Suchergebnisse

This thesis comprises of three research studies undertaken on three important topics of political economics. The first paper (chapter 2) "Bread and the attrition of power: Economic events and German election results'' has analyzed the German's voting behavior in response to the economic situations prevailing during the postwar period 1953-2005. This paper has been a modified and extended version of the Hibbs "Bread and Peace Model'' and result shows that real per capita disposable income growth is the only economic variable that explains the incumbent aggregate vote share in Germany. The second paper (chapter 3) "Pakistan, Politics and Political Business Cycles'' relates to Pakistan's experience in terms of politics, economics and political business cycles. This paper investigates the presence of political business cycles in various macroeconomic indicators during the period 1973-2009. The third paper (chapter 4) "Pakistan Central Bank Independence and Electoral Politics'' examines the existence of political monetary cycles in Pakistan, keeping in view the independence of the State Bank of Pakistan. Each of these three chapters is a self-contained unit, provides empirical evidence enriched with modern sophisticated econometric techniques and provides useful policy implications. Although the substance uncovered in the three chapters is different to each other, but they are all based on the common concept of "economic voting'' and its implications on economy, politics and other institutions. Chapter two studies the German's voting behavior in response to economic situations prevailing during the period 1953-2005. Empirical results suggest that German voters are backward-looking and they consider the whole legislative term with only small discounting of past events. They are concerned about national economic well-being, vote according to the per capita real disposable income growth of the economy. As in Hibbs (2008) for the United States, we find that the aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income. Each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model. However, attrition of power is turned out to be another important variable in the case of Germany that has reduced the vote share in election years 1961, 1994 and 1998. Chapter three focuses on the opportunistic politicians' behavior in terms of manipulation of the macroeconomic indicators during the election period. Research study has been carried out to study whether in Pakistan the dynamic behavior of unemployment, inflation, budget deficit and real GDP growth is systematically affected by the timing of elections. We have covered the period from 1973-2009 that comprises of seven election terms. Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) Model and Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) models with political dummies have been used to investigate the presence of political business cycles in Pakistan. Results show that unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election periods and tends to increase immediately after elections, perhaps as a result of politically motivated employment schemes. Inflation tends to be lower in pre-election periods, perhaps as a result of pre-electoral price regulation. Similarly we find an increase in the governmental budget deficit financed by heavy government borrowings from the central bank and banking sector during the election year. However, real GDP growth and real governmental investment growth declines during pre and post election years, may be as a result of inefficient resource allocation. Chapter four attempts to examine the Pakistan's central bank independence and the existence of political monetary cycles (PMC) during the period 1985-2010. Existence of such cycles demonstrates the opportunistic political behavior as well as the non-independence of central bank in its monetary operations. Despite various amendments that have been made to strengthen the autonomy of Pakistan's central bank during the decade 1990s, it has been witnessed that Pakistan's central bank is still among the list of least independent central banks. The same picture has been exhibited by the rising fiscal deficit and deficit financing trend during the period 1985-2010. Considering this status, one may suspect the existence of political monetary cycles in Pakistan. Using quarterly data for the period 1985Q1-2010Q4, we have estimated the central bank monetary policy reaction function. Empirical results allow us to conclude that whenever there is an increase in the real output gap or real GDP growth and inflationary pressures in the economy, the central bank tighten its monetary policy by raising the discount rate. To test the existence of political monetary cycles, we have introduced some political dummies in the estimated baseline models. Pre-election political dummies are found to be negative and significant, accepting the PMC hypothesis that the central bank facilitates the incumbent parties in the run up to election by reducing the interest rate during the underlying study period in Pakistan. ; Diese Arbeit besteht aus drei Studien zu jeweils einem wichtigen Thema aus dem Bereich der politischen Ökonomie. Das erste Forschungsthema ``Brot und Machtverfall: Volkswirtschaftliche Ergebnisse und Deutsche Wahlergebnisse'' analysiert das Wahlverhalten der Deutschen als Reaktion auf die eigene wirtschaftliche Situation in den Jahren 1953 bis 2005 und ist in ``Public Choice'' (2009) VR. 141, S. 151 -169 veröffentlicht. Diese Studie ist eine modifizierte und erweiterte Version des ``Brot- und Friedensmodells'' von Hibbs und die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass das Wachstum des real verfügbaren Pro-Kopf-Einkommens die einzige ökonomische Variable ist, die den Stimmenanteil der bis dato regierenden Partei bzw. Koalition erklärt. Die zweite Studie (Kapitel 3) ``Pakistan, Politik und politische Konjunkturzyklen'' bezieht sich auf die pakistanische Erfahrung in Bezug auf Politik, Wirtschaft und politische Konjunkturzyklen. Es wird die Präsenz von politischen Konjunkturzyklen in Hinsicht auf verschiedene makroökonomische Indikatoren im Zeitraum von 1973 bis 2009 untersucht. Der dritte Beitrag (Kapitel 4) ``Pakistan die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank und parlamentarische Politik'' untersucht die Existenz von politischen monetären Kreisläufen in Pakistan in Hinblick auf die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank of Pakistan. Jedes dieser drei Kapitel ist eine in sich geschlossene Einheit, liefert empirische Beweise anhand moderner ökonometrischer Methoden und liefert hilfreiche politische Implikationen.Obwohl die Kapitel unterschiedliche inhaltliche Schwerpunkte setzen, beziehen sich alle auf das Konzept von demokratischer Abstimmungen und deren Auswirkungen auf Wirtschaft, Politik und andere Institutionen. Kapitel 2 untersucht das deutsche Wahlverhalten in Reaktion auf die wirtschaftlichen Situationen während des Zeitraums 1953 bis 2005. Empirische Ergebnisse weisen darauf hin, dass Wähler in Deutschland eine gesamte Legislaturperiode rückblickend und dabei nur schwach distanzierend bewerten. Sie sind besorgt über ihr eigenes wirtschaftliches Wohlergehen, sodass sie auf Basis des real verfügbaren Pro-Kopf-Einkommens der Volkswirtschaft abstimmen. Genauso wie Hibbs (2008) für die Vereinigten Staaten herausfand, konnte auch für die etablierten Parteien im Nachkriegsdeutschland eine Stimmenabhängigkeit vom durchschnittlichen Wachstum des realen Pro-Kopf-Einkommens bestimmt werden. Jeder Prozentpunkt des Pro-Kopf-Wachstums des verfügbaren Realeinkommens in einer Legislaturperiode, ergab nachhaltig rund zwei Prozentpunkte mehr der Stimmen in Deutschland. Keine andere ökonomische Variable stört oder schwächt die Aussagekraft der Koeffizienten des Modells signifikant. Allerdings stellt der Machtverfall eine weitere wichtige Variable in Deutschland dar, welche sich negativ auf die Stimmvergabe in den Wahljahren 1961, 1994 und 1998 auswirkte. Kapitel 3 konzentriert sich auf das Verhalten von opportunistischen Politikern in Bezug auf die Manipulation der makro-ökonomischen Indikatoren. Dieser Forschungsbeitrag ist durchgeführt worden um zu untersuchen ob in Pakistan das dynamische Verhalten von Arbeitslosigkeit, Inflation, Haushaltsdefizit und dem realen BIP-Wachstum systematisch durch den Zeitpunkt der Wahlen beeinflusst wird. Wir haben den Zeitraum von 1973 bis 2009 abgedeckt, der sieben Wahlzyklen umfasst. Das Auto Regressive Moving Average (ARMA) Modell und das Auto Regressive Integrated Moving Average (ARIMA) Modell mit politischen Dummys wurde verwendet, um das Vorhandensein von politischen Konjunkturzyklen in Pakistan zu untersuchen. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass die Arbeitslosigkeit tendenziell in Wahlkampfzeiten niedriger ist und dazu neigt, sofort nach den Wahlen zu steigen, vielleicht als Folge der politisch motivierten Beschäftigungsprogramme. Die Inflation ist in Wahlkampfzeiten tendenziell niedriger, vielleicht als Folge der im Vorfeld der Wahlen stattfindenden Preisregulierung. Ebenso finden wir eine Erhöhung des staatlichen Haushaltsdefizits durch eine massive Kreditaufnahme bei der Zentralbank und des Bankensektors im Wahljahr. Doch das reale BIP-Wachstum und das reale staatliche Investitionswachstum sinkt wahrend der Pre- und Post-Wahljahre, was als Ergebnis einer ineffizienten Ressourcenallokation gewertet werden kann. Kapitel 4 versucht zu begutachten, wie sich die Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank in Pakistan und die Existenz von politischen monetären Zyklen (PMC) im Zeitraum von 1985 bis 2010 darstellt. Die Existenz solcher Zyklen deutet auf opportunistisches politisches Verhalten sowie die Nicht-Unabhängigkeit der Zentralbank bei ihren geldpolitischen Operationen hin. Trotz verschiedener Änderungen, die gemacht wurden um die Autonomie der Zentralbank Pakistans in der Dekade der 1990er Jahre zu stärken, ist zu beobachten, dass Pakistans Zentralbank noch auf der Liste der am wenigsten unabhängigen Zentralbanken zu finden ist. Das gleiche Bild ergibt sich durch das steigende Haushaltsdefizit und den Trend der Defizitfinanzierung während der Zeit von 1985 bis 2010. Angesichts dieses Status kann man vermuten, dass politische monetäre Zyklen in Pakistan existieren. Mit vierteljährlichen Daten für den Zeitraum 1. Quartal 1985 bis 4. Quartal 2010, haben wir die geldpolitische Reaktionsfunktion der Zentralbank geschätzt. Empirische Ergebnisse bringen uns zu dem Schluss, dass, wenn es zu einer Erhöhung der realen Output-Lücke, des realen BIP-Wachstums und dem Inflationsdruck in der Volkswirtschaft kommt, die Zentralbank ihre Geldpolitik durch die Erhöhung des Zinssatzes verschärft. Um die Existenz von politischen monetären Zyklen zu testen, haben wir einige politische Dummys in die geschätzten Basis-Modelle eingeführt. Politische Dummys bei Vorwahlen erwiesen sich als negativ und signifikant, was zu der Annahme der PMC Hypothese, dass die Zentralbank in Pakistan die Regierungsparteien im Vorfeld der Wahlen durch Verringerung des Zinssatzes unterstützt, führt.

This paper studies whether in Pakistan the dynamic behaviour
of unemployment, inflation, budget deficit and real GDP growth is
systematically affected by the timing of elections. We cover the period
from 1973-2009. Our results can be summarised as follows: (1)
Unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election periods and tends to
increase immediately after elections, perhaps as a result of politically
motivated employment schemes. (2) Inflation tends to be lower in
pre-election periods, perhaps as a result of pre-electoral price
regulation. (3) We find increase in the governmental budget deficit,
financed by heavy government borrowings from the central bank and
banking sector during election year. (4) Real GDP growth and real
governmental investment growth declines during pre and post election
terms possibly as a result of inefficient resource allocation. JEL
Classification: D72, D78, H50, H61, E51 Keywords: Opportunistic
Political Business Cycle, Fiscal Policy, Macroeconomics, Elections,
Pakistan

Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income. Each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model. However, attrition of power reduced the vote share in election years 1961, 1994 and 1998.

Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income. Each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model. However, attrition of power reduced the vote share in election years 1961, 1994 and 1998. ; Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income. Each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately two percentage points of votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model. However, attrition of power reduced the vote share in election years 1961, 1994 and 1998.

This paper studies whether in Pakistan the dynamic behavior of unemployment, inflation, budget deficit and real GDP growth is systematically affected by the timing of elections. We cover the period from 1973-2009. Our results can be summarized as follows: 1. Unemployment tends to be lower in pre-election periods and tends to increase immediately after elections, perhaps as a result of politically motivated employment schemes. 2. In ation tend to be lower in preelection periods, perhaps as a result of pre-electoral price regulation. 3. We find election year increases in the governmental budget deficit, financed by heavy government borrowings from the central bank and banking sector. 4. Real GDP growth and real governmental investment growth declines during pre and post election terms.

Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income and the attrition of power, especially when the Federal Chancellor sought re-election more than twice. Similar to earlier results for the US, each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately 4 percentage points in votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model. ; Aggregate votes for incumbent parties in post-war Germany were determined by the weighted-average growth of real per capita disposable income and the attrition of power, especially when the Federal Chancellor sought re-election more than twice. Similar to earlier results for the US, each percentage point of per capita real disposable income growth sustained over the legislative term yielded approximately 4 percentage points in votes in Germany. No other economic variables add value or significantly perturb the coefficients of our model.

The airport infrastructures in Pakistan are ranked very low in comparison to airports around the world. Poor airport facilities hinder the growth of aviation sector and of national economy. In their present conditions, airports fail to attract the passenger and cargo carriers. Therefore, a large number of international passengers and cargo carriers have shifted their operations from Pakistanis to Gulf and Middle East. At the time when aviation sector is growing around the globe, the need for airport infrastructure development is immense. As a result, in many developed and developing countries, the Governments are involving private sector to develop the existing airports and to build new airports. Considering the current economic situation of the Pakistan, the Government is unable to invest heavily to develop world-class airport infrastructure. In order to modernize the airports in the country, the Government of Pakistan should infuse private capital.

The presence of high inflation coupled with a persistent and ever-increasing fiscal deficit is the key problem being faced by the developing economies. The fiscal dominance hypothesis suggests that a developing economy is prone to high persistent inflation when government authorities run huge persistent budget deficits and get them financed through money creation. The primary objective of the current study is to test and examine the presence of the fiscal dominance situation over the period 1971–2020. The current study has modelled inflation as a fiscally driven monetary phenomenon by combining monetary and fiscal variables. The study has used the autoregressive distributed lag (ARDL) technique to analyse the long-run and short-run dynamics in a unified framework. The empirical results point to strong and statistically significant long-term relationships between budget deficits and money growth and between money creation and inflation. The study validates the presence of the fiscal dominance hypothesis in the case of a developing economy. The results imply that fiscal dominance handling through a realistic and continuous process of fiscal adjustments on the back of supported monetary policy is necessary for attaining and sustaining price stability in developing countries like Pakistan. In the context of public finance, a broad and wide-ranging tax reforms (increasing the tax base, designing an inflation-proof tax system, and improving tax administration and collection), rationalized government expenditures and privatization of loss-making state enterprises are crucial in establishing the trustworthy fiscal policy.