Suchergebnisse

In two judgments, the European Court of Justice has stated that regulations are directly applicable under the EEA Agreement and automatically become part of the internal legal order of the EEA EFTA States.The EFTA Court has taken the opposite position. In legal literature, the ECJ's interpretation of Article 7 EEA has been dismissed as a plain misunderstanding. This paper sides with the ECJ; it shows that a principle of direct applicability is consistent with the wording of Article 7 EEA and that the principles of homogeneity and loyalty underpin the Court's reasoning. Formally, the ECJ's interpretation of Article 7 EEA is not binding on the EFTA Court or the EEA EFTA States. The EFTA Court should however consider whether legal and factual developments justify a revision of its current position. It would serve the interests of the dualist EEA EFTA States to embrace the ECJ's position.

The EEA EFTA States are the only non-EU States that have been allowed, on a regular basis, to participate in the work of EU agencies governing the internal market. Participation in the work of an agency does not include the right to vote, nor are third States automatically bound by decisions enacted by the agency. Participation "in the work" of an EU agency is a way of providing decision-shaping rights in exchange to third countries that are willing to enter into mechanisms that grant the binding effect of agency decisions in their territories. As these mechanisms are intertwined with the attribution of decision-shaping rights, the arrangements for participation in the work of an EU agency become highly complex. The paper identifies and examines four different models for participation. It argues that the direct participation of third countries in EU agencies, with voting rights, would be favourable compared to the current approach.

The reach of free movement within the EU Internal Market and what constitutes a restriction are the topics of this book. For many years the tension between free movement and restrictions have been the subject of intense discussion and controversy, and this includes the constitutional reach of the rights conferred by the Treaty of Lisbon. Anything that makes movement less attractive or more burdensome may constitute a restriction. Restrictions may be justified, but only if proportionate. The reach of free movement is fundamental to the Internal Market, both for the economic constitution and increasingly for individual rights in a European legal order that provides constitutional guarantees for rights, exceeding those of free movement. The interaction between fundamental rights and fundamental freedoms to movement distinguishes the EU legal order from the national legal systems.The book falls into four parts, namely 'The reach of free movement', 'Justifications and Proportionality', 'Fundamental rights', and 'Looking Abroad'. The clear discussion of the fundamentals and dilemmas regarding the subject of this book should prove useful for academics, practitioners, graduate students as well as EU officials and judges wishing to stay updated on the ongoing scholarly debate regarding relevance to case law.Mads Andenas is Professor at the Department of Private Law, University of Oslo and at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, School of Advanced Studies, University of London.Tarjei Bekkedal is Professor at the Centre for European Law, University of Oslo and the Chair of the Norwegian Association for European Law. Luca Pantaleo is a Lecturer in EU law at The Hague University of Applied Science, who obtained a PhD in International and EU Law in 2013 at the University of Macerata in Italy, and who was previously a Senior Researcher at the T.M.C. Asser Institute and Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Luxembourg. Mads Andenas is Professor at the Department of Private Law, University of Oslo and at the Institute of Advanced Legal Studies, School of Advanced Studies, University of London. Tarjei Bekkedal is Professor at the Centre for European Law, University of Oslo and the Chair of the Norwegian Association for European Law. Luca Pantaleo is a Lecturer in EU law at The Hague University of Applied Science, who obtained a PhD in International and EU Law in 2013 at the University of Macerata in Italy, and who was previously a Senior Researcher at the T.M.C. Asser Institute and Postdoctoral researcher at the University of Luxembourg.

The third volume in the series Legal Issues of Services of General Interest, this book examines and analyzes a set of research questions on the most recent developments in the emergence of services of general interest as a distinct European Union concept.

This study analyzes TTIP, its implications for Norway and Norway's trade policy choices. TTIP will hardly be concluded under Obama's presidency, but the agreement could become a reality within a few years. TTIP aims at comprehensive cooperation in the regulatory area. In the short term there will be limited harmonization of standards but regulatory cooperation between different systems. In the long term, the goal is stronger cooperation in the regulatory area. TTIP will from what we know not lead to a lowering of European health regulations or a "race to the bottom". If TTIP is realized and Norway remains outside, the EEA Agreement will be little affected and the overall economic impact is moderate. If Norway joins TTIP, there will be a significant real income gain, with estimates ranging from 2236 to 6772 NOK per capita in the various scenarios. There is considerable variation across sectors. With Norway outside TTIP there will be a moderate negative impact for a majority of the sectors, especially some manufacturing sectors that face tougher competition in the EU and USA export markets. The oil industry will benefit from increased demand and higher prices. If Norway joins TTIP, a clear majority of industries will benefit; especially business services and a number of other service industries. The public sector gains from TTIP, mainly due to cheaper inputs. TTIP will contribute to the dismantling of import protection for Norwegian agriculture and without compensating measures, production and employment will be reduced. TTIP will still allow some import protection and this margin of maneuver, which depends on future negotiations, is important for the outcome. With a larger margin of manoeuvre and unchanged budgetarty support, most of Norway's agriculture can be maintained. With less margin of manoeuvre, it will be more challenging. Norwegian accession to TTIP may occur in the form of a standard trade agreement in which Norway or EFTA are formally equal to the EU and the United States. Alternatively, Norway may participate in a European pillar as in today's "Open Skies" agreement on air traffic. If TTIP succeeds in establishing comprehensive regulatory cooperation, the latter solution is most likely. Such a solution implies that Norway will become more closely integrated with the European Union also in trade policy towards third countries. Norwegian entry into TTIP implies that we have to accept the established rules and negotiate bilaterally with the EU and the USA on market access. The negotiations with the USA will apply to all aspects of market access, while negotiations with the EU will apply only to areas in which the EEA agreement is not already deeper. The negotiations with the EU for TTIP entry will thus include, among other issues, tariffs for seafood and agriculture. As an alternative to membership in TTIP, Norway or EFTA may initiate a trade agreement with the USA. Such an agreement would likely be less extensive in the regulatory area. Such an agreement will also provide an economic gain for Norway, but less than accession to TTIP. For Norway as a whole, accession to TTIP creates a real income gain between 12.5 and 35 billion NOK according to various scenarios, while a free trade agreement with the United States results in a gain of about 7.4 billion NOK. TTIP also includes negotiations on so-called Investor-State Dispute Settlement (ISDS), whereby foreign-owned companies can sue a state if they are unfairly or inappropriately treated. Such rights also exist in national law but international tribunals have to some extent extended the interpretation of what is considered unfair. The European Union has proposed a solution in TTIP with a permanent court as well as rules that discipline the interpretation of the principles, and thus avoids that ISDS unduly interferes into the states' "right to regulate". This and many other issues are analysed in this report and six background papers.