Science system: international benchmarking
In: Report 96,2
39 Ergebnisse
Sortierung:
In: Report 96,2
In: Naval War College review, Band 57, Heft 1, S. 157-159
ISSN: 0028-1484
In: Naval War College review, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 170-172
ISSN: 0028-1484
In: Naval War College review, Band 54, Heft 3, S. 186-187
ISSN: 0028-1484
In: R & D Enterprise, Asia Pacific, Band 3, Heft 3, S. 18-23
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 123-141
ISSN: 1743-937X
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 123-141
ISSN: 0140-2390
In: Cass series: Naval policy and history 19
In: War in history, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 115-126
ISSN: 1477-0385
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 38, Heft 7, S. 1024-1044
ISSN: 1743-937X
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 38, Heft 7, S. 1024
ISSN: 0140-2390
In: War in history, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 381-409
ISSN: 1477-0385
This article examines Nicholas Lambert's criticisms of the article 'Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914' ( War in History 18, 2011), which challenged revisionist claims that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of implementing a 'naval revolution' based on radical ideas attributed to Admiral Sir John Fisher. It demonstrates that Lambert's criticisms are unfounded, and provides additional evidence to support an alternative interpretation of British naval policy in the period 1912–14. Important changes were undoubtedly under way on the eve of the First World War, but the revisionists exaggerate Fisher's influence and oversimplify an inherently complex decision-making process. The Admiralty's plan to substitute torpedo craft for some of the battleships in its 1914 programme was intended to bolster a conservative strategy, and the changes under consideration were essentially evolutionary in nature.
In: War in history, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 106-107
ISSN: 1477-0385
In: War in history, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 333-356
ISSN: 1477-0385
This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of instituting a 'naval revolution' based on the ideas of Admiral Sir John Fisher. Winston Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, was not prepared to rely on Fisher's concept of 'flotilla defence' in the North Sea, as revisionists contend. Nor did he wish to send capital ships to distant waters. He increasingly looked to submarines to protect Britain's interests in the Mediterranean, a secondary theatre, but he still believed that Britain must maintain a preponderance of strength over Germany in capital ships in the North Sea. Churchill's strategic views were generally conservative. He hoped that new designs or new technologies would one day allow submarines to supplant battleships, and he actively supported measures that might help to make this possible. But there is no evidence that he and his naval advisers were ready to gamble on a radical departure in force structure or naval strategy on the eve of the First World War.