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AbstractUsing the distinctions among the convexity, magnification, and translation effects, we identify the pertinent parameters and examine empirically the relation between cash holdings and option‐based managerial compensation. We show that changes in delta reduce the effects of magnification and convexity on managerial risk aversion. We also provide evidence that there is a negative relation between the option‐based incentives delta and vega and cash holdings. These results are robust when incentives are extended to include all executive board members and when the sample is broken down according to different risk characteristics.

We investigate the impact of COVID-19 on 42,401 UK SMEs and how government intervention affects their capability to survive the pandemic. The results show that, without governmental mitigation schemes, 59% of UK SMEs report negative earnings and that their residual life is reduced from 164 to 139 days. The analysis shows that government support scheme reduces the number of SMEs with negative earnings to 49% and allows extending the residual life for SMEs with negative earnings to 194 days. In addition, the support scheme reduces the number of jobs at risk in our sample by around 20%. However, our results suggest that weaker firms benefit more than strong ones. Besides, industries that are worst hit by COVID-19 are not those that benefit most from the government support scheme. We ascribe this result to the fact that the schemes do not discriminate between those firms that deserve support and those that do not deserve it.

We investigate the impact of COVID-19 on 42,401 UK SMEs and how government intervention affects their capability to survive the pandemic. The results show that, without governmental mitigation schemes, 59% of UK SMEs report negative earnings and that their residual life is reduced from 164 to 139 days. The analysis shows that government support scheme reduces the number of SMEs with negative earnings to 49% and allows extending the residual life for SMEs with negative earnings to 194 days. In addition, the support scheme reduces the number of jobs at risk in our sample by around 20%. However, our results suggest that weaker firms benefit more than strong ones. Besides, industries that are worst hit by COVID-19 are not those that benefit most from the government support scheme. We ascribe this result to the fact that the schemes do not discriminate between those firms that deserve support and those that do not deserve it.

AbstractThis study seeks to understand how political connections affect firm performance. Using a hand‐collected dataset of Pakistani firms from 2008–2014, our firm fixed effects and Heckman two‐stage regression results show that connected firms outperform those without political ties. Moreover, we show channels through which political benefits are realized in terms of greater access to debt, lower financing costs and lower tax rates. These benefits are found to be particularly large when firms are connected to politicians who held political positions most recently and firms connected through their owners. Finally, we do not find evidence for differences in political favours across regulated and unregulated industries.

This study seeks to understand how political connections affect firm performance. Using a hand‐collected dataset of Pakistani firms from 2008–2014, our firm fixed effects and Heckman two‐stage regression results show that connected firms outperform those without political ties. Moreover, we show channels through which political benefits are realized in terms of greater access to debt, lower financing costs and lower tax rates. These benefits are found to be particularly large when firms are connected to politicians who held political positions most recently and firms connected through their owners. Finally, we do not find evidence for differences in political favours across regulated and unregulated industries

This paper investigates whether and how political connections influence managerial financial decisions. Our study reveals that those firms that have a politician on its board of directors are highly leveraged, use more long-term debt, hold large excess cash and are associated with low quality financial reporting compared to their non-connected counterparts. These effects escalate with the strength of the connected politician and whether he or his party is in power. The winning party effect is observed to be stronger than victory by the politician himself. Overall, our paper provides strong evidence that political connection is a two-edged sword. It is indeed a valuable resource for connected firms, but it comes at a cost of higher agency problems.

AbstractWe compare the performance of a sample of U.K.‐based socially responsible investment (SRI) funds with similar conventional funds using a matched‐pair analysis based on size, age, investment universe, and fund management company (FMC). We find that both the SRI and conventional funds outperform the market index about 50% of the time, even after fees. Subsample tests show that the SRI funds in our sample perform better in the pre‐ and postfinancial crisis periods but underperform during the financial crisis period. Importantly, we find that the FMC plays a major role in the outperformance of both SRI and conventional funds.