The social lives of married women: Peer effects in female autonomy and investments in children
In: Journal of development economics, Band 140, S. 26-43
ISSN: 0304-3878
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In: Journal of development economics, Band 140, S. 26-43
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: Canadian public policy: Analyse de politiques, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 145
ISSN: 1911-9917
In: Canadian public policy: a journal for the discussion of social and economic policy in Canada = Analyse de politiques, Band 29, Heft 2, S. 145-161
ISSN: 0317-0861
In: The Canadian journal of economics: the journal of the Canadian Economics Association = Revue canadienne d'économique, Band 43, Heft 1, S. 127-151
ISSN: 1540-5982
Abstract Trade barriers can cause output to be diverted to other countries and into other products. We study the effect of a voluntary price restraint (VPR) on Mexican tomatoes entering the United States. The diversion caused by the VPR is statistically and economically significant – representing over four‐fifths of the direct effects of the trade barrier. When the VPR was binding, Mexico exported more tomatoes to Canada, the United States cut back on exports while Canada increased their exports to the United States. The VPR also diverted fresh tomatoes in Mexico into paste production, which was then exported to the United States.
In: Journal of development economics, Band 158, S. 1-7
ISSN: 0304-3878
World Affairs Online
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Working paper
In: American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Band 101, Heft 1, S. 250-269
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In: Energy economics, Band 48, S. 253-264
ISSN: 1873-6181
In: NBER Working Paper No. w19195
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In: Journal of development economics, Band 158, S. 102920
ISSN: 0304-3878
In: American economic review, Band 103, Heft 3, S. 332-337
ISSN: 1944-7981
We extend the model of Fullerton, Karney, and Baylis (2012) to explore cost-effectiveness of unilateral climate policy in the presence of leakage. We ignore the welfare gain from reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and focus on the welfare cost of the emissions tax or permit scheme. Whereas that prior paper solves for changes in emissions quantities and finds that leakage may be negative, we show here that all cases with negative leakage in that model are cases where a unilateral carbon tax results in a welfare loss. With positive leakage, however, a unilateral policy can improve welfare.
In: NBER Working Paper No. w18898
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 4101
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In: IZA Discussion Paper No. 6347
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