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AbstractCorporate anti-corruption initiatives can make a substantial contribution towards curtailing corruption and advancing efforts to achieve the United Nations' Sustainable Development Goals. However, researchers have observed that underdeveloped assumptions with respect to the conceptualization of corruption and how firms respond to corruption risk impeding the efficacy of anti-corruption programs. We investigate the relationship between the perceived level of corruption in foreign host countries and the organizational structure of subsidiary operations established by multinational corporations (MNCs). Foreign host market corruption is disaggregated into two components—private and public corruption. We employ an uncertainty-based perspective grounded in transaction cost theory to focus upon the distinct mechanisms through which private and public corruption can each be expected to impact a foreign subsidiary's organizational structure [wholly-owned subsidiary (WOS) or a joint venture (JV) with a local partner]. We expect that each type of corruption fosters a different type of uncertainty (environmental or behavioral) which predominates in shaping the MNC's choice of foreign subsidiary investment structure. Hypotheses are developed and tested with a sample of 187 entries into 19 foreign host markets. Each type of corruption was found to exert a distinct effect upon the organizational structure of foreign subsidiaries. More precisely, while heightened perceived levels of public corruption were found to motivate MNCs to invest through a JV with a local partner rather than a WOS, more pronounced private corruption precipitated the opposite outcome.

This paper examines the factors associated with the Export performance of an 86‐firm sample of small and medium‐sized Canadian manufacturers. Two measures of export performance, intensity and relative profitability, are employed in this study. The findings suggest that on‐going commitment is important for both export intensity and profitability. This commitment can be reflected in a number of ways: human resources, market choice, and strategy' components. Export profitability also tends to be linked to the domestic distribution strategy to carefully selected foreign markets.RésuméCette etude éxamine les facteurs associés au renedment à l'exportaton d'un échantillonnage de 86 petits et moyens fabricants canadiens. L'intensité et la rentabilité relatives y sont utilisées comrae critères de rendement. Les résultats de l'étude indiquent qu'un engagement souienu est un facteur imponant pour l'intensité et la rentabilité. Cet engagement peut se manifester, par exemple, dans les ressources humaines, le choix des marchés et dans l'élaboration des stratégies. Le rendement à l'exportation est généralement relié à l'application d'une stratégic de distribution domestique à des marchés étrangers choisis avec soins.

This article examines how multiple ownership changes unfold in international equity joint venture (IEJV) evolution and how such repeated changes impact short-term performance and long-term survival. By theorizing a new concept—the trap of continual change—in the IEJV context, we challenge the adaptive viewpoint assumed in alliance dynamics research. We propose that partners sometimes respond to an initial dissatisfaction with the venture result with a dysfunctional repetition of rearranging the ownership control structure. This continual change locks the organization into bad choices and sends it into a downward spiral. Acknowledging the mixed motive nature of inter-partner relationships, we incorporate cooperative versus competitive dynamics manifested in shared control arrangements. We propose that shared ownership control lends stability to the IEJV until the initial IEJV agreement is renegotiated; this stability is a result of the cooperative forces of mutual interdependence and mutual forbearance between the partners. However, when the power balance breaks down, the potential for inter-partner conflict increases. When the ownership control structure of the IEJV is restructured, especially multiple times, shared control arrangements become increasingly unstable as behavioral, cultural, and managerial differences are amplified.