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The fact that people are being forced to flee from war and disastersis a very current issue. This study concerns young peoplewho have experienced war, taken shelter in Sweden, and havebeen placed in institutions. The purpose of the study is to identifyand analyse power relations that contribute to the shaping ofyoung people's identities and repertoires of action via stigmatisationsand social comparisons with different reference groups.Max Weber (1922/1968) analyses power as a direct action by anactor X that forces an actor Y to act according to X's will, even ifthe action is contrary to Y's interests or will. Weber draws attentionto two dimensions of power relations. The first dimension ismaintained through the practical implementation of pressure(s)or the threat thereof. The second dimension is maintained whenthose who are vulnerable give up or yield and accept the powerof the executor of the said pressure. The power of the executorof pressure often includes an order with content that is expectedto be followed by particular individuals or groups (Weber1922/1968). Randall Collins' (2004, 2008) analysis of power, conflict,solidarity, resistance, and status is inspired by Weber's perspective. Collins believes that in all social arenas, the exercise ofpower is always met with resistance from other people, thus generatingnew conflicts. For Collins, 'conflict and solidarity are twosides of the same coin'. Mobilisation against an enemy often leadsto solidarity among individuals and groups, and vice versa. Thestudy's empirical material includes qualitatively oriented interviews with six young people in institutional care from Afghanistan, Iraq and Syria who have experienced war followed by aplacement in institutional care in Sweden. During the interviewswith the young people, the following themes are discussed: 1) lifebefore the war began; 2) the atmosphere in the home town whenthe war began; 3) experiences during the war; 4) an ordinary dayduring the war; 5) fleeing to Sweden; 6) the efforts made by institutionalcare workers, social services, the Swedish MigrationAgency, legal representatives, school; 7) life at the institution; 8)help after arriving to Sweden and after; 9) processing trauma;10) differences among the young people; 11) explicit and implicitidentifications (refugee, immigrant, war victim, etc.); 12) futureprospects; 13) future help from various public authority staff. The preliminary analysis of power relations in young people'sstories reveals the following themes: a) power relations in war asa permanent state of society; b) power relations in schooling asan arena for war stories; c) power relations and the learning ofan existence characterised by war; d) power relations, normalisation,and neutralisation of states of war; e) power relations whenfleeing war as part of the war; f) power relations in Sweden (includingthe fight for the recognition of numerous identities, suchas a student, worker, husband, breadwinner, and homosexual). ; Society and politics. Power, politics, and social sciences (100 years after Max Weber), Faculty of Political Science, University of Banja Luka, Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina (20200918-20200919). "Unaccompanied young refugees with war experiences in institutional care in Sweden. A Weberian-inspired analysis of power relations in the narratives of young persons". (Plenary session). ; Youth with war experiences in institutional care

QUESTIONS: 1. WHY DO WE NEED education for a culture of peace and non-violence? 2. WHAT NEW KNOWLEDGE do we gain? 3. Is a culture of peace possible in a violent (unjust) world? 4. WHAT DOES the term "culture of remembrance" MEAN, which is a controversial phrase based on a vague mixing of individual and collective memory? 5. WHY ARE culture, multiculturalism, cultural policy, identity policy, preservation of national, ethnic, religious or cultural identity IMPORTANT? EXPLANATION OF THE TOPIC: Building of peace in today's conflicts requires a long-term commitment to establishing connections and relationships across all social levels: relationships that strengthen the resources of reconciliation within society and make effective use of contributions outside it. Peacebuilding is not just work to prevent a return to the conflict of once conflicting parties, but it focuses on the real causes not only of the just-ended war, but of all potential conflicts. In this sense, we can distinguish between a negative peace, that is, the absence of armed conflict and a positive peace that includes justice, equality and other fundamental social and political goods. In a narrower sense, peacebuilding is a process that facilitates the establishment of long-term peace and that seeks to prevent a recurrence of violence by focusing on the causes and consequences of conflict through reconciliation, institution building, political and economic transformation. (Catherine Morris; John Paul Lederach; Barnett et al., 2007; Maiese, 2003; HKO "Kruh sv. Ante"- Trauma centar) ; PITANJA: 1. ZAŠTO NAM JE NEOPHODNO obrazovanje za kulturu mira i nenasilja? 2. KOJA NOVA ZNANJA dobijamo? 3. Da li je moguća kultura mira u nasilnom (nepravednom) svijetu? 4. ŠTA ZNAČI izraz "kultura sjećanja" koji predstavlja spornu sintagmu koja se zasniva na nejasnom miješanju individualne i kolektivne memorije? 5. ZAŠTO SU ZA VAŽNI kultura, multikulturalizam, kulturna politika, politika identiteta, očuvanje nacionalnog, etničkog, religijskog ili kulturnog identiteta? OBRAZLOŽENJE TEME: Izgradnja mira u današnjim sukobima traži dugotrajnu predanost uspostavljanja veza i odnosa peko svih društvenih razina: odnosa koji osnažuju resurse pomirenja unutar društva i učinkovito iskorištavaju doprinose izvan njega. Izgradnja mira nije samo rad na sprečavanju povratka u sukob nekad sukobljenih strana, već se usmjerava na prave uzroke ne samo netom završenog rata, već svih potencijalnih sukoba. U tom smislu, možemo razlikovati negativan mir, odnosno, izostanak oružanog sukoba te pozitivan mir koji uključuje pravdu, jednakosti i ostala temeljna socijalna i politička dobra. U užem značenju, izgradnja mira je proces koji olakšava uspostavu dugoročnog mira te koji pokušava prevenirati ponavljanje nasilja time što se usmjerava na uzroke i posljedice sukoba kroz pomirenje, izgradnju institucija, političku te ekonomsku transformaciju. (Catherine Morris; John Paul Lederach; Barnett et al., 2007; Maiese, 2003; HKO "Kruh sv. Ante"- Trauma centar) ; The third International Victimology Conference in Bosnia and Herzegovina "Education for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence", Institute for Development of Victimology, Bosnia and Herzegovina; Foundation "Help Victims of Power and the Authority Abuse in Bosnia and Herzegovina"; University of Bihać, Bosnia and Herzegovina. "Education for a Culture of Peace and Non-Violence" ("Obrazovanje za kulturu mira i nenasilja"). ; War anomie

The aim of this ethnographic study is to analyse themes for 'the successful collaborations' that emerge from the study field notes on youth in Swedish juvenile care, and that can be interpreted as beneficial for these youth. These successful collaborations were observed, for instance, at meetings where the young persons were being discussed, and where an observer could distinguish planning for them that was carried out practically. The empirical base for this study is its total of 119 field observations/notes. The examples analysed reference a completed appointment for an eye test, a practical realization of active leisure, homework help and an internship placement that works. The coherence of three actors belonging to three different categories (coherent triads), and success points of interest that benefit the youth in the situation, create the image of a positive development for them. In this way, common identities of interplay that are useful for the young person are created and elucidated. The physical presence of the young person in these situations is an especially important theme for the 'successful collaboration'. This study shows that trust and motivation are important aspects for a successful collaboration and inclusion of less powerful individuals and groups of individuals within a community. Young people discussed in this study receive confirmation of their identities by participating in the community, with a successful interaction between actors in juvenile care a prerequisite for successful involvement and integration.

Émile Durkheim's sociological term 'anomie,' which indicates normlessness or a state of norm resolution, is the theme of this ethnographic study. The purpose is to analyze how intelligence and operational personnel in the various border authorities in Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania describe the category "Russian criminals" and which discursive patterns cooperate with the construction of the category "norm-dissolving Russian." Multiple forms of empirical material were analyzed in this study: observations and photographs taken during the field work (718 field hours), interviews (73), documents produced by intelligence and operative personnel, and media coverage concerning intelligence and operative actions. This ethnography explains how police and border guards in the Baltic Sea area reinforce in-group bonds, develop a professional identity, and come to understand the moral aims of their work: by contrasting themselves against the constructed threat of Russian criminals, spies, and military invaders. Intelligence and operational police and border guard work is a practice in which the work from the first moment is characterized by an abstract threat, justified by considering that the stability of society can be transformed into instability if crime is not fought. Police officers and border guards in this study are constructed as key figures in the struggle to prevent the resolution and preserve the current state of society, which is portrayed as stable and better – at least if we speak with intelligence and operative police officers and border guards. From time to time, a "criminal" from Russia has a key role in the performance of law enforcement's fluctuating morality, with the threat of norm resolution coming from Russia and attenuation of the threat based on the representation of effective law enforcement. The media reporting on intelligence and operations, as well as the documentation that was created by the authorities involved in the fight against crime in the Baltic Sea area, call out the "criminals" from Russia by their absence. The media report on syndicates from Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania who commit crimes in Sweden and Finland. In documents created by the intelligence and operational personnel, it is reported that more than 700 individuals had been suspected or convicted of a crime in any of the European countries. Most are citizens of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The picture presented in the interviews is different. Actors in this study produce Russians as the leading criminals in the Baltic region. Russian criminals are represented as organizers and leading figures in various types of crime. An informant's story is constructing a symbolic reality where law-abiding and conventional actors strive to maintain stability in the normative order, in this case referring to the crime that comes from Russia. This reality is partly an expression of fear and solidarity against norm resolution in the form of crime from Russia, and expressions of social development that raise the need for a contra-group to strengthen feelings of solidarity in the norm-stable societies.The identity-based symbolism that informants are constructing in their stories is based on the current and stable normative state of society. ; Citation for published version : Basic, G. (2016). (Un)Making Europe: Anomie in Intelligence and Operational Police and Border Guard Work in the Baltic Sea Area. (Un)Making Europe: Capitalism, Solidarities, Subjectivities , the 13th European Sociological Association Conference , organized by Hellenic Sociological Society, Athens, Greece; Panteion University of Social & Political Sciences, Athens, Greece and Harokopio University, Athens, Greece. Available online: https://www.conftool.pro/esa2017/index.php?page=browseSessions&form_session=1090

Raširenost vladajućih normi u društvu u kontekstu rata, okupacije, anarhije i preuzimanja vlasti od strane kriminalnih snaga uništava stare, ali postavlja nove norme, koje takođe mogu biti odbačene. Anomija se može opisati kao nukleus društva, kao vrsta "pulsirajuće moralne destrukcije" koju niko ne kontroliše, ali koja paradoksalno proizvodi socijalni red. Anomija se ne rađa iz ništavila, iz praznine; ona je produkt interaktivne dinamike koja nastaje kada se pojedinci udruže, djelujući kao pogonsko gorivo koje potiče pojedince da se sretnu. Émile Durkheim se fokusira na to kako međuljudska interakcija stvara promjene u društvu, pri čemu često pokazuje različite patološke karakteristike koje dovode do frustracije i konflikta. Individualna potraga za sopstvenim oslobađanjem od zajednice dovodi do gubitka osjećaja pripadnosti, a time i otuđenja. Kada se stare društvene mreže pokidaju, postaje nemoguće održati stare norme i vrijednosti. Pojedinac više nije ograničen moralnim načelima i autoritetom. Umjesto toga, može da razvije obrazac po kojem konstantno prevazilazi sve granice jer se kolaps prijašnje socijalne kontrole poklapa sa razvojem sistema koji zahtijeva konstantan porast individualnih potreba. Produkt takve interakcije je stanje društva u kojem postoji nesigurnost po pitanju vrijednosti, ciljeva i normi. Durkheim ovakvo stanje naziva "anomijom". Durkheim analizira devijacije normi (kao i individualni i društveni odgovor/reakciju na devijacije normi, kao što je kazna) kao sastavni dio problema solidarnosti i socijalne kohezije. Moralni red u društvu prema Durkheimu ima fundamentalnu vrijednost zato što su pojedinci integrisani u zajednicu koja ih kontroliše. Durkheim vidi integraciju kao način da se pojedinac veže za zajednicu kroz zajednički stav, solidarnost i rituale. On vidi kontrolu kao silu koja opčinjava i veže pojedinca za norme kroz pravni sistem, zakone i sankcije. Durkheim definiše odstupanje od norme kao čin koji vrijeđa jaku i jasnu kolektivnu svijest. Zbog toga su djela antisocijalna ako krše norme i vrijednosti koje su inače važan segment društvenog jedinstva. Rad obavještajnih i operativnih policijskih i graničnih snaga u oblasti Baltičkog mora (Švedskoj, Finskoj, Estoniji, Litvaniji i Letoniji) karakterističan je po ritualima konstantnog stvaranja normi od samog početka dana: od jutarnje kafe i prve razmjene informacija sa obavještajnom službom do operativnih radnji kao što su nadzor ili kontrola pojedinaca ili automobila. Ove interakcije se odlikuju jakom željom da se očuva postojeći društveni red. Što se tiče prijetnje postojećim normama postoje i normativni rituali. Na primjer, u ovakvim interakcijama, konstruišu se "Rusi koji odbacuju norme", oni nisu fizički prisutni u određenoj situaciji, ali su važni u tim vezama kao neki nevidljivi sveti objekti. Stvaranje kategorije "Rus koji odbacuje norme" u kojoj su Rusija/Rusi iskorišteni za dramatizaciju "drugih" je vidljivo u empirijskom materijalu kada akteri u studiji opisuju (1) Ruse kriminalce, (2) ruske špijune i (3) ruskuvojnu okupaciju. ; Resolution of the prevailing norms in a society in the context of war, occupation, anarchy,and takeover by criminal forces dispels the old norms but also sets new norms, which in turn can bequickly dispelled. Anomie can be understood as the core of society, as a kind of "pulsating moral destructiveness" that no one really can control but that paradoxically produces social order. Anomie does not arise from nothing, from the void; it is the product of the interactive dynamics that arise when individuals come together, acting as a propellant to lead individuals to meet. Émile Durkheim's attention goes to how interpersonal interaction is creating changes in society, often showing thevarious pathological features that can lead to frustration and conflict. The individual's quest toliberate himself from the collective as a result has a rootlessness and isolation. When the old network dissolves, it becomes impossible to maintain the old norms and values. The individual is no longer limited by the rules of morality and authority. Instead, the individual may develop a pattern of constantly exceeding all limits because the collapse of the former social control coincides with the development of the system that requires constant growth of individual needs. The product of such interactions is a state of society where there is uncertainty about the values, goals, and norms. Durkheim refers to this state as "anomie". Durkheim analyzes deviation from the norm (as well as individual and societal response/reaction to the norm deviation, such as punishment) as an integral part of the issue of solidarity and social cohesion. The moral order in a society has a fundamental value according to Durkheim because individuals are both integrated with and controlled by the community. Durkheim saw integration as a way to tie the individual to the community through shared attitude, solidarity, and rituals. He saw control as a compelling force that binds the individual to the norms through the judicial system, laws, and sanctions. Durkheim defines a deviation from the normas an act that offends a strong and definite collective consciousness. Thus, the acts are antisocial inthat they violate norms and values that are important to the social unity. The work of intelligence and operational police and border guards in the Baltic Sea area (Sweden, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania, and Latvia) is characterized by the norm-creating and re-creating rituals from the first moments of theday: from the morning coffee and the first information exchange with an intelligence partner to operational actions in the form of surveillance or control of individuals and/or cars. These interactions are characterized by a strong desire to preserve the prevailing social order. In relation tothe threat to the prevailing norms, there also are normative rituals. For example, in these interactions,"norm-dissolving Russians" are constructed who are not physically present in the situation but whoare important in the relationship as invisible sacred objects. The making of the category "norm-dissolving Russian" in which Russia/Russians are used to dramatize the "other" is made visible in the empirical material when actors in the study describe (1) criminal Russians, (2) Russian espionage, and (3) Russian military invasion. ; II International Scientific Conference. "Social Deviations", Centar modernih znanja, Banja Luka, Bosnia and Herzegovina (20171013-20171014). "Društvo i anomija. Sociološka analiza obavještajnog i operativnog policijskog rada i rada granične službe u oblasti Baltičkog mora" (Society and anomie. Sociological analysis of intelligence and operational police and border guard work in the Baltic Sea area). (Plenary session).

In the German camps during the Second World War, the aim was to kill from a distance, and the camps were highly efficient in their operations. Previous studies have thus analyzed the industrialized killing and the victims' survival strategies. Researchers have emphasized the importance of narratives but they have not focused on narratives about camp rituals or analyzed postwar interviews as a continued resistance and defense of one's self. This article tries to fill this gap by analyzing stories told by former detainees in concentration camps in the Bosnian war during the 1990s. This article aims to describe a set of recounted interaction rituals as well as to identify how these rituals are dramatized in interviews. The retold stories of humiliation and power in the camps indicate that there was little space for individuality and preservation of self. Nevertheless, the detainees seem to have been able to generate some room for resistance, and this seems to have granted them a sense of honor and self-esteem, not least after the war. Their narratives today represent a form of continued resistance.

In this analysis of the retold experiences of 27 survivors of the war in northwestern Bosnia, the aim is to describe the informants' portrayal of "war violence", "sexual war violence", "victimhood", and "reconciliation" as a social phenomenon as well as analyzing the discursive patterns that contribute to constructing the category "victim" and "perpetrator". The violence practice during the war is portrayed as organized and ritualized and this creates a picture that the violence practice became a norm in the society, rather than the exception. When, after the war, different categories claim a "victim" status, it sparks a competition for victimhood. All informants are eager to present themselves as victims while at the same time the other categories' victim status are downplayed. The stories of reconciliation are connected to the past; the interactive consequences of war-time violence are intimately linked to the narrator's war experiences. The interviewees distance themselves from some individuals or described situations. It is common that the portrayal of possible reconciliation is transformed into a depicted implacable attitude, thus the interviewees negotiate their stances: they articulate between reconciliation and implacability statements. This study shows that after the war in Bosnia, the interpretations of biographical consequences of violence are intimately connected to previous war experiences. Narratives on the phenomenon "war violence" and "sexual war violence" depict a decay of pre-war social order. The use of violence during the war is described as organized and ritualized, which implies that the use of violence became a norm in society, rather than the exception. The narratives on the phenomenon "war violence" produce and reproduce the image of human suffering and slaughter. Those subjected to violence are portrayed in a de-humanized fashion and branded as suitable to be exposed to it. In these stories, morally correct actions are constructed as a contrast to the narratives on war violence. In these descriptions, the perpetrator is depicted as a dangerous, evil, and ideal enemy. He is portrayed as a real and powerful yet alien criminal who is said to pose a clear threat to the social order existing before the war. The narratives on wartime violence, war perpetrators, and those subjected to violence during war are enhanced with symbolicism of ritualized ethnic violence ("cockade," "chetnik," "Serb," "Muslim," "warlord"). On one hand, the narrators make an ethnic generalization based on the differences between the ethnic categorizations; on the other hand, they present their own physical existence and ethnic identity and that of those subjected to violence as being threatened by the violent situation. The disintegration of the existing, pre-war social order produces and reproduces a norm resolution that enables the ritualized war-time use of violence. This development allows the normalization of war violence in this time period even though the result, as this study shows, means human suffering and the slaughter of humans. This study presents this development in society ambivalently, as both allowed and normatively correct (during the war) and as prohibited and condemned (primarily in retrospect, in post-war narratives). It seems as if the category "war violence" and "sexual war violence" means different things depending on whether it happened during war or not, whether it is retold or observed, and who is telling the story. For some persons, violence targeting civilians during the war is an act of heroism. The Holocaust during World War Two was in many cases highly efficient and industrialized; the typical goal was to kill from a distance, impersonally. Researchers have noted that those who climbed the ranks to leadership positions or were in charge at concentration camps seemed to have engaged in very personal, sadistic acts in Germany during WWII. Is there an interaction of rank/power in wartime and level of motivation/energy input required for violence (ie, those in charge require less energy input because of the factors that put them in charge in the first place)? The stories and phrasing in this paper emphasize a distant, evil, and/or powerful leader who motivates the crowd (perhaps in part by symbolically reducing an ethnic target to something like a dog or rat) or gives orders, with the distinction from Holocaust violence that the leaders in these stories were neighbors, etc., of those they were harming and killing. In general contrast, the war violence in Bosnia was more broadly characterized by the individualized use of violence, in which the perpetrators often knew those subjected to violence. The stories reveal that firearms were seldom used; instead, the weapons were baseball bats or knives. These features can be compared to examples of violence in Rwanda, where the violence was more similar (and even more "savage") to that in my material than the typical examples of industrialized extermination violence of World War Two. The perpetrators in this study are often portrayed as people who enjoyed humiliating, battering, murdering, and inflicting pain in different ways. This characterization is a contrast to Collins (2008), who suggests that soldiers are not good in acting out close violence and that individuals are mostly inclined to consensus and solidarity. An explanation, in my study, of the soldiers' actions can be that soldiers in a war are pressured into being brave in close combat, the aim being to reign over the Others, the enemy. During war, enemies are targets of violence, to be subjected to it and neutralized. Soldiers and police in northwestern Bosnia were not close to any battlefield, and civilians thus were framed in the enemy role. By exposing civilians to violence, soldiers proved their supremacy over the enemy even when the enemy was an abstract type, unarmed and harmless. Another explanation might be found in the degree of mobilization and emotional charge that occurred before the war, through the demonization of the enemy. People were probably brutalized through this process. Those interpersonal interactions that caused the violence continue even after the violent situation is over. Recollections from perpetrators and those subjected to violence of the war do not exist only as verbal constructions in Bosnia of today. Stories about violent situations live their own lives after the war and continue being important to individuals and social life. Individuals who were expelled from northwestern Bosnia during the war in the 1990s are, in a legal sense, in a recognized violence-afflicted victim category. They suffered crimes against humanity, including most types of violent crimes. Several perpetrators were sentenced by the Hague Tribunal and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime. The crimes committed in northwestern Bosnia are qualified as genocide according to indictments against former Serbian leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. All of the interviewees in this study experienced and survived the war in northwestern Bosnia. These individuals have a present, ongoing relation with these communities: Some live there permanently, and some spend their summers in northwestern Bosnia. An analysis of the processing of experienced or described violent situations in a society that exists as a product of a series of violent acts during the war must be conducted in parallel both at the institutional and individual levels. Institutions in the administrative entity Republika Srpska deny genocide, and this approach to war-time events becomes a central theme in future, post-war analysis of the phenomena "war violence," "sexual war violence", "victimhood," and "reconciliation". The existence of Republika Srpska is based on genocide committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, it is very important to analyze the political elite's denial of the systematic acts of violence during the war that have been conveyed by the Hague Tribunal, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime, and Bosnian media. The narratives in my empirical material seem to be influenced by (or coherent with) the rhetoric mediated in these fora. When informants emphasize extermination and the systematization of violence during the war, they produce and reproduce the image of a mutual struggle on a collective level. The aim of this struggle seems to be that the described acts of violence be recognized as genocide. Another interesting aspect of the phenomenon "war violence," "victimhood," and "reconciliation" to be examined in a future analysis, regards the stories of perpetrators describing violent situations. Conversations with these actors and an analysis of their stories might add a nuanced perspective of the phenomenon "war violence," "victimhood," and "reconciliation". Another question that emerged during my work on this article is, What importance is given to stories told by the perpetrator of violence and those subjected to violence in the development of a post-war society? I believe it is of great importance to study stories in both categories. By recounting their stories, those subjected to violence could obtain recognition and some degree of self-esteem and the perpetrators be given a chance to explain to themselves and others, display shame over their actions, and possibly restore their social status. Without this type of process, those who are subjected to violence risk a life without recognition, and the perpetrators risk being permanently bound by their war-time actions, a clearly unstable foundation for the future development of a post-war society.

In this analysis of the retold experiences of 27 survivors of the war in northwestern Bosnia, the aim is to describe the informants' portrayal of "war violence", "sexual war violence", "victimhood", and "reconciliation" as a social phenomenon as well as analyzing the discursive patterns that contribute to constructing the category "victim" and "perpetrator". The violence practice during the war is portrayed as organized and ritualized and this creates a picture that the violence practice became a norm in the society, rather than the exception. When, after the war, different categories claim a "victim" status, it sparks a competition for victimhood. All informants are eager to present themselves as victims while at the same time the other categories' victim status are downplayed. The stories of reconciliation are connected to the past; the interactive consequences of war-time violence are intimately linked to the narrator's war experiences. The interviewees distance themselves from some individuals or described situations. It is common that the portrayal of possible reconciliation is transformed into a depicted implacable attitude, thus the interviewees negotiate their stances: they articulate between reconciliation and implacability statements. This study shows that after the war in Bosnia, the interpretations of biographical consequences of violence are intimately connected to previous war experiences. Narratives on the phenomenon "war violence" and "sexual war violence" depict a decay of pre-war social order. The use of violence during the war is described as organized and ritualized, which implies that the use of violence became a norm in society, rather than the exception. The narratives on the phenomenon "war violence" produce and reproduce the image of human suffering and slaughter. Those subjected to violence are portrayed in a de-humanized fashion and branded as suitable to be exposed to it. In these stories, morally correct actions are constructed as a contrast to the narratives on war violence. In these descriptions, the perpetrator is depicted as a dangerous, evil, and ideal enemy. He is portrayed as a real and powerful yet alien criminal who is said to pose a clear threat to the social order existing before the war. The narratives on wartime violence, war perpetrators, and those subjected to violence during war are enhanced with symbolicism of ritualized ethnic violence ("cockade," "chetnik," "Serb," "Muslim," "warlord"). On one hand, the narrators make an ethnic generalization based on the differences between the ethnic categorizations; on the other hand, they present their own physical existence and ethnic identity and that of those subjected to violence as being threatened by the violent situation. The disintegration of the existing, pre-war social order produces and reproduces a norm resolution that enables the ritualized war-time use of violence. This development allows the normalization of war violence in this time period even though the result, as this study shows, means human suffering and the slaughter of humans. This study presents this development in society ambivalently, as both allowed and normatively correct (during the war) and as prohibited and condemned (primarily in retrospect, in post-war narratives). It seems as if the category "war violence" and "sexual war violence" means different things depending on whether it happened during war or not, whether it is retold or observed, and who is telling the story. For some persons, violence targeting civilians during the war is an act of heroism. The Holocaust during World War Two was in many cases highly efficient and industrialized; the typical goal was to kill from a distance, impersonally. Researchers have noted that those who climbed the ranks to leadership positions or were in charge at concentration camps seemed to have engaged in very personal, sadistic acts in Germany during WWII. Is there an interaction of rank/power in wartime and level of motivation/energy input required for violence (ie, those in charge require less energy input because of the factors that put them in charge in the first place)? The stories and phrasing in this paper emphasize a distant, evil, and/or powerful leader who motivates the crowd (perhaps in part by symbolically reducing an ethnic target to something like a dog or rat) or gives orders, with the distinction from Holocaust violence that the leaders in these stories were neighbors, etc., of those they were harming and killing. In general contrast, the war violence in Bosnia was more broadly characterized by the individualized use of violence, in which the perpetrators often knew those subjected to violence. The stories reveal that firearms were seldom used; instead, the weapons were baseball bats or knives. These features can be compared to examples of violence in Rwanda, where the violence was more similar (and even more "savage") to that in my material than the typical examples of industrialized extermination violence of World War Two. The perpetrators in this study are often portrayed as people who enjoyed humiliating, battering, murdering, and inflicting pain in different ways. This characterization is a contrast to Collins (2008), who suggests that soldiers are not good in acting out close violence and that individuals are mostly inclined to consensus and solidarity. An explanation, in my study, of the soldiers' actions can be that soldiers in a war are pressured into being brave in close combat, the aim being to reign over the Others, the enemy. During war, enemies are targets of violence, to be subjected to it and neutralized. Soldiers and police in northwestern Bosnia were not close to any battlefield, and civilians thus were framed in the enemy role. By exposing civilians to violence, soldiers proved their supremacy over the enemy even when the enemy was an abstract type, unarmed and harmless. Another explanation might be found in the degree of mobilization and emotional charge that occurred before the war, through the demonization of the enemy. People were probably brutalized through this process. Those interpersonal interactions that caused the violence continue even after the violent situation is over. Recollections from perpetrators and those subjected to violence of the war do not exist only as verbal constructions in Bosnia of today. Stories about violent situations live their own lives after the war and continue being important to individuals and social life. Individuals who were expelled from northwestern Bosnia during the war in the 1990s are, in a legal sense, in a recognized violence-afflicted victim category. They suffered crimes against humanity, including most types of violent crimes. Several perpetrators were sentenced by the Hague Tribunal and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime. The crimes committed in northwestern Bosnia are qualified as genocide according to indictments against former Serbian leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. All of the interviewees in this study experienced and survived the war in northwestern Bosnia. These individuals have a present, ongoing relation with these communities: Some live there permanently, and some spend their summers in northwestern Bosnia. An analysis of the processing of experienced or described violent situations in a society that exists as a product of a series of violent acts during the war must be conducted in parallel both at the institutional and individual levels. Institutions in the administrative entity Republika Srpska deny genocide, and this approach to war-time events becomes a central theme in future, post-war analysis of the phenomena "war violence," "sexual war violence", "victimhood," and "reconciliation". The existence of Republika Srpska is based on genocide committed in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Therefore, it is very important to analyze the political elite's denial of the systematic acts of violence during the war that have been conveyed by the Hague Tribunal, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime, and Bosnian media. The narratives in my empirical material seem to be influenced by (or coherent with) the rhetoric mediated in these fora. When informants emphasize extermination and the systematization of violence during the war, they produce and reproduce the image of a mutual struggle on a collective level. The aim of this struggle seems to be that the described acts of violence be recognized as genocide. Another interesting aspect of the phenomenon "war violence," "victimhood," and "reconciliation" to be examined in a future analysis, regards the stories of perpetrators describing violent situations. Conversations with these actors and an analysis of their stories might add a nuanced perspective of the phenomenon "war violence," "victimhood," and "reconciliation". Another question that emerged during my work on this article is, What importance is given to stories told by the perpetrator of violence and those subjected to violence in the development of a post-war society? I believe it is of great importance to study stories in both categories. By recounting their stories, those subjected to violence could obtain recognition and some degree of self-esteem and the perpetrators be given a chance to explain to themselves and others, display shame over their actions, and possibly restore their social status. Without this type of process, those who are subjected to violence risk a life without recognition, and the perpetrators risk being permanently bound by their war-time actions, a clearly unstable foundation for the future development of a post-war society. ; Panel with Presenters

Previous research on violence during the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina have emphasized the importance of narratives without focusing on narratives mentioning war violence, but they have not analyzed stories on war violence that were the product of interpersonal interaction and meaning-making activity. The aim of this study is to fill this knowledge gap by analyzing the narratives of survivors of the war in northwestern Bosnia in the 1990s. The focus lies on analyzing interviewees' description of war-time violence and also analyzing discursive patterns that contribute in constructing the phenomenon "war violence". Analysis shows that the interpersonal interactions that caused the violence continue even after the violent situation is over. Recollections from perpetrators and those subjected to violence of the war do not exist only as verbal constructions in Bosnia of today. Stories about violent situations live their own lives after the war and continue being important to individuals and social life. Individuals who were expelled from northwestern Bosnia during the war in the 1990s are, in a legal sense, in a recognized violence-afflicted victim category. Several perpetrators were sentenced by the Hague Tribunal and the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime. The crimes committed in northwestern Bosnia are qualified as genocide according to indictments against former Serbian leaders Radovan Karadžić and Ratko Mladić. All interviewees in this study experienced and survived the war in northwestern Bosnia. These individuals have a present, ongoing relation with these communities: Some live there permanently, and some spend their summers in northwestern Bosnia. Institutions in the administrative entity Republika Srpska (to which northwestern Bosnia now belong administratively) deny genocide, and this approach to war-time events becomes a central theme in future, post-war analysis of the phenomena "war violence", and "reconciliation". Therefore, it is very important to analyze the political elite's denial of the systematic acts of violence during the war that have been conveyed by the Hague Tribunal, the Court of Bosnia and Herzegovina on War Crime, and Bosnian media. The narratives in my empirical material seem to be influenced by (or coherent with) the rhetoric mediated in these fora. When informants emphasize extermination and the systematization of violence during the war, they produce and reproduce the image of a mutual struggle on a collective level. The aim of this struggle seems to be that the described acts of violence be recognized as genocide.

U ranijim istraživanjima ratnog nasilja, tokom rata u Bosni i Hercegovini, naglašavana je važnost priča ŽRTAVA ali fokus analize nije bio usmjeren na priče o ratnom nasilju, niti su analizirani poslijeratni intervjui kao produkt međuljudske interakcije. Ovom studijom pokušava se popuniti ta praznina analiziranjem priča osoba koje su preživjele rat u sjeverozapadnoj Bosni i Hercegovini. Prvi cilj studije je analizirati verbalne opise ratnog nasilja, drugi cilj je analizirati diskurzivne modele koji učestvuju u produkciji fenomena "ratno nasilje". Analiza pokazuje da se međuljudske interakcije koje uzrokuju nasilje nastavljaju i nakon što se nasilna situacija završila. Sjećanja na počinitelje i žrtve nasilja iz rata ne postoje samo kao verbalne konstrukcije u današnjoj Bosni. Priče o ratnim nasilnim situacijama se prepričavaju nakon rata i sa time bivaju važne za pojedince kao i za društvenu zajednicu. Individue koje su protjerane iz sjeverozapadne Bosne tijekom rata su, u pravnom smislu, priznata kategorija žrtava. Nekolicina počinitelja je osuđena od strane Haškog tribunala i Odjela za ratne zločine suda Bosne i Hercegovine. Prema optužnici Radovana Karadžića i Ratka Mladića, zločini počinjeni na području sjeverozapadne Bosne su kvalificirani kao genocid. Svi intervjuisani u ovoj studiji su doživjeli i preživjeli rat u sjeverozapadnoj Bosni. Ove individue su takođe i dio današnje društvene zajednice: nekolicina živi permanentno u sjeverozapadnoj Bosni, a jedan dio, iz instanstva provodi ljeta u sjeverozapadnoj Bosni. Institucije administrativnog entiteta Republike Srpske (kojem najveći dio sjeverozapadne Bosne administrativno pripada) negiraju genocid, i ovaj institucionalni pristup zločinima za vrijeme rata je izuzetno bitan za buduće analize fenomena "ratno nasilje" i "pomirenje". Stoga, je veoma važno analizirati kontekst konfliktnog odnosa političkih elita prema ovom pitanju koji se producira i reproducira između ostalog i raportiranjem Haškog tribunala, Odjela za ratne zločine suda Bosne i Hercegovine, kao i raportiranjem bosanskih medija. Čini se da su priče u mojem empirijskom materijalu pod uticajem (ili u koherentnoj vezi) sa retorikom koja se prezentira na ovim forumima. Kada informanti u studiji naglašavaju istrebljenje i sistematizaciju nasilja tokom rata, oni produciraju i reproduciraju sliku međusobne borbe na kolektivnoj razini. Čini se da je cilj ove borbe, da verbalno opisana djela ratnog nasilja dobiju status genocida poslije rata.

The aim of this article is to analyze verbally portrayed experiences of 27 survivors of the 1990's war in northwestern Bosnia. The focus lies on evaluating interviewees' description of wartime sexual violence and analyzing discursive patterns that contribute in constructing the phenomenon "sexualized war violence". My analysis shows that the new social war order normalized the sexualized war violence in society. In many cases, these crimes are committed by neighbors and people known by the victim. After the war, all interviewees described war sexual violence as something morally reprehensible. These narratives paint a picture of the perpetrator as someone who is dangerous, evil and the absolute enemy. This enemy is a real but distant criminal who is seen as a clear threat to the existing social order from before the war. ; Konferens: 1) First Conference of Victimology in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Ambassadors of Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, International Peace Research Association – IPRA, Bihać University, Sakarya University and Institute of Knowledge Management Skopje, Sarajevo, Bosnia and Herzegovina (20150303-20150304). 2) International Conference on Community Empowerment, Coping, Resilience and Hope, Brisbane Institute of Strengths Based Practice, Hyderabad, India (20141214-20141216). 3) Victims' protection: International law, national legislations and practice, The Fifth Annual Conference of the Victimology Society of Serbia, Victimology Society of Serbia, Beograd, Serbia (20141127-20141128). ; War sociology – renewed analysis of ethnographic material from Bosnia