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Scholars studying congressional committees have noted the potential for members to seek membership on particular committees, leading to bias. Underpinning this line of scholarship is what might be termed a theory of comparative committee statics, characterized by a cross-sectional empirical approach. We present a new approach that focuses on the dynamics of jurisdictional control. By following a series of issues through the committee hearing process, we show that there is indeed significant issue bias in particular committee venues. However, we also find that new committees often claim jurisdiction over issues as they are redefined in the political process. The degree of jurisdictional monopoly enjoyed by different committees has been overlooked in the literature on this topic in spite of its importance in determining the nature of representation of interests in Congress.

A criticism of research by Frank R. Baumgartner & Jack L. Walker (see SA 37:5/89U9660), which claims that membership in voluntary organizations has risen since the 1950s, using evidence on the increase in new groups & from national surveys. This claim is refuted, highlighting methodological problems with the research, eg, differences in context, data measurement errors, & noncomparable question wordings in existing survey data. Baumgartner's & Walker's article also affirms that the standard question on group membership masks membership increases since the 1974 General Social Survey (GSS). It is shown here that this is only partially correct: although the GSS question does not count multiple memberships within the 16 group categories, other factors must be taken into consideration. In Response to Smith's "Trends in Voluntary Group Membership: Comments on Baumgartner and Walker": Measurement Validity and the Continuity of Results in Survey Research, Baumgartner (Texas A&M U, College Station) & Walker state that this debate involves a trade-off between continuity of results (ie, preserving reliability of growing time series by not changing the wording of the questions) & validity (ie, fine-tuning the survey questions to increase relevance). They claim that holding on to the seriously outdated standard questions results in serious measurement error. 3 Tables, 1 Appendix, 45 References. C. Grindle

AbstractRacial disparities in traffic stop outcomes are widespread and well documented. Less well understood is how racial disparities may be amplified or muted in different contexts. Here we focus on one such situational factor: whether the initial traffic stop was related to a traffic safety violation or a (broadly defined) investigatory purpose. This is a salient contextual characteristic as stop type relates to different levels of assumed discretion and purpose. While all traffic stops involve some officer discretion, investigatory stops are more easily used as justifications to conduct a search based on an officer's diffuse suspicion; traffic safety stops are more often just what they seem. Using millions of traffic stops from several states, we show that black male drivers are more likely to be searched and less likely to be found with contraband and that this relationship is amplified where the initial stop purpose is investigatory. One implication of this is that one path to alleviating disparities in traffic stops for agencies is emphasizing traffic safety, rather than using stops as a supplemental investigatory tool.

AbstractEvidence that racial minorities are targeted for searches during police traffic stops is widespread, but observed differences in outcomes following a traffic stop between white drivers and people of color could potentially be due to factors correlated with driver race. Using a unique dataset recording over 5 million traffic stops from 90 municipal police departments, we control for and evaluate alternative explanations for why a driver may be searched. These include: (1) the context of the stop itself, (2) the characteristics of the police department including the race of the police chief, and (3) demographic and racial composition of the municipality within which the stop occurs. We find that the driver's race remains a robust predictor: black male drivers are consistently subjected to more intensive police scrutiny than white drivers. Additionally, we find that all drivers are less likely to be subject to highly discretionary searches if the police chief is black. Together, these findings indicate that race matters in multiple and varied ways for policing outcomes.

We investigate a possible linkage between municipal reliance on fines, fees, and forfeitures as a revenue source and policing behavior. With a dataset of four million traffic stops made by North Carolina municipalities, we demonstrate that a regular reliance on fines, fees, and forfeitures has powerful, predictable, and racially distinct impacts on black and white drivers, and that fiscal stress exacerbates these differences. A greater regular reliance on fines, fees, and forfeitures is linked to a decrease in the probability of white, but not black, drivers being searched; and increased odds of finding contraband among those white drivers who are searched, but no such change for black drivers. We validate the North Carolina tests with aggregate analyses of municipalities across four states.

The authors show that the number of lobbyists active in a given issue area is driven not only by social mobilizations and economic trends but also by government activity. The effect of government spending is smaller than that of congressional interest as reflected in the number of hearings. Much lobbying is in response to regulations, not budgets. The authors augment their analysis by considering indicators of presidential activities. In areas where the president is traditionally active, presidential activity is shown to divert lobbying away from Congress, reducing overall lobbying levels. The authors find strong support for the congressional demand model of lobbying. Adapted from the source document.

The authors show that the number of lobbyists active in a given issue area is driven not only by social mobilizations and economic trends but also by government activity. The effect of government spending is smaller than that of congressional interest as reflected in the number of hearings. Much lobbying is in response to regulations, not budgets. The authors augment their analysis by considering indicators of presidential activities. In areas where the president is traditionally active, presidential activity is shown to divert lobbying away from Congress, reducing overall lobbying levels. The authors find strong support for the congressional demand model of lobbying.