Suchergebnisse

People rely on the facial appearance of political candidates when voting. Here, we examine whether the perceived competence, trustworthiness, and attractiveness of male Italian mayoral candidates (n = 150) predict their electoral success. Building on situational leadership theory, we also examine whether associations between apparent traits and electoral success are moderated by contextual factors. Specifically, we test whether trustworthy-looking politicians are more successful in Southern Italy where political corruption is a more salient issue. Across three preregistered studies (N = 470), we find that attractive-looking candidates were more successful. Perceived competence and trustworthiness were not consistently associated with electoral success. Moreover, we do not find evidence that regional variation in corruption moderates the success of trustworthy-looking politicians.

Research on multiparty negotiation has investigated how parties form coalitions to secure payoffs but has not addressed how emotions may affect such coalition decisions. Extending research on bilateral negotiations which has generally argued that it is beneficial to communicate anger, we argue that it constitutes a considerable risk when there are more than two people present at the negotiation table. Using a computer-mediated coalition game we show that communicating anger is a risky strategy in multiparty bargaining. The main findings of three studies were that participants: (1) form negative impressions of players who communicate anger and therefore (2) exclude such players from coalitions and from obtaining a payoff share, but (3) make considerable concessions on those rare occasions that they choose to form a coalition with an angry player, or (4) when they had to form a coalition with an angry player. We discuss the implications of these results for theorizing on emotions, negotiations, and coalition formation.

Reaction times and picture evaluations by 18 adults with hearing loss were compared with those of 18 matched controls during two visual priming tasks. In Task 1, participants reacted to sexual and plant target pictures (while influenced by similar preceding pictures) by pressing "sex" or "plant" buttons. In Task 2, they evaluated target Japanese ideographs (while influenced by preceding positive or negative facial expressions as prime pictures) by pressing "positive" or "negative" buttons. In Task 1, the controls had the faster responses. In Task 2, they showed the usual congruent priming effect during very short prime presentations. Participants with hearing loss showed this effect only during short and long prime presentation times; thus, they were not superior to the controls in picture recognition, instead showing (a) impaired processing of visual information or (b) impaired perceptual-motor skills regarding quick responses to visual information (or both).

"In this study we investigate how outcome valence affects the importance of self-interest and fairness in ultimatum bargaining. In three experiments we systematically study the effect of outcome valence on fairness accessibility, norms, and behavior. Results on all three aspects show strong evidence for the hypothesis that fairness becomes more important and self-interest becomes less important in negative valence bargaining. Fairness accessibility was higher when bargaining involved negative payoffs than when it involved positive payoffs (Experiment 1), the fairness norm was stronger in negatively versus positively valenced bargaining when an identical unequal offer benefiting the allocators was evaluated (Experiment 2), and allocators allocated more to recipients in negative valence bargaining than in positive valence bargaining (Experiment 3). We relate our findings to insights derived from the do-no-harm principle." [author's abstract]

The present research compared interindividual and intergroup coalition processes. We examined whether groups are more likely to form small coalitions than individuals, and whether this tendency would depend on the social value orientation of the coalition party. Consistent with our hypothesis, results revealed that proselfs formed more small coalitions in intergroup settings than in interindividual settings whereas prosocials formed a similar number of small coalitions in both intergroup and interindividual settings. These and complementary findings add credence to the claim that people who are self-oriented are more likely to exclude others to maximize their own payoff and that such processes are especially pronounced in intergroup settings.

In four studies, the authors investigated the individual-oriented versus social-oriented nature of procedural justice effects by comparing fairness-based responses to decision-making procedures among proself versus prosocial oriented individuals. In Studies 1 through 3, we measured participants' social value orientation and manipulated whether or not they were granted or denied voice in a decision-making process. Results consistently revealed that the effects of voice versus no-voice on fairness-based perceptions, emotions, and behavioral intentions were significantly more pronounced for individuals with proself orientations than for individuals with prosocial orientations. These findings were extended in Study 4, a field study in which perceived procedural justice was a stronger predictor of satisfaction and organizational citizenship behaviors among proselfs than among prosocials. These findings suggest that procedural justice effects can be accounted for by self-oriented motives or needs, rather than prosocial motives that are often conceptualized as being associated with justice.