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BeckerLawrence C.: Lawrence C. Beckeris a fellow of Hollins University and professor emeritus of philosophy at the College of William Mary. He was an associate editor of the journal Ethicsfrom 1985-2000, and the editor, with Charlotte B. Becker, of two editions of the Encyclopedia of Ethics.

What would stoic ethics be like today if stoicism had survived as a systematic approach to ethical theory, if it had coped successfully with the challenges of modern philosophy and experimental science? A New Stoicism proposes an answer to that question, offered from within the stoic tradition but without the metaphysical and psychological assumptions that modern philosophy and science have abandoned. Lawrence Becker argues that a secular version of the stoic ethical project, based on contemporary cosmology and developmental psychology, provides the basis for a sophisticated form of ethical naturalism, in which virtually all the hard doctrines of the ancient Stoics can be clearly restated and defended. Becker argues, in keeping with the ancients, that virtue is one thing, not many; that it, and not happiness, is the proper end of all activity; that it alone is good, all other things being merely rank-ordered relative to each other for the sake of the good; and that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Moreover, he rejects the popular caricature of the stoic as a grave figure, emotionally detached and capable mainly of endurance, resignation, and coping with pain. To the contrary, he holds that while stoic sages are able to endure the extremes of human suffering, they do not have to sacrifice joy to have that ability, and he seeks to turn our attention from the familiar, therapeutic part of stoic moral training to a reconsideration of its theoretical foundations

What would stoic ethics be like today if stoicism had survived as a systematic approach to ethical theory, and if it had coped successfully with the challenges of modern philosophy and experimental science?What would stoic ethics be like today if stoicism had survived as a systematic approach to ethical theory, if it had coped successfully with the challenges of modern philosophy and experimental science? A New Stoicism proposes an answer to that question, offered from within the stoic tradition but without the metaphysical and psychological assumptions that modern philosophy and science have abandoned. Lawrence Becker argues that a secular version of the stoic ethical project, based on contemporary cosmology and developmental psychology, provides the basis for a sophisticated form of ethical naturalism, in which virtually all the hard doctrines of the ancient Stoics can be clearly restated and defended. Becker argues, in keeping with the ancients, that virtue is one thing, not many; that it, and not happiness, is the proper end of all activity; that it alone is good, all other things being merely rank-ordered relative to each other for the sake of the good; and that virtue is sufficient for happiness. Moreover, he rejects the popular caricature of the stoic as a grave figure, emotionally detached and capable mainly of endurance, resignation, and coping with pain. To the contrary, he holds that while stoic sages are able to endure the extremes of human suffering, they do not have to sacrifice joy to have that ability, and he seeks to turn our attention from the familiar, therapeutic part of stoic moral training to a reconsideration of its theoretical foundations.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- PART ONE: THE WAY THINGS STAND -- 1. The Conceit -- 2. A New Agenda for Stoic Ethics -- 3. The Ruins of Doctrine -- PART TWO: THE WAY THINGS MIGHT GO -- 4. Normative Logic -- 5. Following the Facts -- 6. Virtue -- 7. Happiness -- Appendix. A Calculus for Normative Logic -- Postscript to the Revised Edition -- Bibliography -- Index

Much discussion of morality presupposes that moral judgments are always, at bottom, arbitrary. Moral scepticism, or at least moral relativism, has become common currency among the liberally educated. This remains the case even while political crises become intractable, and it is increasingly apparent that the scope of public policy formulated with no reference to moral justification is extremely limited.The thesis of On Justifying Moral Judgments insists, on the contrary, that rigorous justifications are possible for moral judgments. Crucially, Becker argues for the coordination of the three m

The tendency to reciprocate - to return good for good and evil for evil - is a potent force in human life, and the concept of reciprocity is closely connected to fundamental notions of 'justice', 'obligation' or 'duty', 'gratitude' and 'equality'. In Reciprocity, first published in 1986, Lawrence Becker presents a sustained argument about reciprocity, beginning with the strategy for developing a moral theory of the virtues. He considers the concept of reciprocity in detail, contending that it is a basic virtue that provides the basis for parental authority, obligations to future generations, a

1. Introduction -- 2. Property rights -- 3. The argument from first occupancy -- 4. The labor theory of property acquisition -- 5. Arguments from utility -- 6. The argument from political liberty -- 7. Considerations of moral character -- 8. Anti-property arguments -- 9. The justification of property rights.

""Cover""; ""Contents""; ""Introduction""; ""Part 1: Habilitation and Basic Justice""; ""Preface to Part One""; ""1. Concepts and Conceptions: Basic Justice and Habilitation""; ""1. Basic Justice""; ""2. Habilitation: Concept and Conception""; ""3. Normative Theories with a Close Connection to Habilitation""; ""4. Habilitation: Conception and Framework""; ""2. The Circumstances of Habilitation for Basic Justice""; ""1. Humean Accounts""; ""2. Functional Abilities in a Given Range of Environments""; ""3. Summary of the Circumstances of Habilitation""; ""4. The Centrality of Health and Agency""

A philosophical essay under this title faces severe rhetorical challenges. New accounts of the good life regularly and rapidly turn out to be variations of old ones, subject to a predictable range of decisive objections. Attempts to meet those objections with improved accounts regularly and rapidly lead to a familiar impasse — that while a life of contemplation, or epicurean contentment, or stoic indifference, or religious ecstasy, or creative rebellion, or self-actualization, or many another thing might count asagood life, none of them can plausibly be identified withthegood life, or thebestlife. Given the long history of that impasse, it seems futile to offer yet another candidate for the genus "good life" as if that candidate might be new, or philosophically defensible. And given the weariness, irony, and self-deprecation expected of a philosopher in such an impasse, it is difficult for any substantive proposal on this topic to avoid seeming pretentious.