Suchergebnisse

Az idősödő európai társadalmakban kiemelten fontos közpolitikai kérdés, hogy milyen formális és informális intézményi keretekben szerveződik a tartós gondoskodás. Az elmúlt évtizedek európai reformjai a gondoskodás területén az ellátások hozzáférhetőségének és megfelelő minőségének, illetve a tartós gondoskodás pénzügyi és humán erőforrásainak biztosítására irányultak. Ezek a változások többféle mechanizmuson keresztül hatnak a nők és a férfiak részvételére a fizetett és a háztartási munkákban, következményük pedig ellentmondásos a nemek közötti egyenlőségre. A tartós gondoskodás intézményi szerveződése beágyazódik a családról alkotott elképzelésekbe és a társadalmak általános viszonyulását tükrözi idős, illetve fogyatékos állampolgáraikhoz, a gondoskodási munkák világához, valamint a férfiak és nők közötti munkamegosztáshoz. A gondoskodási politikák, illetve a munka és a családi élet összeegyeztetését alakító politikák mintázatait európai összehasonlításban, a fuzzy set ideáltípus-elemzés módszerével vizsgáljuk. A tartós gondoskodás intézményi szerveződésében kiemelt figyelmet fordítunk a családi és családi kereteken túli gondoskodás (de/familializáció) kettősségére. Ideáltípusaink kiindulópontja Nancy Fraser klasszikus tipológiája, az empirikus elemzés dimenziói pedig a tartós gondoskodás közösségi finanszírozásának nagysága, az ellátatlan gondozási szükségletek, az otthoni gondoskodás szabályozása, illetve a nők és a férfiak fizetett munkában történő részvétele. A tartós gondoskodás feltárt intézményi mintázatait összevetjük a nemek közötti egyenlő(tlen)ség és a bevándorlók otthoni gondoskodásban történő részvételének megfigyelhető mutatóival. Eredményeinkben részben visszaköszönnek a jólétirezsim-tipológiáknak az európai országok összehasonlításában szokásos mintázatai, néhány posztszocialista ország esetében ugyanakkor transzformatív, a nemek közötti egyenlőség érdemi előmozdítására utaló jeleket tapasztalunk.

Recent changes in the organization of long-term care have had controversial effects on gender inequality in Europe. In response to the challenges of ageing populations, almost all countries have adopted reform measures to secure the increasing resource needs for care, to ensure care services by different providers, to regulate the quality of services, and overall to recalibrate the work-life balance for men and women. These reforms are embedded in different family ideals of intergenerational ties and dependencies, divisions of responsibilities between state, market, family, and community actors, and backed by wider societal support to families to care for their elderly and disabled members. This article disentangles the different components of the notion of '(de)familialization' which has become a crucial concept of care scholarship. We use a fuzzy-set ideal type analysis to investigate care policies and work-family reconciliation policies shaping long-term care regimes. We are making steps to reveal aggregate gender equality impacts of intermingling policy dynamics and also to relate the analysis to migrant care work effects. The results are explained in a four-pronged ideal type scheme to which European countries belong. While only Nordic and some West European continental countries are close to the double earner, supported carer ideal type, positive outliers prove that transformative gender relations in care can be construed not only in the richest and most generous welfare countries in Europe.

Analyzes the relative positions of managers & bankers in the postsocialist Hungarian economic elite in light of competing theses about managerial rule & bank hegemony in capitalist economies. Privileged & dominant positions in the economic elite are distinguished, drawing on 1990 & 1993 survey data. Socioeconomic indicators are elucidated, along with the career trajectories of economic elite from pre- to posttransition. Banker & manager career patterns differed markedly in terms of workplace career & multiple position holding, as well as Hungarian Workers Party (HSWP) membership under state socialism. While managers rose to subelite positions quicker than bankers, the latter ascended more quickly from subelite to elite positions. Manager career-related contacts were mostly in professional organizations & in the HSWP, whereas bankers were more frequently connected to external board & advisory positions. Banker & manager opinions on the control & speed of privatization are compared, finding that a key factor behind attitudinal differences was one's position in the elite. It is concluded that there is not much support for the idea that large enterprise managers played a decisive role in postsocialist conditions, but not all evidence points to the hegemonic positioning of bankers; segments of the economic elite are still competing for primacy. 3 Tables, 25 References. J. Zendejas

Analyzes the relative positions of managers & bankers in the postsocialist Hungarian economic elite in light of competing theses about managerial rule & bank hegemony in capitalist economies. Privileged & dominant positions in the economic elite are distinguished, drawing on 1990 & 1993 survey data. Socioeconomic indicators are elucidated, along with the career trajectories of economic elite from pre- to posttransition. Banker & manager career patterns differed markedly in terms of workplace career & multiple position holding, as well as Hungarian Workers Party (HSWP) membership under state socialism. While managers rose to subelite positions quicker than bankers, the latter ascended more quickly from subelite to elite positions. Manager career-related contacts were mostly in professional organizations & in the HSWP, whereas bankers were more frequently connected to external board & advisory positions. Banker & manager opinions on the control & speed of privatization are compared, finding that a key factor behind attitudinal differences was one's position in the elite. It is concluded that there is not much support for the idea that large enterprise managers played a decisive role in postsocialist conditions, but not all evidence points to the hegemonic positioning of bankers; segments of the economic elite are still competing for primacy. 3 Tables, 25 References. J. Zendejas

AbstractPolicy change frameworks are commonly used to understand policy development processes. However, few studies have attempted to apply these frameworks to the recent popular fee-free policy education at the high school level in Sub-Saharan Africa. Investigating fee-free policy development through policy change frameworks can assist both in identifying the genesis of past policies, including who the important actors are, how issues are framed and problematised, and how specific solutions are designed, as well as how to interpret unfolding policies. In this article, we review three prominent policy change frameworks: Baumgartner and Jones' "punctuated equilibrium framework," Sabatier and Jenkins-Smith's "advocacy coalition framework," and Kingdon's "multiple streams framework." After reviewing the frameworks, we apply them to two fee-free policies in Ghana which are Progressive Free Senior High School and Free Senior High School policies to understand the drivers of fee-free policy change. From the socio-political background, three main concepts were derived from these policy change frameworks deducing from the basic assumptions of these theories. They are domestic politics, political and policy entrepreneurs, and socio-economic dynamics. The results show that fee-free policies are largely driven by domestic politics and political and policy entrepreneurs in political executive positions. Factors under socio-economic dynamics are only scope conditions that are not significant to trigger the adoption of a fee-free policy.

The rise of populist governance throughout the world offers a novel opportunity to study the way in which populist leaders and parties rule. This article conceptualises populist policy making by theoretically addressing the substantive and discursive components of populist policies and the decision-making processes of populist governments. It first reconstructs the implicit ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies based on the mainstream governance and policy making scholarship. Then, taking stock of the recent populism literature, the article elaborates an ideal type of populist policy making along the dimensions of content, procedures and discourses. As an empirical illustration we apply a qualitative congruence analysis to assess the conformity of a genuine case of populist governance, social policy in post-2010 Hungary with the populist policy making ideal type. Concerning the policy content, the article argues that policy heterodoxy, strong willingness to adopt paradigmatic reforms and an excessive responsiveness to majoritarian preferences are distinguishing features of any type of populist policies. Regarding the procedural features populist leaders tend to downplay the role of technocratic expertise, sideline veto-players and implement fast and unpredictable policy changes. Discursively, populist leaders tend to extensively use crisis frames and discursive governance instruments in a Manichean language and a saliently emotional manner that reinforces polarisation in policy positions. Finally, the article suggests that policy making patterns in Hungarian social policy between 2010 and 2018 have been largely congruent with the ideal type of populist policy making.

The rise of populist governance throughout the world offers a novel opportunity to study the way in which populist leaders and parties rule. This article conceptualises populist policy making by theoretically addressing the substantive and discursive components of populist policies and the decision-making processes of populist governments. It first reconstructs the implicit ideal type of policy making in liberal democracies based on the mainstream governance and policy making scholarship. Then, taking stock of the recent populism literature, the article elaborates an ideal type of populist policy making along the dimensions of content, procedures and discourses. As an empirical illustration we apply a qualitative congruence analysis to assess the conformity of a genuine case of populist governance, social policy in post-2010 Hungary with the populist policy making ideal type. Concerning the policy content, the article argues that policy heterodoxy, strong willingness to adopt paradigmatic reforms and an excessive responsiveness to majoritarian preferences are distinguishing features of any type of populist policies. Regarding the procedural features populist leaders tend to downplay the role of technocratic expertise, sideline veto-players and implement fast and unpredictable policy changes. Discursively, populist leaders tend to extensively use crisis frames and discursive governance instruments in a Manichean language and a saliently emotional manner that reinforces polarisation in policy positions. Finally, the article suggests that policy making patterns in Hungarian social policy between 2010 and 2018 have been largely congruent with the ideal type of populist policy making.

Hungary Post-2010 has been ruled by Viktor Orbán and his right-wing Fidesz party and is generally regarded as a typical case of populist governance. Reforming the Penal Code was one of the first major policy changes initiated by Fidesz shortly after winning the 2010 elections. It introduced the 'three-strikes' principle into Hungarian penal policy which is considered a prime example of penal populism. It could be inferred that in the past decade Hungarian penal policy has been dominated by penal populism and punitive measures. This paper argues that reality is more nuanced and presents the concepts of penal populism and populist policy making, with a special focus on the Hungarian context. The article provides an overview of the most important penal policy measures in the past two decades and examines whether and how increased strictness of legislative acts influenced the sentencing practice. The paper highlights the related results of an empirical survey on public opinions about criminal law and ends with a case study exploration of the intersections of lowering the age limit of criminal responsibility and penal populism.