement with news accounts. Network analysis reveals that engagement with IO accounts was largely driven by a small number of influential accounts.

Focal days of protest are increasingly common to episodes of revolutionary mobilization. This paper explores the significance of focal days in patterning sustained protest in Egypt and Tunisia from 2011 to 2012. In Egypt, resource-poor activists exploited the confluence of worshippers on Fridays to mobilize mass transitory protest. This reliance on ritualized action hindered cross-sectoral coordination and meant mass protest often failed to inflict a direct economic cost. In Tunisia, there was no focal day of protest, in large part due to the coordinating hand of trade unions. In consequence, mass protest was more likely to span multiple sites, sectors, and tactics. These results suggest that oppositions can sustain mass mobilization even absent organizational capacity, but a reliance on a focal day limits the potential of protest over a political transition. Supplementary analyses point to the applicability of our findings to a number of other Arab Spring countries.

Prevailing understandings of labor protest and strikes take as their focus stable democratic settings where autonomous trade union structures are an established component of the organizational resources available to workers. We extend the analysis of labor mobilization to a radically different context: Egypt in the year of the January 25th Revolution, when workers mobilized en masse in the absence of union leadership. For this, we use a catalogue of 4,912 protest events reported in Arabic-language newspapers. Our findings point to the importance of cross-sectoral demonstration effects in contexts of political disorganization—local and national mobilization advancing both labor and nonlabor demands inspired subsequent labor protest. This speaks to the value of understanding labor protest and strikes not as delimited domains of action but as parts of a wider universe of contentious politics. In addition, state-level signals of opportunity and shifts in economic conditions are also found to pattern the incidence of labor mobilization.

Prevailing understandings of labor protest and strikes take as their focus stable democratic settings where autonomous trade union structures are an established component of the organizational resources available to workers. We extend the analysis of labor mobilization to a radically different context: Egypt in the year of the January 25th Revolution, when workers mobilized en masse in the absence of union leadership. For this, we use a catalogue of 4,912 protest events reported in Arabic-language newspapers. Our findings point to the importance of cross-sectoral demonstration effects in contexts of political disorganization-local and national mobilization advancing both labor and nonlabor demands inspired subsequent labor protest. This speaks to the value of understanding labor protest and strikes not as delimited domains of action but as parts of a wider universe of contentious politics. In addition, statelevel signals of opportunity and shifts in economic conditions are also found to pattern the incidence of labor mobilization.

What are the determinants of ethnic violence? Existing research has forwarded a range of often competing explanations, from political opportunism to economic competition to state incapacity. We argue that this diversity of accounts is attributable, in part, to scholars' tendency to lump together distinct forms of ethnic violence that have different underlying determinants. We propose that scholars instead disaggregate ethnic violence and put forward a typology based on the target of the attack (properties vs. individuals) and whether assailants use arms. We demonstrate the utility of this typology by applying it to an original dataset of ethnic attacks against Christians in Egypt from 2013 to 2018. In addition to a set of shared factors, we find that unarmed attacks against property ("burnings") are the product of political mobilization, unarmed attacks against individuals ("beatings") are related to socioeconomic tensions, and armed attacks ("bombings") follow the strategic logic of terrorist violence.

Mazumder investigates the long-term effect of protest on political attitudes. He finds that whites have more liberal views on race and are more likely to be Democrats in counties where Civil Rights protest was reported in the early 1960s. The analysis omits a crucial predictor of protest and of racial attitudes: college education. We include the proportion of adults with a college degree and the number of college students at the county level. The inclusion of these variables, along with some other contextual variables from the original dataset, cuts the effect of protest by about half. Protest is no longer statistically significant in eight out of nine combinations of outcome variables and protest measures. The size of the effect remains trivial when we shift analysis from the county to the individual level. Even accounting for the individual's own education, the county's proportion of college graduates is strongly associated with racial liberalism. This finding emphasizes the importance of education as a contextual variable. Our conclusion highlights two methodological lessons. First, causal inference should be paired with sustained historical inquiry that specifies plausible mechanisms. Second, statistical tests for sensitivity can induce complacency about the risk of confounding.

AbstractHow does protest affect political speech? Protest is an important form of political claim-making, yet our understanding of its influence on how individual legislators communicate remains limited. Our paper thus extends a theoretical framework on protests as information about voter preferences, and evaluates it using crowd-sourced protest data from the 2017–2019 Fridays for Future protests in the UK. We combine these data with ~2.4m tweets from 553 legislators over this period and text data from ~150k parliamentary speech records. We find that local protests prompted MPs to speak more about the climate, but only online. These results demonstrate that protest can shape the timing and substance of political communication by individual elected representatives. They also highlight an important difference between legislators' offline and online speech, suggesting that more work is needed to understand how political strategies differ across these arenas.

AbstractWho joins extremist movements? Answering this question is beset by methodological challenges as survey techniques are infeasible and selective samples provide no counterfactual. Recruits can be assigned to contextual units, but this is vulnerable to problems of ecological inference. In this article, we elaborate a technique that combines survey and ecological approaches. The Bayesian hierarchical case–control design that we propose allows us to identify individual-level and contextual factors patterning the incidence of recruitment to extremism, while accounting for spatial autocorrelation, rare events, and contamination. We empirically validate our approach by matching a sample of Islamic State (ISIS) fighters from nine MENA countries with representative population surveys enumerated shortly before recruits joined the movement. High-status individuals in their early twenties with college education were more likely to join ISIS. There is more mixed evidence for relative deprivation. The accompanying extremeR package provides functionality for applied researchers to implement our approach.

Abstract
A body of research suggests that social media has afforded new opportunities for orchestrating mobilization in autocracies. However, the mechanisms linking online coordination with offline mobilization are rarely demonstrated. We address this lacuna by exploring the impact of Farsi-language social media posts that called for protest on precise days and locations in Iran during the 2017 'Dey Protests'. To conduct our analysis, we match a dataset of posts with an original protest event catalogue. Our results show that if a district was the subject of a protest call, it was much more likely to witness higher levels of mobilization on the target date. This relationship was especially pronounced for calls that received more online engagement. The findings suggest that the digital commons can play a role akin to an analogue protest flyer: social media posts can inform broad audiences of the where and when of upcoming mobilization.