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This paper is a response to the paucity of theoretical and empirical research into the political actions undertaken by organisations to influence policymakers' responses to economic and financial crises. By using original, primary data gathered from semi-structured interviews conducted with Brussels-based Government Affairs Managers of multi-national enterprises, it reports the results of inductive, exploratory research into corporate political activity during the 2007-2011 financial crisis. Results suggest that not all firms are in favour of increased regulatory intervention during times of economic upheaval. They also imply that, during recessions, firms are more likely to seek long-term as opposed to short-term relationships with policymakers, they also have a greater propensity to engage in collective political action than individual political action and they use information strategies more frequently than constituency-building and financial-incentive strategies. These results are subsequently used as the basis for a conceptual framework that draws on numerous theoretical traditions to capture the antecedents of firms' political behaviours during economic crises. Given the absence of theoretical and empirical work that actively engages with this issue, the research makes important contributions to the existing literature on corporate political activity. It also has practical implications for corporate political strategists and policymakers. [Copyright John Wiley and Sons, Ltd.]

This paper is a response to the paucity of theoretical and empirical research into the political actions undertaken by organisations to influence policymakers' responses to economic and financial crises. By using original, primary data gathered from semi‐structured interviews conducted with Brussels‐based Government Affairs Managers of multi‐national enterprises, it reports the results of inductive, exploratory research into corporate political activity during the 2007–2011 financial crisis. Results suggest that not all firms are in favour of increased regulatory intervention during times of economic upheaval. They also imply that, during recessions, firms are more likely to seek long‐term as opposed to short‐term relationships with policymakers, they also have a greater propensity to engage in collective political action than individual political action and they use information strategies more frequently than constituency‐building and financial‐incentive strategies. These results are subsequently used as the basis for a conceptual framework that draws on numerous theoretical traditions to capture the antecedents of firms' political behaviours during economic crises. Given the absence of theoretical and empirical work that actively engages with this issue, the research makes important contributions to the existing literature on corporate political activity. It also has practical implications for corporate political strategists and policymakers. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to explore the cultural dimensions of corporate political activity (CPA).Design/methodology/approachThe study uses a qualitative research design. Data collected from interviews conducted with the Brussels‐based Government Affairs Managers of French and British firms are analysed to examine the impact of national culture on their objectives and preferred political strategies.FindingsThe findings suggest possible relationships between the cultural dimensions elaborated by Hofstede and the different components of corporate political action: uncertainty avoidance can help explain managers' objectives when becoming politically active; the long‐term vs short‐term dimension can account for their general approaches to political activity; their level of participation in the political process can be explained by the individualism vs collectivism dimension; and their choices of specific lobbying tactics and techniques can be explained in terms of power distance.Practical implicationsAs firms increasingly interact with foreign rivals when seeking to influence policy outcomes, knowing that corporate political strategies are in part culturally grounded can help Government Affairs Managers to anticipate, respond to and act on the strategies pursued by firms socialised in other national cultures.Originality/valueWhile previous mainstream research into CPA is based largely on universal theories, the primary contribution of the paper is to introduce national culture as a variable to explain cross‐country differences in the types and processes of firms' political activities.

Using original data from a survey conducted in 2012, we apply theoretical insights from the literature on strategic alliances to explore Brussels-based corporate lobbyists' perceptions of prospective political partners. We find these perceptions to be driven primarily by strategic considerations. We also uncover instances where the size and nationality of respondents' firms influence their partner evaluations. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that respondents' assessments of lobbying partners are shaped by EU institutional arrangements. Whilst extant literature suggests information and relationships are important preconditions for successful EU lobbying, we expose the specific circumstances when seeking access to these—and other political resources—that can influence corporate lobbyists' perceptions of their partners. Combined, our findings respond to a concern that scholars of interest coalitions focus on why firms lobby in coalitions whilst overlooking how they select their lobbying partners.

Using original data from a survey conducted in 2012, we apply theoretical insights from the literature on strategic alliances to explore Brussels-based corporate lobbyists' perceptions of prospective political partners. We find these perceptions to be driven primarily by strategic considerations. We also uncover instances where the size and nationality of respondents' firms influence their partner evaluations. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that respondents' assessments of lobbying partners are shaped by EU institutional arrangements. Whilst extant literature suggests information and relationships are important preconditions for successful EU lobbying, we expose the specific circumstances when seeking access to these—and other political resources—that can influence corporate lobbyists' perceptions of their partners. Combined, our findings respond to a concern that scholars of interest coalitions focus on why firms lobby in coalitions whilst overlooking how they select their lobbying partners.

Using original data from a survey conducted in 2012, we apply theoretical insights from the literature on strategic alliances to explore Brussels-based corporate lobbyists' perceptions of prospective political partners. We find these perceptions to be driven primarily by strategic considerations. We also uncover instances where the size and nationality of respondents' firms influence their partner evaluations. Surprisingly, we find little evidence that respondents' assessments of lobbying partners are shaped by EU institutional arrangements. Whilst extant literature suggests information and relationships are important preconditions for successful EU lobbying, we expose the specific circumstances when seeking access to these—and other political resources—that can influence corporate lobbyists' perceptions of their partners. Combined, our findings respond to a concern that scholars of interest coalitions focus on why firms lobby in coalitions whilst overlooking how they select their lobbying partners.

Using original data collected from a survey of Brussels-based Government Affairs Managers (GAMs) in May and June 2010, we explore the political actions of firms in the European Union during the 2007–10 financial crisis. Findings suggest that the financial constraints imposed by the crisis had a significant impact on whether GAMs entered into short-term or long-term relationships with policy makers and whether they engaged in individual or collective action. Significant crosscountry differences were also observed between the political objectives pursued by firms, their propensity to engage in collective political action, and the tactics they use to influence policy makers. Taken together, these findings challenge institutional explanations of EU lobbying, which suggest that the EU system of policy making provides powerful incentives for firms to adopt specific lobbying behaviours in order to gain a seat at the EU policy-making table.

The goal of this book is to provide the skills for science and engineering to meet the challenges of their future careers, whether they be in academia, industry, or as an entrepreneur. The book is based upon a course taught at Rice University entitled Management for Science and Engineering (MSCI-610 - ENGI 610), which was started in 1998. The course was taught to undergraduates, graduate students, and professional masters students and involves the areas of organizational behavior & leadership, accounting, marketing, strategy, entrepreneurship, and project management. It is this last area that is covered in this book. Irrespective of your future career in science and engineering you will be involved in projects and an awareness of the factors that enable a successful project is important for all team members. It should be recognized that the topics included in the book are not limited to scientists and engineers, they are useful for people in any careers. This course is not aimed at making you a certified project manager, but to provide the skills that will allow you to be a more effective project team member and also when you are dragged screaming and kicking into the role of accidental project manager. ; This work was created using the Connexions authoring platform. This platform will be retired as of the end of 2021. This work has been migrated to PDF format for continuous access to the educational content, however any embedded links within the text to the legacy platform may no longer be accessible.

Our target article, "Insects have the capacity for subjective experience," has provoked a diverse range of commentaries. In this response we have collated what we see as the major themes of the discussion. It is clear that we differ from some commentators in our commitments to what subjective experience is and what the midbrain is capable of. Here we clarify where we stand on those points and how our view differs from some other influential perspectives. The commentaries have highlighted the most lively areas of disagreement. We revisit here the debates surrounding whether the cortex is essential for any form of consciousness in vertebrates, how to interpret interventionist evidence, and whether any specific behavioural criteria can be used to assess the occurrence of consciousness. We recognise that these debates will not be resolved once and for all in this discussion, and we take this opportunity to explore what new forms of experimental evidence might be needed to provide clarity. We emphasise how functional neurobiological analyses in combination with careful behavioural studies of a diverse range of animals will help progress our understanding of how neural circuits can support different forms of behaviour. Ultimately this will help us reach an understanding of how different conscious capacities could be supported by neural systems, and which animals are capable of them.

We use data from in-depth interviews with business lobbyists in Brussels to investigate why they choose to join lobbying coalitions. We find that lobbyists face two competing institutional incentives. First, they are confronted with incentives to ally with other European organisations, develop multi-lateral policy messages and communicate messages to the Commission and the Parliament. Simultaneously, they face inducements to join narrower coalitions, develop bilateral policy messages and direct those messages at the Council. Lobbyists' receptivity to these incentives – and thus their choices of lobbying coalitions – differs with their age, educational background and with the type and ownership structure of the organisations they represent. Combined, our findings contribute to the limited, mainly American literature on interest coalitions by demonstrating that lobbyists operate in complex institutional environments, and that their interpretations of and reactions to institutional complexity are shaped by individual- and organisational-level factors.