Suchergebnisse

U radu se polazi od centralističke pozicije monarhističke Jugoslavije i njenog razbijanja kao nulte tačke u izgradnji novoustanovljene federalističke paradigme. Središnji deo rada se odnosi na izgradnju novih osnova federativnog uređenja tokom antifašističke borbe i socijalističke revolucije koju je predvodio partizanski pokret uz dominantnu ulogu KPJ, čija je organizaciona struktura prethodno odredila karakter državnog uređenja. Polazeći od prvih Narodnooslobodilačkih odbora i procesa konstituisanja ratnih pokrajina, etapno je razgrađivan odozdo centralistički model i uvođen federativni princip na oslobođenim teritorijama. Posebna pažnja u radu je posvećena državno-utemeljiteljskom zasedanju AVNOJ-a u Jajcu 1943. na kome je usvojen nacionalno-emancipatorski koncept države u izgradnji – pet, odnosno, šest nacija i njihovih šest federalnih država kao konstituensi nove federativne Jugoslavije. I dok je Bosna i Hercegovina konstituisana na istorijskom, a ne nacionalnom principu, Vojvodina kao zaokružena ratna pokrajina nije postala federalna jedinica. Nakon konstitucionalnog Drugog zasednja AVNOJ-a, federalne države, članice nove federacije su na svojim najvišim predstavničkim telima ubrzano dovršavale procese vlastite institucionalne izgradnje. Najsloženiji proces odvijao se u Srbiji u koju je trebalo inkorporirati Vojvodinu kao dovršenu ratnu pokrajinu, Sandžak kao nedovršenu ratnu pokrajinu i Kosovo sa svojom složenom nacionalnom strukturom. Proces izgradnje federativne Jugoslavije, započet izgradnjom prvih NOO i formiranjem ratnih pokrajina (1941), na Prvom (1942) i Drugom (1943) zasedanju AVNOJ-a, zavšen je na njegovom Trećem zasedanju 1945. godine.

U radu se analiziraju politička stajališta reformskih političkih elita u
Srbiji i Hrvatskoj o ključnim pitanjima unutarnjega razvoja Jugoslavije
početkom 1970-ih. Oba republička partijska rukovodstva stupila su na političku scenu u zenitu jugoslavenske reformske orijentacije i vala liberalizacije nakon Brijunskoga plenuma. Nova generacija srpskih i hrvatskih komunista zasnivala je svoje reformske programe na idejama demokratizacije i emancipacije jugoslavenskoga samoupravnog socijalizma.
Borba za novi koncept Jugoslavije, tržišnu privredu, reformu Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i liberalizaciju društva povezivala je političke elite Zagreba i Beograda. Međutim, neriješeni odnosi u federaciji, skupa
s porastom nacionalizma i snažnim otporom partijskih konzervativaca, određivali su krajnje domete suradnje reformskih snaga i perspektive razvoja demokratskoga i tržišnoga socijalizma u Jugoslaviji.

U radu se analiziraju politička stajališta reformskih političkih elita u Srbiji i Hrvatskoj o ključnim pitanjima unutarnjega razvoja Jugoslavije početkom 1970-ih. Oba republička partijska rukovodstva stupila su na političku scenu u zenitu jugoslavenske reformske orijentacije i vala liberalizacije nakon Brijunskoga plenuma. Nova generacija srpskih i hrvatskih komunista zasnivala je svoje reformske programe na idejama demokratizacije i emancipacije jugoslavenskoga samoupravnog socijalizma. Borba za novi koncept Jugoslavije, tržišnu privredu, reformu Saveza komunista Jugoslavije i liberalizaciju društva povezivala je političke elite Zagreba i Beograda. Međutim, neriješeni odnosi u federaciji, skupa s porastom nacionalizma i snažnim otporom partijskih konzervativaca, određivali su krajnje domete suradnje reformskih snaga i perspektive razvoja demokratskoga i tržišnoga socijalizma u Jugoslaviji. ; This paper examines the relations between the two largest Yugoslav republics, Serbia and Croatia, through the political orientation of their leading reformist structures in the period from when they came to power in late 1968 to the forced resignation of the Croatian leadership in December 1971. Starting from the common strategic goals of the reform-oriented leaderships of Marko Nikezić and Savka Dabčević Kučar, the relations of official Belgrade and Zagreb fluctuated from alliance based on common interests, compatible constitutional and market goals, mutual defence from the arbitrary actions of the federal political centre, the need to expand the reformist base in society, the operationalisation of 'clean slate' politics, and a desire for the further liberalisation and democratisation of Yugoslav self-governing socialism to misunderstandings regarding the decentralisation of financial capital, different political methodologies, and different approaches to Tito. From the Tenth Session of the Central Committee of the League of Communists of Croatia to the Seventeenth Session of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia, Marko Nikezić's leadership showed a much higher degree of understanding for the political challenges that were coming from the reformist political leadership in Zagreb compared to the conservatives in Belgrade, who expected that Serbia would return to the role of the key 'guardian' of Yugoslavia. Still, a change in the political course took place when Tito, using the principle of 'democratic centralism', decided to defend the decentralised state through a recentralised, monopolist party. Reformist advocates of a more decisive modernisation of Yugoslav socialism were stigmatised as a disruptive factor. For this reason, at the Twenty-First Session of the Presidency of the League of Communists of Yugoslavia in Karađorđevo, Nikezić's leadership remained alone in its disagreement with the forcible removal of leading figures of the Croatian Central Committee, knowing that the suppression of the Croatian Spring would open the way towards a permanent change of course and the re-Stalinisation of political conditions in the country as well as the complication of Croatian-Serbian relations in the future.

This paper analyzes Soviet-Yugoslav relations in the context of the first major crisis between the two countries that started in 1948. The focus is on the period after Stalin's death, which was followed by a period of detente and reconciliation. This process was not without tensions because the interests of the two countries were in opposition to one another. While the Soviet leader, Nikita Khrushchev, wanted to return Yugoslavia to the Soviet sphere of influence, Tito considered Yugoslav independence won during the conflict with Stalin as his foreign policy priority. Due to these circumstances, the Hungarian rebellion in the autumn of 1956 against the Soviet occupation was the catalyst for further development of relations between Yugoslavia and the USSR, and these relations are a necessary frame of reference for understanding the politics of Yugoslavia during this Hungarian crisis.

The goal of this article is to trace the appearance of a pattern of forest mismanagement from the beginnings of modern Serbian state in the 19th century. The article will demonstrate that rapid demographic growth, accompanied by the expansion of arable land due to a gradual transition from animal husbandry to agriculture as the dominant form of economy, led to a vigorous increase in the process of deforestation in the period spanning from the attainment of autonomy (1830) to the wars against the Ottoman Empire (1876-1878). Supremacy of agriculture in the beginning of the 1870s was achieved at the expense of forests, because the increase in agricultural yields in the peasant existential economy, which was characterized by underdeveloped agricultural techniques, meant a continuous expansion of arable land. The example of the Principality of Serbia confirms that in agrarian economies competition between the usufruct of the forest and its potential as agricultural land regularly ends with the removal of the forest.

This paper explores the phenomenon of revisionism in historiography, while focusing in particular on illegitimate revisionism and negationism. It is indisputably true that historiography must be subject to constant revisions. Like all scientific theories, it needs to be characterized by a sort of "conservative" openness towards new ideas; however, revisions and negations are often put forward without scientific grounding. They reject the well-established historiographical methods, while opening themselves to various kinds of ideologies, biases and manipulations. The paper further offers a synthesized overview of the revisionist practice in dominant parts of the society and historiography in post-communist Serbia. The change in the ideological paradigm that occurred in the 1980s was accompanied by a politically motivated reinterpretation of the past, which primarily focused on World War II in Yugoslavia. In Serbia in the 1990s, Tito's Partisans were no longer celebrated as national heroes and fighters against fascism; they were replaced by the royalist and nationalist Chetniks led by Draža Mihailović, whose collaboration with the occupying forces was purposefully glossed over. The nationalist interpretation of history and the new revisionist politics in Serbia were supported by the state and the activities of its three branches: legislative, executive and judicial. In spite of the political changes that took place in Serbia in 2000, the dominant nationalist matrix in historical interpretations and revisionist politics remained unchanged. ; Polazeći od distinkcije između nauke i pseudonauke, rad se bavi pojavama revi-zionizma u naučnoj istoriografiji sa posebnim akcentom na pojave nelegitimnog revizionizma i negacionizma. Iako nije sporno da istoriografija mora da bude pod-ložna konstantnim revizijama, jer kao i svaka naučna teorija mora da ima neku vrstu konzervativne otvorenosti prema novim idejama, česte su pojave nenauč-nih revizija i negacionističkog pristupa. Ove pojave odbacuju utvrđene istorio-grafske metode uz otvaranje prema različitim vrstama pristrasnosti i manipula-cije. U radu se dalje daje sintetizovan pregled revizionističke prakse u dominantnim delovima društva i istoriografije u postkomunističkoj Srbiji. Promena ideološke paradigme krajem osamdesetih godina prošlog veka donela je i politički motivi-sanu reinterpretaciju, pre svega, Drugog svetskog rata na jugoslvoenskom pro-storu. Umesto dotadašnjih Titovih partizana u Srbiji u poslednjoj deceniji 20. veka rojalistički i nacionalistički četnici Draže Mihailovića bivaju proglašeni za nacionalne heroje i borce protiv fašizma, dok se njihova kolaboracija prećutkuje. Nacionalističko tumačenje istorije i nova revizionistička politika u Srbiji uživala je podršku države kroz delatnost sve tri grane vlasti: zakonodavne, izvršne i sud-ske. Uprkos političkim promenama u Srbiji 2000. dominantna nacionalistička matrica u istorijskim interpretacijama i politici revizionizma, nije promenjena.

POPREBEL Working Paper no. 4: Political populism from the fringe to the mainstream: A conceptual framework. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822682. POPREBEL Working Paper series POPREBEL (Populist rebellion against modernity in 21st-century Eastern Europe: neo-traditionalism and neo-feudalism) is a large Horizon 2020-funded research project on the rise of populism in Central and Eastern Europe. The aim of the project is to describe the phenomenon, create a typology of its various manifestations, reconstruct trajectories of its growth and decline, investigate its causes, interpret its meanings, diagnose its consequences and propose policy solutions. This project has received funding from the European Union's Horizon 2020 research and innovation programme under grant agreement No 822682.The POPREBEL consortium comprises six universities – UCL (co-ordinatinginstitution), University of Belgrade, Charles University, Corvinus University ofBudapest, Jagiellonian University and University of Tartu – and Edge ryders, a social enterprise. Contents 1. Introduction 2.Political populism 2.1 Varieties of populism in CE/SEE 2.2 The populist challenge from within the mainstream 2.3 Populists in power 2.4 Popular geopolitics and the cultural grounds of populism 2.5 Looking beyond parties to understand populist politics