Suchergebnisse

Inhaltsverzeichnis: Introduction : Scapegoats or Solutions -- Before the Syrian Crisis -- Enter the Syrians -- From Brothers in Need to Invaders -- Grievances against Governance -- Pushed to the Edge -- Conclusion : Refugees and Changing State-Citizen Relations.

Introduction : organizing for security -- Welfare, work, and collective action -- State and militia welfare and their demise -- Hard times and private-sector welfare options -- Kin mutual aid -- Creating kin and new institutions -- Elites, elections, and civil society -- Conclusion : insight into identity and institutions

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/09592318.2013.866432 ; We know little of the internal governing practices of non-state actors once in control of territory. Some territories have witnessed the establishment of new institutions of public goods remarkably similar to state institutions. This article compares four armed political parties governing territory during the Lebanese civil war. These non-state violent actors established complex political and economic institutions and administrative structures. Despite the wide range of ideologies and identities of these actors, they all converged in their institutional priorities, although not in their capacities or the particular ways of achieving those priorities. Data from interviews and the actions of the armed political parties suggest a combination of ideology and desire for control is causal in generating public institutions, partly attributable to the high degree of citizen activism marking the Lebanese case.

How and when do movements transform? Change in social movements has been attributed to external, structural political opportunities and to repression, generating either moderation or radicalization, respectively. Locating all change outside the movement, however, neglects large categories of change, particularly the agency of members. Even when the influence of members is acknowledged, it is still generally limited to internal political battles for control or is viewed as reflecting changes in external political opportunities. Yet factors outside political opportunities can change members' priorities for the movement and their view of their own place in it. Economic and historical factors falling outside social movement analysis can profoundly affect extant members, while new constituencies and generations can enter the movement with different ideas. Particularly in the developing world and in authoritarian countries, much mobilizing takes place within the informal, everyday realm and within movement institutions-such as social services and the media-that are not geared to formal politics. In short, Social Movement Theory (SMT) as currently formulated omits the capacity of members, in realms outside those geared to formal politics or control of the organization, to affect the movement as a whole.

The Middle East appears rife with violent non-state actors operating outside domestic law and international norms. Through state incapacity, economic reforms, or war, increasing areas are untouched by state services or law. Territories are becoming effectively stateless even in the geographic heart of the nominal state itself. States considered strong (Tunisia) or rich (Saudi Arabia) are similarly affected. Yet unlike Hobbes's nightmare of all-out competition and violence, the areas are in fact governed. Instead of chaos in spaces where state sovereignty is sparse or absent, alternative authorities arise. New actors and institutions fulfill roles previously considered the preserve of the state. Gangs, militias, thugs, local men of influence, and religious political parties are the main contenders for authority. These actors and their authority are not traditional or longstanding; they are newly successful, self-made leaders. They establish authority through services to the community and legitimate it in terms of religion, identity, or violence.

In The International Encyclopedia of Peace. Edited by Nigel Young. New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010. ; This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted

The article of record as published may be found at http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/15512160903035658 ; Simple role-play simulations can not only demonstrate the dynamics of a conflict but also create awareness of multiple perspectives even among populations relatively set in their opinions. To teach my student population of military officers, I utilize simple, nongame simulations of multisided Middle East conflicts that not only facilitate learning the complex sides but also generate insight and new perspectives. Understanding the motivations of all sides is a prerequisite to analyzing conflicts fully and creating effective policies, necessary skills for military students. The nongame character of these simulations allowed inclusion of the average person; a role generating alternative perspectives, creative thinking, and understanding of the motivations and grievances of disliked groups. Students stated that they now appreciated different claims and the causes of even terrorist group stances, having seen the conflict from the players' points of view. Most students stated that they had not considered the effect on the average person previously, viewing the conflict and potential solutions purely in terms of superpower diplomacy, military actors, terrorist groups, and governmental actions. By not narrowly focusing on diplomatic negotiations, these role-plays spurred insights into the situation on the ground and empathy for the common people.

In Robert Looney ed, Handbook on US. Middle East Relations, Routledge, pp. 310-323, 2009. ; For Americans, Lebanon conjures up images of terrorism and Israeli invasions. More recently, Lebanon's mass demonstrations to rid the country of its Syrian occupation swept the media in 2005. Often called the Cedar revolution, the West saw contrasting images of Western-looking women and black-dad Islamists. The perspective of Lebanese politics neatly divided into two--one western, Lebanese, and democratic, the other lslamist, non-Lebanese, and antidemocratic- has permeated US perspectives of the country. Moreover, this divided view of Lebanese domestic politics is usually equated with international and regional alignments and conflicts. Domestic actors here are viewed as reflecting regional ambitions and not their own political priorities. Throughout Lebanon's history, actors have been seen to represent the opposing forces in the cold war, civilizational divisions, or neighboring hostile states. These lenses, obscuring the domestic players' interests, transmit a skewed interpretation of Lebanese politics and hinder a complete understanding of the effects of US foreign policy in Lebanon.

in Robert Looney ed, Handbook on U.S. Middle East Relations, Routledge, pp. 310-323, 2009. ; This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, may not be copyrighted.

International Journal on World Peace 26:3 (September 2009), 5-34. ; This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted

Arab Media & Society (Issue 9, Fall 2009). The article of record as published may be found at: http://www.arabmediasociety.com/?article=728. ; This publication is a work of the U.S. Government as defined in Title 17, United States Code, Section 101. As such, it is in the public domain, and under the provisions of Title 17, United States Code, Section 105, it may not be copyrighted