Suchergebnisse

In Europe, legislators are increasingly introducing sustainability goals into the system of private law. By prohibiting certain conduct, increasing transparency, nudging companies, as well as changing institutions, procedures and liability regimes, legislators complement private law with tools and goals traditionally attributed to public law. This article provides an overview and points to critical aspects, including the limited empirical evidence on how effective such measures are, whether such measures invite strategic maneuvers by companies, and how this affects the general relationship between private and public law. ; ISSN:0043-6275 ; ISSN:1613-978X

Main description: Wissen wird im (unternehmerischen) Wettbewerb zunehmend zur entscheidenden Ressource. Zunehmend dominiert der Wettbewerb um neue Märkte statt derjenige innerhalb einer gegebenen Marktumgebung. Ausdruck dieser Tendenz ist nicht zuletzt, dass immaterielle Schutzrechte geistigen Eigentums - allen voran die steigende Zahl der erteilten Patente - für die Unternehmen ständig wichtiger werden, um sich im Wettbewerb zu behaupten. In dem Maße wie jedoch die Bedeutung des "Geistigen Eigentums" steigt, nimmt auch die Gefahr zu, dass die damit verbundenen Ausschlussrechte zu wettbewerbswidrigen Zwecken eingesetzt werden und insoweit das Immaterialgüterrecht in Konflikt mit dem Wettbewerbsrecht, also der Aufrechterhaltung effizienten Wettbewerbs, gerät. Dies zeigt sich auch zunehmend an umstrittenen, die Schnittstelle zwischen beiden Rechtsbereichen betreffenden Gerichtsentscheidungen.Die Arbeitsgruppe "Wettbewerb" des Wirtschaftspolitischen Ausschusses im Verein für Socialpolitik hat deshalb ihre Jahrestagung 2006 der Beziehung zwischen dem Recht Geistigen Eigentums und der "klassischen" Wettbewerbspolitik gewidmet. Der vorliegende Band vereinigt die auf der Tagung gehaltenen Beiträge. Auf diese Weise wird die vor allem in den Wirtschaftswissenschaften bislang vernachlässigte Debatte über das Spannungsfeld zwischen Immaterialgüterrecht und Wettbewerbsrecht einem breiteren Publikum zugänglich gemacht.

Internet search engines display advertisements along with search results, providing them with a major source of revenue. The display of ads is triggered by the use of keywords, which are found in the searches performed by search engine users. The fact that advertisers can buy a keyword that contains a trademark they do not own has caused controversy worldwide. To explore the actual effects of trademark and keyword advertising policies, we exploit a natural experiment in Europe. Following a decision by the Court of Justice of the European Union, Google relaxed its AdWords policy in continental Europe in September 2010. After the policy change, Google allowed advertisers to select a third party's trademark as a keyword to trigger the display of ads, with only a limited complaint procedure for trademark owners. We use click-stream data from European Internet users to explore the effect this policy change had on browsing behavior. Based on a data set of 5.38 million website visits before and after the policy change, we find little average change. However, we present evidence that this lack of average effect stems from an aggregation of two opposing effects. While navigational searches are less likely to lead to the trademark owner's website, non-navigational searches are more likely to lead to the trademark owner's website after the policy change. The effect of changing keyword advertising policies varies with the purpose of the consumers using the trademark, and it is more pronounced for lesser-known trademarks. The article points to tradeoffs trademark policy is facing beyond consumer confusion. More generally, the article proposes a novel way of analyzing the effect of different allocations of property rights in intellectual property law.

Judges decide cases. Do they also try to influence which cases they decide? Clearly plaintiffs "shop" for the most attractive forum, but do judges try to attract cases by "selling" their courts? Some American judges actively try to enlarge their influence by making their courts attractive to plaintiffs, a phenomenon known as "forum selling." This article shows that forum selling occurs outside the U.S. as well, focusing on Germany, a country that is often held up as the paragon of the civil law approach to adjudication. As in the U.S., German courts attract cases primarily through the pro-plaintiff manipulation of procedure, including the routine issuance of ex parte injunctions in press cases and refusal to stay patent infringement proceedings when the patent's validity is challenged in another forum. A critical difference between forum selling in Germany and the U.S. is that court administrators are more actively involved in Germany. As state officials, German court administrators have the incentive to consider the effect of caseloads on government revenue and the local economy, and they use their power to allocate judges to particular kinds of cases in order to make their courts attractive. They also use their power over promotion, case allocation, and resources to reward judges who succeed in attracting cases. Based on an extensive set of interviews with attorneys, judges and court officials, this article describes evidence of forum selling in German patent, press, and antitrust law. It also analyzes how German courts compete internationally with courts from other countries.