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AbstractThis article answers the question of why certain European mainstream parties have changed their policy positions on the GAL-TAN (Green/Alternative/Libertarian vs. Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist) dimension in recent years. I argue that these changes can be explained through the electoral success of new right-wing populist parties and the ideological proximity of conservative mainstream parties towards these parties. These arguments were tested with econometric models of mainstream parties' policy positions in 11 Western European democracies between 2002 and 2019. The results indicate that mainstream parties chase the other "populist zeitgeist" by changing their policy positions on the GAL–TAN dimension in response to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Mainstream parties respond to this threat by closing the distance to these parties on the GAL–TAN dimension. However, this responsiveness is largely constrained to conservative mainstream parties. The findings have important implications for understanding mainstream party responsiveness towards rivalling right-wing populist parties.

This article answers the question of why certain European mainstream parties have changed their policy positions on the GAL-TAN (Green/Alternative/Libertarian vs. Traditional/Authoritarian/Nationalist) dimension in recent years. I argue that these changes can be explained through the electoral success of new right-wing populist parties and the ideological proximity of conservative mainstream parties towards these parties. These arguments were tested with econometric models of mainstream parties' policy positions in 11 Western European democracies between 2002 and 2019. The results indicate that mainstream parties chase the other "populist zeitgeist" by changing their policy positions on the GAL–TAN dimension in response to the electoral success of right-wing populist parties. Mainstream parties respond to this threat by closing the distance to these parties on the GAL–TAN dimension. However, this responsiveness is largely constrained to conservative mainstream parties. The findings have important implications for understanding mainstream party responsiveness towards rivalling right-wing populist parties.

AbstractIn recent years several contributions have made the argument that right-wing populist voting is interrelated with individuals being negatively affected by globalisation. While there is certainly merit to this argument, it cannot explain why voters unconcerned by globalisation vote for right-wing populist parties. In this article we answer this question and argue that ontological insecurity or, the way we frame it, existential anxieties are a previously overlooked determinant of right-wing populist voting, as these anxieties make people vulnerable to right-wing populist crises narratives even when they are not affected by the crises. Using European Social Survey data for 12 Western European countries between 2004 and 2018, we construct a novel index that measures existential anxieties on the individual level. Our index shows (1) that existential anxieties increase the likelihood of right-wing populist voting and (2) that the fear fuelling narratives of these parties especially mobilise individuals with moderate globalisation attitudes.

AbstractPopulist parties enjoy stable support in various European countries. The literature on the rise of populism argues that this support especially increases in times of crises. Surprisingly, the German right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) did not increase its support in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the party even lost 2.3 percentage points in the 2021 federal election. We address this puzzle and ask why the AfD has not been able to use the crisis to its advantage. Our main argument in answering this question is that, although the AfD pursued the classic populist strategy of fundamental opposition, the support base of the AfD is strongly divided on the preference towards measures containing the spread of COVID-19. This division is reinforced by individual affectedness by the pandemic. Introducing a novel weekly dataset on voter preferences, we show that the AfD support base is strongly divided on the issue with approval of the government measures being a significant and substantial contributor to vote switching away from the AfD. Using regional-level data and a difference-in-differences approach, we further show that western German regions hit especially hard by the pandemic display a lower AfD vote share than other regions. Our findings have important implications for the impact of exogenous shocks on electoral competition and also on the future of populist parties.

Populist parties enjoy stable support in various European countries. The literature on the rise of populism argues that this support especially increases in times of crises. Surprisingly, the German right-wing populist Alternative für Deutschland (AfD) did not increase its support in the wake of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, the party even lost 2.3 percentage points in the 2021 federal election. We address this puzzle and ask why the AfD has not been able to use the crisis to its advantage. Our main argument in answering this question is that, although the AfD pursued the classic populist strategy of fundamental opposition, the support base of the AfD is strongly divided on the preference towards measures containing the spread of COVID-19. This division is reinforced by individual affectedness by the pandemic. Introducing a novel weekly dataset on voter preferences, we show that the AfD support base is strongly divided on the issue with approval of the government measures being a significant and substantial contributor to vote switching away from the AfD. Using regional-level data and a difference-in-differences approach, we further show that western German regions hit especially hard by the pandemic display a lower AfD vote share than other regions. Our findings have important implications for the impact of exogenous shocks on electoral competition and also on the future of populist parties.

In the past, the European Union seems to have been able to tame Euroscepticism through regional 'convergence' funding. After the Eastern enlargement of the Union, however, this relationship needs to be put to the test. Not only have the new member states become the main recipients of EU funding, Eastern Europe has also changed from once being the most integration-friendly region to displaying the most integration-hostile attitudes in the EU. Motivated by this empirical puzzle, we revisit the relationship between structural 'convergence' funding and Euroscepticism and ask where - if at all - is the EU's convergence spending still able to tame Euroscepticism. Most surprisingly, correlation analyses reveal that between 2006 and 2018 larger regional subsidies go along with increasing opposition to EU integration. We can rebut this counterintuitive finding by a Diff-in-Diff approach that reveals an increasing Euroscepticism in Eastern European regions between 2006 and 2014. Nevertheless, also these more advanced models fail to establish a positive relationship between regional funding eligibility and pro-integrationist attitudes. Finally, fuzzy RDD models exploit the funding assignment rule and corroborate that the EU is no longer able to pacify integration-critical regions by their simply increasing 'convergence' funding. Nevertheless, the EU has won support in Eastern Europe where EU investments are perceived (positively). In designing a strategy to win back support for EU integration, Brussels does not need more fiscal capacity but rather has to design 'convergence' funding that is visible as well as clearly attributable to its donor.

Abstract
There is currently a geopoliticisation of foreign policy, which is primarily driven by dependencies on autocratic systems. Autocracies are constantly on the rise, especially when measured by the percentage distribution of the world population. Even though the EU still trades with significantly more democracies than autocracies, trade relations with autocracies are often characterised by strong dependencies, especially with regard to critical raw materials such as lithium or magnesium. This also applies to the market for medical products, where China in particular uses its position as the main supplier to expand its geopolitical influence. This, together with the fact that autocracies are generally more likely to impose trade restrictions than democracies, means that the EU needs a strategy for how to handle trade with autocratic regimes in the future.

Die Studie befasst sich mit der Rolle der ESI-Fonds bei dem Aufbau der Europäischen Gesundheitsunion (EHU) vor dem Hintergrund der Halbzeitüberprüfung des mehrjährigen Finanzrahmens und der hohen Varianz der Übersterblichkeit zwischen und innerhalb der EU-Mitgliedstaaten während der COVID-19-Pandemie. Im Einzelnen analysiert die Studie die Determinanten der regionalen Übersterblichkeit und untersucht, wie die ESI-Fonds durch Kohäsions- und die Konvergenzförderung zum Aufbau der EHU und zur Schaffung von resilienten Gesundheitssystemen beitragen können. Das Papier stützt sich auf drei Thesen: (1) Ökonomische Deprivation und Unterschiede in der medizinischen Infrastruktur beeinflussen die Übersterblichkeit während der Pandemie; (2) Unterstützung durch die ESI-Fonds kann die medizinische Infrastruktur verbessern; und (3) die ESI-Fonds unterstützen den Aufbau resilienter Gesundheitssysteme.

+++++ Der Datensatz ist unter der aktuellen Version 1.1.0 der Studie (https://doi.org/10.7802/2498) verfügbar. +++++

Die Covid-19-Pandemie und der Ukrainekrieg haben die Abhängigkeit der Europäischen Union (EU) von einzelnen Handelspartnern deutlich gemacht. Eine der Aufgaben der 2021 von der Kommission neu eingerichteten Generaldirektion für Krisenvorsorge und -reaktion bei gesundheitlichen Notlagen (HERA) soll es daher sein, zur »offenen strategischen Autonomie« der EU beizutragen, indem Importabhängigkeiten bei Arzneimitteln identifiziert und beseitigt werden. Die Arbeit von HERA reiht sich damit in aktuelle Bemühungen der EU zur Reduzierung konzentrierter Importrisiken ein. Drei Aspekte sind dabei von besonderer Bedeutung: Identifikation von Abhängigkeiten, Wege zur deren Überwindung und Einbettung in die globale Gesundheitsgovernance.

Die Covid-19-Pandemie und der Ukrainekrieg haben die Abhängigkeit der Europäischen Union (EU) von einzelnen Handelspartnern deutlich gemacht. Eine der Aufgaben der 2021 von der Kommission neu eingerichteten Generaldirektion für Krisenvorsorge und -reaktion bei gesundheitlichen Notlagen (HERA) soll es daher sein, zur »offenen strategischen Autonomie« der EU beizutragen, indem Importabhängigkeiten bei Arzneimitteln identifiziert und beseitigt werden. Die Arbeit von HERA reiht sich damit in aktuelle Bemühungen der EU zur Reduzierung konzentrierter Importrisiken ein. Drei Aspekte sind dabei von besonderer Bedeutung: Identifikation von Abhängigkeiten, Wege zur deren Überwindung und Einbettung in die globale Gesundheitsgovernance.

Norms play a pivotal role in fostering peace. Yet, there is a dearth of compara-
tive empirical studies testing which norms exhibit the strongest connection.
Moreover, peace is usually only measured in terms of the absence of violent
conflict, neglecting its positive dimensions. This article uses fresh data from the
World Values Survey to assess how different norms correlate with negative and
positive measures of peace. It confirms that societal endorsement of democ-
racy, tolerance, and gender equality significantly correlate with reduced violent
conflict. However, only gender equality also correlates with interpersonal trust
as a key indicator of positive peace.

Populist parties and actors now govern various countries around the world. Often elected by the public in times of crises and over the perceived failure of 'the elites', the question stands as to how populist governments actually perform once elected, especially in times of crisis. Using the pandemic shock in the form of the COVID-19 crises, our paper poses the question of how populist governments handle the pandemic. We answer this question by introducing a theoretical framework according to which populist governments (1) enact less far-reaching policy measures to counter the pandemic and (2) lower the effort of citizens to counter the pandemic, so that populist governed countries are (3) hit worse by the pandemic. We test these propositions in a sample of 42 countries with weekly data from 2020. Employing econometric models, we find empirical support for our propositions and ultimately conclude that excess mortality in populist governed countries exceeds the excess mortality of non-populist countries by 8 percentage points (i.e., 98%). Our findings have important implications for the assessment of populist government performance in general, as well as counter-pandemic measures in particular, by providing evidence that opportunistic and inadequate policy responses, spreading misinformation and downplaying the pandemic are strongly related to increases in COVID-19 mortality.

Populist parties and actors now govern various countries around the world. Often elected by the public in times of crises and over the perceived failure of 'the elites', the question stands as to how populist governments actually perform once elected, especially in times of crisis. Using the pandemic shock in the form of the COVID-19 crises, our paper answers the question of how populist governments handle the pandemic. We answer this question by introducing a theoretical framework according to which populist governments (1) enact less far-reaching policy measures to counter the pandemic and (2) lower the effort of citizens to counter the pandemic, so that populist governed countries are (3) hit worse by the pandemic. We test these propositions in a sample of 42 countries with weekly data from 2020. Employing econometric models, we find empirical support for our propositions and ultimately conclude that excess mortality in populist governed countries exceeds the excess mortality of conventional countries by 10 percentage points (i.e., 100%). Our findings have important implications for the assessment of populist government performance in general, as well as counter-pandemic measures in particular, by providing evidence that opportunistic and inadequate policy responses, spreading misinformation and downplaying the pandemic are strongly related to increases in COVID-19 mortality.