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In politics, actors hold different ideological positions across issues from foreign trade to welfare states. These actors form coalitions without necessarily settling their differences. However, some disagreements are considered to be irreconcilable and hinder cooperation. This research seeks to identify mechanisms of coalition building in an environment where actors deal with multiple issues. I conducted case studies to understand how actors cooperate in real life. This article explains how I used that data to draw inferences on coalition dynamics in politics. My case studies focused on France (1814-1830) and the Ottoman Empire (1860-1908)--two cases from different geographies and eras featuring different types of actors and points of contention. This piece explains how I used this data to run longitudinal network models to establish what type of disagreements do not hinder cooperation. This study is informative for researchers who use case studies as well as those who combine unconventional methods in their research design.

Cover -- Title -- Copyright -- Dedication -- Contents -- List of Tables and Figures -- List of Abbreviations -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction -- 1 Global Value Chain & -- Changes in the Nature of the Firm -- 2 Petroleum Value Chain & -- Its Transformation -- 3 Impact of the Changes on the IOC-OSC Relationship -- 4 Case Studies: IOC & -- OSC Relationship in Selected Sectors -- 5 Conclusion -- Appendix: Research Methodology -- Index.

Offering a nuanced and realistic account of the authority of international law, this book discusses whether international law is obeyed, and the type of duties it imposes on the state. Through a review of present accounts ranging from the mainstream to extra-disciplinary, the extent of authority is explored.

We show the effects of the bargaining power of labour unions on product innovation under decentralised and centralised wage bargaining. In this context, we show the implications of preference function, which affects the market size. A higher union bargaining power increases innovation if bargaining is decentralised, the market expansion effect is weak and the cost of innovation is moderate but low. Otherwise, a higher union bargaining power reduces innovation. Hence, whether a higher union bargaining power increases or decreases product innovation depends on the type of wage bargaining, market expansion effect and the cost of innovation.

Despite the overstated, pessimistic claims that the social relationships as well as their quality are weakening and that individuals have become lonely, isolated, selfinterested, uncaring and lacking in trust as a result of the 'individualisation' of contemporary 'Western' life, relationships today are far more subtle, complex and multifaceted. Friends play a crucial role in the lives of international students and provide vital support to those studying abroad. However, the concept and meaning of friendship have been altered considerably and are challenged by our increasingly mobile and interc

Trina Nileena Banerjee, Performing Silence: Women in the Group Theatre Movement in Bengal. Oxford University Press, 2021, 354 pp., ₹1795 (Hardbound). ISBN 978-0-19-012770-1.

Abstract
We consider a bargaining game in which both sides are uncertain about their opponent's commitment, which leads to delay and welfare loss in equilibrium. We address the following question: does ex ante better public information about a player improve expected social welfare? We show that if the information cannot turn the bargaining table (turns the weak bargainer into a strong one and vice versa), more information does not help. More information about a weak bargainer has zero impact, whereas that about the strong bargainer is strictly detrimental. Moreover, by specialising in a binary signal structure, we show that if the information is more accurate in every state, it improves social welfare when it can turn the table.