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Naval mutinies of the twentieth century: an international perspective
In: Cass series: Naval policy and history 19
Contested Waters: The Royal Navy in the Fisher Era
In: War in history, Band 23, Heft 1, S. 115-126
ISSN: 1477-0385
The Myth of a Naval Revolution by Proxy: Lord Fisher's Influence on Winston Churchill's Naval Policy, 1911–1914
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 38, Heft 7, S. 1024-1044
ISSN: 1743-937X
The Myth of a Naval Revolution by Proxy: Lord Fisher's Influence on Winston Churchill's Naval Policy, 1911-1914
In: The journal of strategic studies, Band 38, Heft 7, S. 1024
ISSN: 0140-2390
On Standards and Scholarship: A Response to Nicholas Lambert
In: War in history, Band 20, Heft 3, S. 381-409
ISSN: 1477-0385
This article examines Nicholas Lambert's criticisms of the article 'Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911–1914' ( War in History 18, 2011), which challenged revisionist claims that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of implementing a 'naval revolution' based on radical ideas attributed to Admiral Sir John Fisher. It demonstrates that Lambert's criticisms are unfounded, and provides additional evidence to support an alternative interpretation of British naval policy in the period 1912–14. Important changes were undoubtedly under way on the eve of the First World War, but the revisionists exaggerate Fisher's influence and oversimplify an inherently complex decision-making process. The Admiralty's plan to substitute torpedo craft for some of the battleships in its 1914 programme was intended to bolster a conservative strategy, and the changes under consideration were essentially evolutionary in nature.
Book Review: Anglo-American Naval Relations, 1919–1939 Edited by Michael Simpson
In: War in history, Band 19, Heft 1, S. 106-107
ISSN: 1477-0385
Sir John Fisher's Naval Revolution Reconsidered: Winston Churchill at the Admiralty, 1911-1914
In: War in history, Band 18, Heft 3, S. 333-356
ISSN: 1477-0385
This article challenges claims by revisionist historians that in July 1914 the Royal Navy was on the verge of instituting a 'naval revolution' based on the ideas of Admiral Sir John Fisher. Winston Churchill, the first lord of the Admiralty, was not prepared to rely on Fisher's concept of 'flotilla defence' in the North Sea, as revisionists contend. Nor did he wish to send capital ships to distant waters. He increasingly looked to submarines to protect Britain's interests in the Mediterranean, a secondary theatre, but he still believed that Britain must maintain a preponderance of strength over Germany in capital ships in the North Sea. Churchill's strategic views were generally conservative. He hoped that new designs or new technologies would one day allow submarines to supplant battleships, and he actively supported measures that might help to make this possible. But there is no evidence that he and his naval advisers were ready to gamble on a radical departure in force structure or naval strategy on the eve of the First World War.
The Royal Navy and the Lessons of the Invergordon Mutiny
In: War in history, Band 12, Heft 1, S. 75-92
ISSN: 1477-0385
This article examines the Royal Navy's efforts to understand the underlying causes of the Invergordon mutiny. Previous studies of this event have tended to focus on the Admiralty's attempt to conceal its own failures by finding scapegoats in the Atlantic Fleet. However, the navy's treatment of the senior personnel involved in the mutiny is less important than its efforts to identify and correct systemic problems within the service that were believed to be undermining the foundations of naval discipline. The Invergordon mutiny was regarded by most naval officers as evidence of a collective failure by the officer corps to gain the confidence of the lower deck. Class tensions undoubtedly existed within the navy during this period, but they were not a significant factor in the mutiny, and were not regarded as matters requiring the navy's urgent attention. Instead, the Admiralty sought ways to develop the leadership skills of its junior officers and non-commissioned officers so that future crises could be dealt with before they escalated to the point of mutiny.
Navies in Modern World History (review)
In: The journal of military history, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 285-287
ISSN: 1543-7795
Review: Navies in Modern World History (review)
In: The journal of military history, Band 69, Heft 1, S. 285-286
ISSN: 0899-3718
Book Reviews: Churchill: A Study in Greatness by Geoffrey Best
In: Defence studies: journal of military and strategic studies, Band 1, Heft 2, S. 149
ISSN: 1470-2436
"Our Most Exposed Outpost": Hong Kong and British Far Eastern Strategy, 1921-1941
In: The Journal of Military History, Band 60, Heft 1, S. 61
Decision in the Atlantic: the Allies and the longest campaign of the Second World War
In: New perspectives on the Second World War
The Atlantic war, 1939-1945: the case for a new paradigm / Marc Milner -- The view from the top: Winston Churchill, British grand strategy, and the Battle of the Atlantic / Christopher M. Bell -- "Immobilized by reason of repair" and by the choice "between Lithgow and Hitler" : class conflict in Britain's wartime merchant shipping repair yards / Kevin Smith -- Brothers in arms : the Admiralty, the Air Ministry, and the Battle of the Atlantic / Tim Benbow -- The Fleet Air Arm and trade defense, 1939-1944 / Ben Jones -- All should be "A" teams: the development of group anti-submarine escort training in the British and Canadian navies during the Atlantic campaign / James Goldrick -- "A most disagreeable problem" : British perceptions of the Kriegsmarine's aircraft carrier capability / Marcus Faulkner -- Meat exports and the limits of wartime multilateralism : Secretary of Agriculture Claude Wickard's response to America's changing global role / Kevin Smith -- The other critical convoy battles of 1943 : the eclipse of the Schnellboote in the English Channel and the North Sea / G. H. Bennett -- The cruise of U-188 : Special Intelligence and the "liquidation" of Group Monsoon, 1943-1944 / David Kohnen.
At the crossroads between peace and war: the London naval conference of 1930
"This volume provides fresh perspectives on the international strategic environment between the two world wars. At London in 1930, the United States, Great Britain, and Japan concluded an important arms control agreement to manage the international competition in naval armaments. In particular, the major naval powers reached agreement about how many heavy cruisers they could possess. Hailed at the time as a signal achievement in international cooperation, the success at London proved short-lived. France and Italy refused to participate in the treaty. Even worse followed, as within a few years growing antagonisms among the great powers manifested itself in the complete breakdown of the interwar arms control regime negotiated at London. The resulting naval arms race would set Japan and the United States on a collision course toward Pearl Harbor. "--