Suchergebnisse

In this paper a network model is developed in which three players sequentially choose their strategies. In the first stage, a profitmaximizing network firm chooses the price and thus the size of the network. In the second stage the consumers decide whether to join in the network or not. In the last stage a hacker has the opportunity to hack the network and cause damage to the consumer. The success of hacking is based on the protection of the customers. Whereas in the first part of the paper this is given exogenously it is endogenized later on. In an extension, the utility of the hacker as well as the consumers includes psychological costs, thus allowing some further insights. Finally, policy implications are given implying better international cooperation of the law enforcement authorities.

Many firms have to decide whether and how much of their business activities they want to digitize. Several studies point to considerable differences, especially between small- and large-sized firms. This paper develops a simple model that shows under which conditions digitization can be profitable for a firm. At first, different competitive situations are taken into account and subsequently, the effects of security problems on digitization decisions are examined using the example of the dangers of a cyberattack. The results show that digitization is a dominant strategy, which results in a prisoner's dilemma if the competition is fierce. Moreover, in highly competitive markets, firms should set common security standards to protect against unauthorized access.

Der Markt für Social Games verzeichnet hohe Wachstumsraten und stellt ein lukratives Umfeld für potentielle Neueintreter dar. Allerdings ist dieser Markt durch einige ökonomische Besonderheiten gekennzeichnet, die ihn von traditionellen Märkten unterscheiden und bei jeder unternehmerischen Entscheidung zu berücksichtigen sind. Zudem steigt die dortige Wettbewerbsintensität zunehmend, während zugleich mit den Interessen der Betreiber sozialer Netzwerke sowie den anspruchsvoller werdenden Kunden umgegangen werden muss, und damit die dort aktiven Unternehmen vor große Herausforderungen stellt. Dieser Beitrag beleuchtet den Markt näher, identifiziert wichtige Erfolgsfaktoren und Preisstrategien, stellt aktuelle Entwicklungen dar und gibt darauf basierend Handlungsempfehlungen. As the market for social games becomes more and more important, many game developers try to enter this market. However, firms must be aware that this market features some special economic features which distinguish it from traditional markets. As this market matures, competition gets fiercer and consumers become more demanding. Moreover, the social networks interests also challenge the game developers. This paper analyzes the market, identifies important factors of success and pricing strategies, and derives recommendations. Keywords: spieldesign, monetarisierungsstrategien, konsumentenprofil, alleinstellungsmerkmal

Florian W. Bartholomae integriert die Idee heterogener Konsumenten in ein Modell mit inter- und intra-industriellem Handel. Dies ermöglicht es, horizontalen und vertikalen intra-industriellen Handel in einem einheitlichen Modellrahmen zu erklären und aufzuzeigen, wie die Handelsstruktur vom Entwicklungsstand der beteiligten Länder abhängt. Dr. Florian W. Bartholomae studierte Volkswirtschaftslehre an der Ludwig-Maximilians-Universität München und promovierte bei Univ.-Prof. Dr. Karl Morasch an der Universität der Bundeswehr München.

Entscheidungstheorie -- Grundlegende Konzepte -- Simultanspiele -- Mehrstufige Spiele -- Wiederholte Spiele -- Unvollständige Information -- Methodik -- Industrieökonomische Anwendungsbeispiele -- Finanzwissenschaftliche Anwendungsbeispiele -- Militärische Anwendungsbeispiele -- Anwendungsbeispiele aus verschiedenen Bereichen.

The coronavirus pandemic poses major challenges for governments. Especially in the beginning when news of the virus was breaking, information about the virus was limited. Many minor (e.g., facemasks) and major (e.g., curfews) restrictions were implemented to contain the virus. However, the German government failed at presenting a clear and targeted strategy, which led to confusing and overwhelmingly detailed regulations that did not entail suitable cost-benefit considerations. Many costs occurred as a consequence of the measures that were instituted (e.g., government aid for forced shop and restaurant closures). In addition, asymmetric interventions severely impacted the economic structure of and the careers, for example, those in the hospitality industry. We suggest that the government focus on more general recommendations for action based on sound information, which would then provide an appropriate framework for the markets.

The demographic problems in developed countries are getting more and more important. Very low fertility rates especially among skilled individuals will soon become relevant for a country's economy. Also of importance is education of children. Since there is an increasing demand for skilled workers, the positive correlation between social background and education worsens the situation. Therefore family planning as well as fertility providing and educational measures are of major importance for regional decision makers. We define in our model the optimal number of children considering the income and education of their parents by using a Cobb-Douglas utility function which implies that children and consumption are complementary goods. Children are considered to be a differentiated good with respect to their education. Therefore, we distinguish between high educated and low educated children. After deciding the optimal number of children, the education level of children has to be determined. We assume that only one parent is responsible for the education. Further we presume a negative correlation between the opportunity costs of educating a child and their parent's qualification. Since we consider the parents income and education, many cases result. Regional policy makers have the possibility to change individual decisions regarding offspring by creating monetary incentives. As wages and therefore family income are exogenous, the regional governments have only two policy measures left: either child allowance and/or scholarships. Considering the population's preferences, regions may optimize the number and structure of children.

The demographic development in Germany has severe consequences on the economic and social development of the country. The aging and decreasing of the population are certainly the most considered aspects of the demographic change. We consider additionally the competition between regions for inhabitants, which can be observed in Germany and aggravates the country's demographic situation. Indicators such as the natural population development, the fertility rate, the sex ratio, the migration, etc. are varying significantly from region to region. Very strong regional differences in these indicators are observable between East and West Germany, as well as between North and South Germany. High-qualified persons are recruited by other regions for the purpose to built higher location advantages. This intensified competition leads to very big regional differences that some regions cannot successfully face. The consideration, that a cooperation of regions instead their competition would yield success regarding the demographic problem, which is stronger through the national migration, is very important. We consider in our model two utility-maximizing German regions that pursue a policy of attracting young inhabitants through different policy measures.Therefore, we construct an oligopoly model that picture the competition situation. A Prisoner's dilemma results, where each region has the incentive to attract inhabitants from the other region, despite that cooperation between both regions would lead to higher welfare, better allocation of the factors and less government spending.

Based on an extended welfare chauvinism concept that more systematically integrates the labor market and public finance aspects, this paper examines the impact of the refugee crisis − which culminated in the EU in 2015/16 − on changes in voting behavior in Germany (revealed in the two German federal elections in 2013 and 2017), explaining the attitudinal preference for ethnic boundaries around national welfare systems and the emergence of the right-wing populist party AfD. For this dynamic approach, an OLS analysis is conducted based on county-level data. The variables are selected taking into account existing theoretical and empirical findings in the international context, combined with Germany-specific facts and experiences, local demographic and economic differences, and party-specific voter characteristics. Among the key empirical findings are sufficiently reliable indications of the occurrence of welfare-chauvinistic effects that led to the success of the AfD in the 2017 election.