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When, why, and how are democratic institutions reformed? This is the broad question guiding this research, rooted in a context of crises of representative democracy. Core democratic rules can be understood as the formal political rules regulating the direct relationship between elites within the political system, parties, and citizens. They are therefore the cornerstone of the functioning of any political system. This book deals with the context, the motives, and the mechanisms explaining the incidence of institutional engineering in consolidated European democracies between 1990 and 2015

International audience ; Empirical political science has increasingly focused on citizens' conceptions of their political system. Most existing studies draw upon large quantitative datasets which have produced contradictory results. Qualitative approaches are used more and more commonly to identify the general narrative produced by ordinary citizens on their political system, but they tend to underplay the variations found in their discourses. In this article, I use semi-directed interviews to explore citizens' contrasting aspirations about their political system. This article is based on 32 interviews conducted with French citizens across Fall and Winter 2017 and on 24 interviews conducted during the Yellow Vests movement in fall 2019. During these interviews, citizens were asked to define in their own terms what politics is, what it should achieve, what the flaws and advantages of their political system are and what should be changed. These citizens have produced four ideal-typical discourses, uncovering four distinct conceptions of what the political system is, how it legitimizes itself, what types of procedures it should lay on and what types of outcomes it should produce. Citizens' discourses heavily focus on alternative logics of political representation, which remains unavoidable to channel political decisions. They express four competing aspirations: entrustment, participation, identification, and control & sanction. The two latter conceptions remain under-explored empirically.

International audience ; Empirical political science has increasingly focused on citizens' conceptions of their political system. Most existing studies draw upon large quantitative datasets which have produced contradictory results. Qualitative approaches are used more and more commonly to identify the general narrative produced by ordinary citizens on their political system, but they tend to underplay the variations found in their discourses. In this article, I use semi-directed interviews to explore citizens' contrasting aspirations about their political system. This article is based on 32 interviews conducted with French citizens across Fall and Winter 2017 and on 24 interviews conducted during the Yellow Vests movement in fall 2019. During these interviews, citizens were asked to define in their own terms what politics is, what it should achieve, what the flaws and advantages of their political system are and what should be changed. These citizens have produced four ideal-typical discourses, uncovering four distinct conceptions of what the political system is, how it legitimizes itself, what types of procedures it should lay on and what types of outcomes it should produce. Citizens' discourses heavily focus on alternative logics of political representation, which remains unavoidable to channel political decisions. They express four competing aspirations: entrustment, participation, identification, and control & sanction. The two latter conceptions remain under-explored empirically.

Resume Cet article illustre comment l'usage inductif du process tracing permet d'analyser l'issue finale d'une série de réformes de la démocratie : le quinquennat et la modification du calendrier électoral en France (2000-2001) et les réformes électorale et constitutionnelle en Italie (2003-2006). Basés sur un raisonnement inductif et une méthode séquentielle, les résultats présentés montrent concrètement comment le process tracing peut être utilisé pour faire apparaître deux mécanismes causaux : le credit claiming , et donc la diversité des intérêts des acteurs ; et les réformes imbriquées et la manière dont elles permettent de construire le consensus dans une majorité divisée.

Les élections municipales en Italie ont dans une très large mesure ouvert la voie à beaucoup des développements les plus marquants des institutions italiennes depuis 1993, mais aussi aux bouleversements permanents qu'a connu le système partisan italien depuis la même époque. En effet, les élections municipales ont été les premières en Italie à organiser l'élection directe du chef de l'exécutif local, et donc à promouvoir des logiques de personnalisation et de « présidentialisation de la vie politique » présentes dans l'ensemble des démocraties consolidées, mais particulièrement prégnantes dans le cas de l'Italie. Comme le note ainsi Annick Magnier, l'Italie s'est positionnée à l'avant-garde d'un mouvement plus général, celui de l'élection directe du maire. Ces développements institutionnels ont profondément changé le rôle du maire en lui donnant une prééminence nouvelle, mais les dynamiques institutionnelles municipales ne peuvent pas être dissociées des dynamiques électorales qui ont bouleversé le système partisan depuis 1993 de façon générale. Ce chapitre précisera d'abord brièvement les modalités du système électoral en vigueur pour les élections municipales en Italie dans les régions à statut ordinaire. Il reviendra ensuite sur les trois grands phénomènes caractérisant désormais la compétition électorale municipale en Italie en revenant sur le phénomène des primaires et sa généralisation, sur la stabilisation des exécutifs municipaux, et sur les dynamiques de coalition et de dé-nationalisation qui ont caractérisé la compétition municipale depuis 1993.

International audience ; Current theories on institutional change tend to interpret it either as the result of long-term gradual trends, or of disrupting shocks following periods of punctuated equilibrium. Less is known about the moments in which change is more frequent. Focusing on the short-term determinants of reforms of core democratic rules in consolidated democracies, the article shows that proximate shifts in the electoral arena have a distinctive impact on the number of institutional reforms that are adopted in a legislature. Using the empirical and theoretical findings of the literature on electoral reform, the article develops a model tested in statistical analyses aggregating a large sample of institutional reforms in Western European democracies between 1990 and 2010. The results show that rising electoral uncertainty measured by volatility, and the change of preferences of the actors in power measured by the advent of new forces in government lead to the adoption of more institutional reforms. These results appear consistent when some categories of reform are added or subtracted, giving confidence that this model can be applied to a wide range of institutional reforms.

Current theories on institutional change tend to interpret it either as the result of long-term gradual trends, or of disrupting shocks following periods of punctuated equilibrium. Less is known about the moments in which change is more frequent. Focusing on the short-term determinants of reforms of core democratic rules in consolidated democracies, the article shows that proximate shifts in the electoral arena have a distinctive impact on the number of institutional reforms that are adopted in a legislature. Using the empirical and theoretical findings of the literature on electoral reform, the article develops a model tested in statistical analyses aggregating a large sample of institutional reforms in Western European democracies between 1990 and 2010. The results show that rising electoral uncertainty measured by volatility, and the change of preferences of the actors in power measured by the advent of new forces in government lead to the adoption of more institutional reforms. These results appear consistent when some categories of reform are added or subtracted, giving confidence that this model can be applied to a wide range of institutional reforms.

L'article porte sur la question de la fréquence de la réforme des institutions démocratiques dans les démocraties consolidées. Il se fonde sur une base de données comprenant six dimensions des réformes démocratiques entre 1990 et 2010 dans 18 démocraties d'Europe de l'Ouest. On démontre la centralité du contexte politique pour expliquer la fréquence de ces réformes. À long terme, les démocraties où le niveau de soutien politique est le plus faible réforment davantage leurs institutions. À court terme, il apparaît que les réformes sont plus nombreuses dans les législatures précédées par une alternance au pouvoir et une montée de la volatilité électorale. On montre ainsi que les déterminants politiques des réformes démocratiques sont plus pertinents pour expliquer la fréquence des réformes que le degré de contrainte institutionnelle inhérent à chaque système.

International audience ; The economic turmoil that struck Western Europe in the last five years makes it inescapable to reflect about the link between economic and political crisis, and institutional reform. It is important to understand in what context reforms are being put on the agenda, but also to understand what determines their final outcome. This paper focuses on what happens after bundles of reform (i.e. several reforms affecting multiple dimensions of the institutional architecture linked together by the reformers) are being put on the agenda, focusing on three sequences of reform: one in France (reduction of the presidential term and reversal of the electoral calendar, 2000-2001), one in Italy (constitutional and electoral reform of 2005) and one in Ireland (the sequence of political reforms starting in 2011). I identify two types of reform according to the level of support at the beginning of the process: consensual, and divisive. Secondly, I distinguish between majoritarian, supermajoritarian, and externalized processes of reform according to their level of inclusion. I argue that the final outcome depends on the interaction between the nature of reform, and the process chosen to conduct it. I show empirically that the paths leading to successful reforms are different for consensual and divisive reforms. Divisive reforms appear to be driven primarily by self-interest and their outcome to depend on the veto player dynamics and on the ability to build a large coalition of reformers. Consensual reforms lead to credit-claiming strategies. Their outcomes depend on the capacity of the majority of actors to feel able to claim benefits for a popular reform.

International audience ; The economic turmoil that struck Western Europe in the last five years makes it inescapable to reflect about the link between economic and political crisis, and institutional reform. It is important to understand in what context reforms are being put on the agenda, but also to understand what determines their final outcome. This paper focuses on what happens after bundles of reform (i.e. several reforms affecting multiple dimensions of the institutional architecture linked together by the reformers) are being put on the agenda, focusing on three sequences of reform: one in France (reduction of the presidential term and reversal of the electoral calendar, 2000-2001), one in Italy (constitutional and electoral reform of 2005) and one in Ireland (the sequence of political reforms starting in 2011). I identify two types of reform according to the level of support at the beginning of the process: consensual, and divisive. Secondly, I distinguish between majoritarian, supermajoritarian, and externalized processes of reform according to their level of inclusion. I argue that the final outcome depends on the interaction between the nature of reform, and the process chosen to conduct it. I show empirically that the paths leading to successful reforms are different for consensual and divisive reforms. Divisive reforms appear to be driven primarily by self-interest and their outcome to depend on the veto player dynamics and on the ability to build a large coalition of reformers. Consensual reforms lead to credit-claiming strategies. Their outcomes depend on the capacity of the majority of actors to feel able to claim benefits for a popular reform.