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John Stuart Mill advocated for increased interactions between individuals of dissenting opinions for the reason that it would improve society. Whether Mill and similar arguments that advocate for opinion diversity are valid depends on background assumptions about the psychology and sociality of individuals. The field of opinion dynamics is a burgeoning testing ground for how different combinations of sociological and psychological facts contribute to phenomena that affect opinion diversity, such as polarization. This paper applies some recent results from the opinion dynamics literature to assess the impacts of the Millian suggestion. The goal is to understand how the scope of the validity of Mill-style arguments depends on plausible assumptions that can be formalized using agent-based models, a common modeling approach in opinion dynamics. The most salient insight is that homophily (increased interactions between like-minded individuals) does not sufficiently explain decreased opinion diversity. Hence, decreasing homophily by increasing interactions between individuals of dissenting opinions is not the simple solution that a Millian-style argument may advocate.

AbstractThe method of reflective equilibrium is typically characterized as a process of two kinds of adjustments: hold fixed one's current set of commitments/intuitions and adjust rules/principles to account for them, then hold fixed those rules while making adjustments to one's set of commitments. Repeat until no further adjustments are required. Such characterizations ignore the role of precedent, i.e., information about the commitments and rules of others and how those might serve as guides in one's own process of deliberation. In this paper we develop a model that narrows in on a local part of a reflective equilibrium process in which a group of peer agents start with identical lists of commitments and work towards finding the rule that captures that set. If successful, we say they reach rest stop interpersonal convergence. The trouble is that, without precedent, reaching this convergence rests on implausible deterministic assumptions. We analyze how far the inclusion of a kind of soft precedent goes towards aiding the group in reaching said convergence when those assumptions are relaxed.

AbstractSome common explanations of issue polarization and echo chambers rely on social or cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. Accordingly, suggested interventions like "be more open-minded" target these mechanisms: avoid epistemic bubbles and don't discount contrary information. Contrary to such explanations, we show how a much weaker mechanism—the preference for belief—can produce issue polarization in epistemic communities with little to no mechanisms of exclusion. We present a network model (with an empirically-validated structure) that demonstrates how a dynamic interaction between the preference for belief and common structures of epistemic communities can turn very small unequal distributions of initial beliefs into full-blown polarization. This points to a different class of explanations, one that emphasizes the importance of the initial spread of information. We also show how our model complements extant explanations by including a version of biased assimilation and motivated reasoning—cognitive mechanisms of exclusion. We find that mechanisms of exclusion can exacerbate issue polarization, but may not be the ultimate root of it. Hence, the recommended interventions suggested by extant literature is expected to be limited and the problem of issue polarization to be even more intractable.

AbstractThis short article offers reflections on an approach to environmental policy and land management forwarded by Peter Kareiva and Emma Fuller. Their approach both mimics evolution in its structure and seeks to manage for evolution in application. They argue this approach is a novel perspective on policy that is more adaptive and flexible in setting realistic conservation goals and objectives. While we agree that their approach is a novel starting point for discussion of ecosystem resilience and adaptive management, we argue that they do not offer the required framework of guiding principles, or—more importantly—a set of values on which to base this particular environmental policy and management approach. We analyze the main driver behind Kareiva and Fuller's article (an evolutionary perspective in regards to policy) with respect to non‐epistemic values and outline key questions that will be important to inform environmental and conservation research, efforts, and policy.

In this article, we investigate how external election interventions influence satisfaction with democracy. We expect that mere knowledge about a foreign intervention will not affect system support. Instead, only those who believe that the external influence campaign had a decisive impact on the election outcome should see a reduction in democratic satisfaction. Furthermore, since electoral winners are likely to think that their preferred party provides superior policy outputs, supporters of winning parties should be less affected by their beliefs in the decisiveness of an influence campaign. Finally, we expect that those who place a high value on in-group loyalty will be more likely to engage in motivated reasoning. Thus, in-group loyalty should cause electoral winners to discount the substantive impact of a given electoral intervention, whereas it should have the opposite effect for losers. Our analysis relies on US survey data, and it uncovers broad support for our theoretical expectations.

Significant scholarship examines the effects of disasters and disaster management on political behavior and attitudes. Yet, no research has assessed how health crises might shape people's levels of external efficacy, nor how disaster response affects external efficacy beyond localized extreme-weather events. Using the United States as a case study, we seek to fill these gaps in the literature by exploring how individuals' external political efficacy is affected by assessments of the federal COVID response. With an original collection of survey data from April 2020, we find that respondents who view the government's handling of COVID more positively report higher levels of external efficacy. In a secondary analysis, we performed an experiment in February 2021 where people were given different narratives about government management of the pandemic response. The experimental results strongly suggest that disaster management—in this case the handling of the pandemic—shapes individuals' efficacy.