This book offers a comprehensive analysis of the determinants of EU support between 2006 and 2015, and of electoral behavior during the European Parliament elections. In light of the Eurozone financial and debt crisis, it also examines how political and economic turbulences have affected EU citizens' stance on democracy and their support for EU institutions. It explores measures taken in the context of the Euro crisis management and the reactions of EU citizens, in order to shed new light on the determinants and developments of EU support. The author highlights the heterogeneity of the developments between the member states and identifies social, political, and economic facets of the crisis that have changed the ways citizens form their political attitudes towards the EU. The book delivers a profound account of the Euro crisis, integrating approaches from political economy, psychology, sociology, and public opinion research. It will appeal to scholars and anyone interested in learning more about the declining citizen support in the EU and the heterogeneous developments in the member states, which may significantly endanger the long-term existence of the European Union
Durch ein effektives Patient Blood Management (PBM) können bei elektiven Operationen die Risiken operativer Eingriffe verringert werden. Mit dem positiven Nebeneffekt, dass im deutschen Gesundheitswesen auch bis zu 1,3 Milliarden Euro an direkten und bis zu 24 Milliarden Euro an indirekten Krankheitskosten pro Jahr eingespart werden.
Die Unterstützung der EU durch ihre Bürger ist spätestens seit dem Vertrag von Maastricht Gegenstand einer Vielzahl von Beiträgen in der Einstellungsforschung. Eine zentrale Annahme der bisherigen Forschung war die große Distanz der EU zur Alltagswirklichkeit der Bürger. Nach dieser werden Einstellungen zur EU nur aufwendig oder mit Rückgriff auf Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat gebildet. Mit der Euro-Schuldenkrise, deren wirtschaftlichen Auswirkungen für die Bürger und einer Vielzahl von EU-Krisengipfeln erfuhr die europäische Politik seit 2010 eine enorme Aufmerksamkeit in der Öffentlichkeit. In dieser Arbeit wird die Entwicklung der EU-Unterstützung vergleichend in Deutschland und Griechenland vor und während der Schuldenkrise untersucht: 1) Zunächst wird diskutiert, inwieweit die Schuldenkrise mit den etablierten Determinanten der Unterstützungsforschung theoretisch zusammenhängt. Im Mittelpunkt stehen wirtschaftliche und demokratische Performanz, europäische und nationale Identität sowie Heuristiken zum Nationalstaat. 2) Der Fokus auf Deutschland und Griechenland ermöglicht einen Vergleich der Determinanten vor und während der Krise, da beide Länder substanziell völlig unterschiedlich, jedoch gleichzeitig betroffen waren. Während die Bürger in Griechenland spürbare Wohlstandsverluste erleiden, stellt sich in Deutschland die Frage nach der Solidarität mit den europäischen Nachbarn. 3) Die empirische Analyse zeigt, dass die etablierten Determinanten in der Schuldenkrise ihre Relevanz behalten. Das individuelle wirtschaftliche Schicksal ist in Griechenland ein stärkerer Einflussfaktor als vor der Krise. Es bestätigt sich die Erwartung, dass die größere Präsenz der EU in der Krise mit einer geringeren Bedeutung der Einstellungen zum Nationalstaat einhergeht. ; Since 2010, European policy-makers have been forced to deal with serious macroeconomic and financial threats. Still heavily affected by the shock waves of the international financial and economic crisis, the sovereign debt of most of the EU member states has increased significantly. Financial markets question the credibility of the governments of various member states concerning their ability to prevent state bankruptcy. On the other hand, European people are affected by economic downturn and severe policy adjustments. The sovereign debt crisis can be considered as the first political event that has the potential to reduce the distance between the EU and the everyday lives of its citizens, a finding repeatedly stated in research on EU support in the past two decades. rnTherefore, the goal of my thesis is to refocus on political support of the European Union in times of crisis. The first step of the analysis is to differentiate between countries that need the help of their fellow European partners and countries that are still performing well with regard to their key economic data. While the former are affected by austerity measures decided on the European level, the latter are forced to question their willingness of solidarity with (oder â towardâ ) their European neighbours. The analysis of Eurobarometer survey data from 2007 and 2011 considers several well established determinants of political support, such as economic and democratic performance, social identity, national cues and the impact of being personally affected by austerity measures. rnTheoretically, I draw from Dieter Fuchs- model of political support of the EU (Fuchs 2003, 2011) and other significant works from the research on EU support and EU skepticism in the past years. Considering the implications of the sovereign debt crisis â economic downturn and increased salience of European politics â common hypotheses on political support of the EU are re-evaluated. Empirically, I use Eurobarometer cross-sectional data to compare the development of support and its determinants in both economically well and poor performing member-states â represented by the cases of Germany and Greece respectively. Results show that the well-established determinants can explain most of the variance of political support in both 2007 and 2011. During the crisis, the personal economic situation of the people in Greece has become a stronger predictor. Also, results support the hypothesis that European politics became more salient in wake of the crisis, and therefore people rely on national cues to a lesser extent. rn
Civic orientation has become one of the dominant immigrant integration policies in western Europe, with the aim of transmitting knowledge, norms, and values, thereby furthering "integration" into the new country. However, there is a not much research regarding how the educational content is communicated and negotiated in civic orientation courses in practice. This article aims to bring more empirically based knowledge in this field. The case study discussed in this article explores one specific module, entitled "nature and environment", in civic orientation courses for newly arrived adults in Sweden. This is done through participatory observations in the courses, both in classrooms in real life and on the internet and exploring in detail the negotiations between the civic orientation communicators and the course participants. The analyses show how a real "success story" of Sweden and its citizens is constructed through an overall discourse of Swedes high awareness of the environment and nature, not least through comparisons between geographical spaces in the world. The analyses also re-veal antagonistic voices about the content, although these are not particularly strong. We suggest that there is an urgent need to critically reflect on the aim, content, and teaching practices of civic orientation courses for newly arrived migrants, as these more seem to contribute to the Swedish nation's reproduction of "banal nationalism".
Civic orientation has become one of the dominant immigrant integration policies in western Europe, with the aim of transmitting knowledge, norms, and values, thereby furthering "integration" into the new country. However, there is a not much research regarding how the educational content is communicated and negotiated in civic orientation courses in practice. This article aims to bring more empirically based knowledge in this field. The case study discussed in this article explores one specific module, entitled "nature and environment", in civic orientation courses for newly arrived adults in Sweden. This is done through participatory observations in the courses, both in classrooms in real life and on the internet and exploring in detail the negotiations between the civic orientation communicators and the course participants. The analyses show how a real "success story" of Sweden and its citizens is constructed through an overall discourse of Swedes high awareness of the environment and nature, not least through comparisons between geographical spaces in the world. The analyses also re-veal antagonistic voices about the content, although these are not particularly strong. We suggest that there is an urgent need to critically reflect on the aim, content, and teaching practices of civic orientation courses for newly arrived migrants, as these more seem to contribute to the Swedish nation's reproduction of "banal nationalism".
Sweden has long been described as a beacon of multiculturalism and generous access to citizenship, with integration policies that seek to offer free and equal access to the welfare state. In this article, we use the policy of Civic Orientation for Newly Arrived Migrants as a case with which to understand how migrants' inclusion is discursively articulated and constructed by the different constituencies involved in interpreting the policy and organising and teaching the course. We do this by employing Foucault's closely interrelated concepts of technology of self, political technology of individuals, and governmentality. With the help of critical discourse analysis, we illustrate how migrants' inclusion is framed around an opposition between an idealised "good citizen" and a "target population" (Schneider & Ingram, 1993). In our analysis, we draw on individual interviews with 14 people involved in organising civic orientation and on classroom observations of six civic orientation courses. Firstly, we show how migrants are constructed as unknowing and in need of being fostered by the state. Secondly, we illustrate how social inclusion is presented as being dependent upon labour market participation, both in terms of finding work and in terms of behaving correctly in the workplace. Lastly, we show how migrant women are constructed as being problematically chained to the home and therefore needing to subject themselves to a specific political technology of self to be included.
In der sich verschärfenden Diskussionen über wirksamen Klimaschutz wird sowohl in Deutschland als auch in Europa und weltweit die Atomkraft als "saubere Energie" ins Spiel gebracht. Vor diesem Hintergrund analysiert dieser Bericht ihre historischen, gegenwärtigen und zukünftigen Kosten und Risiken. Die Ergebnisse zeigen, dass Atomkraft aufgrund radioaktiver Strahlung für über eine Millionen Jahre mitnichten als "sauber" bezeichnet werden kann, sondern für Mensch und Umwelt gefährlich ist. Zudem fallen hohe Risiken bezüglich Proliferation an. Eine empirische Erhebung aller jemals gebauten 674 Atomkraftwerke zeigt, dass privatwirtschaftliche Motive von Anfang an keine Rolle gespielt haben, sondern militärische Interessen. Selbst bei Vernachlässigung der Kosten für den Rückbau der Atomkraftwerke und die langfristige Lagerung des Atommülls wären rein privatwirtschaftliche Investitionen in Atomkraftwerke mit hohen Verlusten verbunden – im Durchschnitt knapp fünf Milliarden Euro pro Kraftwerk, wie eine betriebswirtschaftliche Simulation zeigt. In Ländern, in denen noch Atomkraftwerke gebaut werden, wie etwa China und Russland, spielen private Investitionen auch keine Rolle. Atomkraft ist zu teuer und gefährlich und daher keine Option für eine klimafreundliche Energieversorgung.
The debate on effective climate protection is heating up in Germany and the rest of the world. Nuclear energy is being touted as "clean" energy. Given the circumstances, the present study analyzed the historical, current, and future costs and risks of nuclear energy. The findings show that nuclear energy can by no means be called "clean" due to radioactive emissions, which will endanger humans and the natural environment for over one million years. And it harbors the high risk of proliferation. An empirical survey of the 674 nuclear power plants that have ever been built showed that private economic motives never played a role. Instead military interests have always been the driving force behind their construction. Even ignoring the expense of dismantling nuclear power plants and the long-term storage of nuclear waste, private economy-only investment in nuclear power plant would result in high losses— an average of five billion euros per nuclear power plant, as one financial simulation revealed. In countries such as China and Russia, where nuclear power plants are still being built, private investment does not play a role either. Nuclear power is too expensive and dangerous; therefore it should not be part of the climate-friendly energy mix of the future.