Suchergebnisse

The last two decades have witnessed a decrease in public health expenditure relative to total health spending. One may ask whether this decreasing role of Government expenditure in the financing of health care is due to mature options on the desired health care system or is more the result of Governments complying with more binding budget constraints. In this paper, we provide a first answer to this question, based on evidence for a set of OECD countries. The main point of the paper can be easily stated: the observed smaller role of public financing of health expenditures in total public expenditure is the result, to a significant extent, of exogenous political pressures for lower Government budget deficits. Given an overall budget ceiling, there is no evidence supporting a general time change in health spending priority in the budget bargaining process. However, we do find that Government budget constraints lead to lower priority of health care in the Government's budget allocation process. This conclusion seems to hold whether health public spending is determined by a bargaining process within the Government or by population needs. At least, the empirical evidence provided suggests that more research on the political process governing health care expenditures is desirable. ; N/A

Mestrado em Mathematical Finance ; O número cada vez maior de investidores não profissionais a adquirir produtos financeiros complexos levou a União Europeia a adotar regulamentos sobre como os PRIIP lhes devem ser apresentados e como ajudá-los a tomar decisões de investimento informadas através da comparação de produtos oferecidos por diferentes fornecedores. Estes regulamentos - n. 1286/2014 e Regulamento Delegado 2017/653 - apresentam as regras de como avaliar os produtos no que toca ao seu nível de risco, desempenho futuro, custos e como apresentar todas estas métricas num único documento - o Documento de Informação Fundamental (DIF) - de modo a garantir que as instituições financeiras que vendem produtos financeiros atuam em benefício dos interesses dos investidores. Produtos cambiais, produtos financeiros que permitem duas contrapartes adquirir ou vender moeda estrangeira, fazem parte dos produtos para os quais se devem apresentar DIF aos investidores no âmbito dos Regulamentos supramencionados. Se um investidor não profissional desejar assumir uma posição longa ou curta numa moeda estrangeira, o banco deve-lhe fornecer DIF do produto que melhor se aplica aos seus interesses. O DIF deve ser gerado e atualizado tendo em conta: o par de moeda a transacionar; os dados que servem como base de cálculo do nível de risco, dos custos e do desempenho futuro; a maturidade do acordo; e qual a moeda a ser comprada ou vendida em concreto. Este Trabalho leva a cabo o estudo e análise do conteúdo dos DIF referente ao desempenho de produtos cambiais para quatro cenários distintos: stress, desfavorável, moderado e favorável. ; The crescent number of non-professional investors taking positions on complicated financial products has led the European Union to adopt regulations about how PRIIPs must be presented to their potential buyers and aid them in making informed investment decisions through comparison amongst a diverse supply of products. These regulations - No 1286/2014 and the Commission Delegated Regulation 2017/653 - present rules on how to assess key pieces of information about the products' types market risk-wise, their risk levels, performance expectations, cost profiles and how to provide all these metrics in a single document - the Key Information Document (KID) - to insure that the institutions that sell investment products act on behalf of the investors' best interests. Foreign Exchange products, financial instruments that allow two counterparties to acquire or dispose of positions on foreign currency, fall in the scope of the aforementioned regulations. Every time a non-professional investor wishes to have a long or short position on a currency, the bank must provide them with the KID of the product that best suits their interest. The KID must be generated and updated according to: the currency pair being traded; the data that serves as a base for market risk, performances and cost calculations; the maximum tenor of the deal; and what currency from the pair is being purchased or sold. This report carries out the study and analysis of the KID's content referring to Foreign Exchange products' performances under four different scenarios: stress, unfavorable, moderate and favorable. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/publishedVersion

The article aims to present the geographical (political and economic) importance of Mato Grosso do Sul (MS) for the connection of Brazil with its South American neighbors and particularly in the construction of Bioceanic Corridors. Thus, in addition to being a geopolitical platform (for projecting influence), it is argued that MS has enormous productive and logistical potential within the scope of South American integration. Still, with the objective of contributing to public policies, a mapping of the main infrastructure projects that can improve the integration of the MS with neighboring countries is presented. It's given an emphasis to those that are part of the bioceanic road corridor, and how these projects should be viewed from a broader set and structuring of projects and investments, notably those of a multimodal nature. For this reason, it's also presented some relevant rail and river transport projects – waterways and ports – even North-South sense. The methodology used involves the bibliographic review of authors of Brazilian geopolitics, databases and documents on South American physical integration, especially from UNASUR and IIRSA, documents from government agencies (BNDES, for example), and news published by the government of Mato Grosso do Sul or by the local press.

We consider the interplay between regulatory agencies with overlapping competencies: for example, a competition authority and a sectoral regulator. This reflects the current situation in the European Union and in the US. We analyse how authorities' incentives to act are affected if they can decide independently, or must follow each others' opinions, respectively, and consider how this relationship performs in the presence of institutional biases and lobbying efforts. A higher likelihood of closing a case tends to be achieved when the authorities act independently of each other: the probability of coming to a decision is higher, and decisions are less vulnerable to lobbying. ; authorsversion ; published

Ramsey pricing has been proposed in the pharmaceutical industry as a principle to price discriminate among markets while allowing to recover the (fixed) R&D cost. However, such analyses neglect the presence of insurance or the fund raising costs for most of drug reimbursement. By incorporating these new elements, we aim at providing some building blocks towards an economic theory incorporating Ramsey pricing and insurance coverage. We show how coinsurance affects the optimal prices to pay for the R&D investment. We also show that under certain conditions, there is no strategic incentive by governments to set coinsurance rates in order to shift the financial burden of R&D. This will have important implications to the application of Ramsey pricing principles to pharmaceutical products across countries.

Our concern is with a firm-specific industrial policy. When R&D subsidies or taxes are differentiated among firms, the question arises which firms in an industry should receive such support. We analyze a situation where firms differ in their R&D technologies in two distinct ways: They differ both in the costs of performing R&D activities and in the output obtained from such activities. We find that the optimal firm-specific industrial policy is affected differently by the two sources of firm heterogeneity. Furthermore, a change in a firm's R&D productivity has an ambiguous effect on the optimal policy towards the firm.